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The theoretical and empirical underpinnings of contemporary modernization and 
postmaterialism literature strongly imply an insidious Catch-22 dilemma for contemporary 
authoritarian regimes.  If such regimes fail to deliver economic growth, they lose their key basis 
of popular support and are removed from power.  If such regimes are successful in effecting 
heightened socio-economic growth, they unwittingly unleash an attendant set of societal changes 
that render their autocratic mode of rule increasingly unpalatable to the very population that has 
so keenly benefited from the economic goods that they have provided.  The causal mechanism 
linking economic failure with regime demise in the first scenario is rather straightforward; in the 
second scenario it is the emergence and expansion of postmodern “self-expression” values – with 
postmaterialist values emphasizing emancipation and personal choice at their core – that serve as 
the causal linkage between economic prosperity and popular demand for political liberalization.  
The current study has provided theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that individuals’ 
perception of the relative level of external threat facing their nation has potentially profound 
consequences for their measured levels of postmaterialist values, with higher levels of perceived 
threat/insecurity tending to be associated with lower levels of overall postmaterialism and lower 
 v 
 
levels of threat/insecurity tending to be associated with higher levels of postmaterialism.  As the 
findings in the current study strongly indicate, citizens’ perception of the extent to which the 
relative power and prestige of their nation as a whole are either threatened or assured is likely to 
also have a strong impact on their ordering of the values priorities contained within the 
postmaterialism question batteries.  Yet long-term predictions presented in the extant 
modernization literature regarding the development of postmaterialist/self-expression values in 
economically-developing authoritarian societies – and the increasing demands for 
democratization that they are presumed to bring – have generally made virtually no reference to 
issues of critical issues of national pride, national identity or national threat.  The findings of the 
current study thus indicate that such predictions need to be re-visited and possibly revised, with a 
broader set of societal factors, indicators and phenomena taken into account. 
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CHAPTER ONE: MODERNIZATION, VALUE CHANGE AND REGIME TRANSITION 
 The End of History and the “Damned” Dilemma 
One strong conclusion that appears to have been reached in the global studies and 
democratization literature over the past two decades can be summed up by this quote from 
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005), who observe that “although Francis Fukuyama1 
may have exaggerated in calling this ‘The End of History,’ we do seem to be living in a 
genuinely new era in which the main alternatives to democracy have been discredited” (p. 264).  
Larry Diamond (2008) similarly notes that as “the prevailing ideas about what constitutes a 
legitimate form of rule have over the past decades become increasingly democratic ideas, it has 
become ever more difficult to maintain straightforward authoritarian rule,” and, as a logical 
consequence, leaders of autocratic regimes have increasingly been forced to “justify themselves 
in a large measure based on their performance,” particularly in the economic sphere (p. 90).   
Following this, there is a general assumption running through the literature that citizens 
living in non-democratic political settings calculate their level of support for (or opposition to) 
the existing regime on what Inglehart (2000) terms the “What have you done for me lately?” 
criterion of current government performance.  In other words, modern authoritarian regimes are 
viewed as largely incapable of fostering and enjoying “diffuse support” of the type that Easton 
(1965) described, which Inglehart defines as the “generalized perception that the political system 
                                                 
1
 Fukuyama, Francis.  1992.  The End of History and the Last Man.  The Free Press. 
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is inherently good, quite apart from its current outputs” (2000, p. 93).  Thus, autocratic regimes 
that don’t deliver the goods – especially the economic ones – quickly lose one of their only bases 
of legitimacy and popular support.   
But as Huntington (1991) observed in his study of the “third wave” of global democratization 
of the latter half of the twentieth century, authoritarian regimes in the modern era have been 
damned as much by their success as by their failure.  As Diamond (2008) puts it, a contemporary 
dictatorship faces a “classic catch-22,” in that if it indeed manages to create and sustain 
economic growth, it does so at the cost of its own demise, as “over time it transforms its society 
in ways that make authoritarian rule even more dispensable – and longed to be dispensed with – 
in favor of democratic rule” (p. 90).   
Why would this necessarily be the case?  The close link between development and 
democracy has strong theoretical and empirical support in the literature, dating back at least to 
the late Seymour Martin Lipset’s landmark 1959 study on “Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy,” in which he concluded that the wealthier a country the greater the probability that it 
would sustain democratic rule.  The empirical foundations of this axiomatic relationship have 
since been affirmed and extended through numerous studies, most notably in the comprehensive 
analyses of Adam Przeworski et al. (2000).  The strong correlation between is democracy and 
development is, at least in the aggregate, quite robust.   
Meanwhile, Inglehart et al.’s emancipative values paradigm – a revival of a line of 
investigation dating back at least to Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s classic The Civic 
Culture – has made a critical contribution to our understanding of the precise causal linkages 
between economic modernization and political democratization.  As Welzel, Inglehart, and 
Klingemann (2003) observe, the structural changes brought on by economic growth tend to 
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increase social mobility and diversify human activity in ways that foster the development of new 
value priorities and orientations, which have alternatively been termed ‘civic cultural’ values 
(Almond and Verba 1963); ‘individual modernity’ (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Inkeles 1983); 
‘postmaterialistic values’ (Inglehart 1977; 1990), and ‘self-expression values’ (Inglehart 1997; 
Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  Whatever the precise terminology, 
Inglehart and his colleagues note that the common features of these emancipative values are 
“greater tolerance of human diversity, higher life satisfaction and a stronger emphasis on 
individual freedom” (Welzel et al. 2003, p. 348) as well as “high priority on self-expression and 
participation in decisionmaking” (Inglehart 2000, p. 92). 
It is not difficult to appreciate the theoretical and practical consequences of this phenomenon 
for economic-growth oriented authoritarian regimes.  According to Welzel et al. (2000), as 
citizens living under autocratic political rule in a modernizing economy come to experience and 
enjoy increased personal resources (e.g. income, education, information) and the new 
“emancipative orientations” that their newly-won personal autonomy brings, they will 
increasingly come not only to regard “authoritarian rule as an illegitimate restriction of their 
rights” (p. 348), but also to feel that they themselves possess both the resources and the 
prerogative to demand greater political liberalization and, ultimately, democratization.  Indeed, 
Inglehart (2000) goes so far as to opine that the only sure-fire way for an authoritarian regime to 
head off democratic aspirations amongst its citizenry is to forego industrialization altogether. 
In sum, modernization theory and contemporary democratization studies imply that modern 
autocratic regimes – for example, the People’s Republic of China today – face a "damned if they 
do, damned if they don't" dilemma.  If such regimes fail to deliver provide economic growth, 
they lose one of their few claims to legitimacy, their support collapses, and they fall.  On the 
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other hand, if they do deliver the “economic goods,” the resulting prosperity and socio-economic 
advancement fosters a more sophisticated, complex, and participatory society that comes to 
demand a greater say in how the country is run – resulting in popular demands for greater 
political liberalization and, ultimately, democratization.  Authoritarian regimes would thus 
appear to sow the seeds of their own destruction – one way or another. 
The present study takes no issue with the central premises and findings of the modernization 
school, namely that economic modernization tends to bring about significant transformations in 
citizens’ value orientations, and that these value priority shifts are a key causal linkage between 
national prosperity on the one hand and national democratization on the other.  Indeed, the 
political science community generally and the comparative politics/democratization literatures in 
particular are indebted to the efforts of such scholars as Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues 
(Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990, 1997; 2000; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Welzel, Inglehart and 
Klingemann 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) in reviving the political culture research program 
of Almond and Verba (1963), most notably through their championing of ambitious global 
public opinion survey projects such as the World Values Survey.
2
   
That being said, modernization theory (and its “damned if they do” corollary predictions for 
development-minded authoritarian regimes) only captures part of the story.  Critically, the 
existing literature overemphasizes economic performance as the central – if not sole – basis of 
popular support for autocratic regimes, to the exclusion of other types of “goods” that citizens 
might value.  Specifically, modernization theory, to its detriment, makes little allowance for the 
influences of national pride and national threat in shaping citizens’ attitudes towards authority, as 
well as their aspirations for greater political liberalization. Modernization and its effects are 
                                                 
2
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better understood once we integrate the simple (but oft-neglected) observation that national 
economic development does not take place in a vacuum, but rather occurs within the context of 
an increasingly complex and interconnected international environment.   
 Confucianism or Convergence? 
The modernization school has often been pitted against what might be called the “civilization 
school,” most closely associated with Samuel P. Huntington and his 1996 The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which the author argues that, following the 
end of the Cold War interlude – and despite the “modernizing” or “westernizing” influences of 
industrialization – the core, persistent cultural differences of the major world civilizations have 
again revealed themselves.  According to Huntington, these cultural zones (e.g. “Orthodox,” 
“Sinic,” “Hindu”) have their roots primarily, though not exclusively, in the historically-dominant 
religious traditions of their respective geographical areas.  One strong and controversial 
implication of Huntington’s “civilizations” hypothesis is that countries outside of the historically 
Protestant West may be culturally disadvantaged in their efforts to establish and maintain liberal 
democratic institutions in the western mold.  Although Huntington’s name is the one perhaps 
most closely associated with this perspective, other scholars such as Lawrence Harrison (1985, 
1992, 1997) and Lucien Pye (1985) have also argued compellingly for the role of countries’ 
distinct historical-cultural legacies in shaping the unique trajectories of their economic and 
political development.   
Some of the strongest arguments for and against the notion that an existing historical-
cultural heritage can place constraints on the potential for economic modernization to foster the 
development of democratic values and institutions have been made in what can be termed the 
“Asian Values” debate.  On one side, scholars such as Lucien Pye (1985) argue that Confucian-
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influenced Asian societies may be handicapped in their adoption of western-style democratic 
institutions by such persistent cultural characteristics as strong psychological tendencies to defer 
to authority and to avoid conflict and confrontation.  On the other side, writers such as Larry 
Diamond (2008) point to a wealth of recent global public opinion data – indicating that citizens 
of East Asian societies are no more in favor of strong authority and no less supportive of 
democratic institutions than their counterparts in other regions – and contend that aspirations for 
democracy and individual freedom are universal, and not subject to limitation by so-called 
“Asian” or “Confucian” values. 
The Asian values controversy – and the broader debate between the modernization and 
civilization schools of thought – can be characterized in terms of what Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
refer to as value convergence and value persistence, with the modernization approach 
emphasizing the former and the civilization literature emphasizing the latter.  At the same time, it 
is worth noting here that Inglehart himself tested Huntington’s “civilizations” thesis utilizing 
multiple waves of cross-national public opinion data from the World Values Survey, and found 
that it did indeed have some merit: 
“The evidence suggests that economic development tends to move societies in a common 
direction, regardless of their cultural heritage.  Nevertheless, distinctive cultural zones continue 
to persist two centuries after the industrial revolution was launched.”  (Inglehart 2000, p. 88) 
Similarly, the findings of Nathan (2007) are also helpful in squaring the circle of this debate.  
Utilizing data from the two most recent waves of the East Asian Barometer (EAB) survey for his 
analysis, Nathan determined that an “interlinked cultural syndrome” of traditional values does 
exist in the East Asian-Pacific region (e.g. deference to parental authority, preference for 
avoiding direct confrontation), and furthermore found that citizens with higher levels of such 
traditionalism invariably exhibit lower levels of support for democratic values and principles.  At 
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the same time, Nathan also concluded that economic modernization in the region is serving to 
erode traditional social values – and thus promote the embrace of democratic values. 
This debate surrounding the rival hypotheses of value convergence (the modernization 
approach) and value persistence (the civilization school) is certainly not without merit, and the 
abundance of cross-national and global public opinion data that have become available to 
scholars thanks to such ambitious survey programs as the World Values Survey and the East 
Barometer are now enabling researchers to conduct much more in-depth and sophisticated 
analyses of these issues.  At the same time, I would argue here that this convergence vs. 
persistence debate, and particularly its “Asian Values” corollary, is not helpful in addressing the 
modernization school’s above-mentioned neglect of issues of national attachment and national 
threat.  If anything, these debates serve to distract attention from these promising lines of inquiry, 
and thus add only further to the neglect of critically important and dynamic factors impacting the 
processes of modernization, value change, and political transformation taking place in countries 
of great academic and global interest today – most notably, the People’s Republic of China. 
I <3 China 
The People’s Republic of China is arguably the most outstanding example of a development-
oriented authoritarian regime in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, and thus it is perhaps no 
surprise that the modernization school reserves some of its strongest “damned if you do” 
predictions for this country.  Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, writing in 2005, asserted 
that given China’s current and projected rates of economic growth, a shift from “survival” to 
“self-expression” values on the part of the majority of the Chinese population will occur within 
the next two decades, bringing with it a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.  Henry 
Rowen, writing in 2007, predicted that, based on projections of per capita income growth likely 
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to occur in China over the first quarter of this century (and the corresponding shifts in socio-
demographic patterns and value orientations), China will have effected a transition to democracy 
by the year 2025.  A similar view is proposed by Larry Diamond (2008), who, drawing directly 
on Inglehart and Rowen’s above data and analysis, has predicted that “in 2025, India will have 
essentially the same political system that it has today, and China will not.”  (p. 237) 
What is perhaps most striking about these strong predictions for China’s future political 
trajectory is that the data and analyses offered to support them include little to no investigation – 
or, often, even mention – of the phenomena of Chinese national identity and national attachment.  
Given the neglect of issues of national affect and attachment in the modernization literature, 
noted above, the lack of attention paid to these issues in the case of China (or any other country) 
should perhaps come as no surprise.  Yet given also the tremendously important role ascribed to 
modern Chinese nationalism by a variety of sources (international relations and foreign policy 
studies, scholarship on Chinese domestic politics, and journalistic and editorial conventional 
wisdom), the modernization literature’s general omission of discussion of this topic is especially 
conspicuous in this instance – particularly in light of the confident predictions, above, that 
researchers in this field have offered in regard to China’s long-term political destiny.  
At the same time, analyses that have addressed the issue of Chinese nationalism have often 
provided in-depth and insightful description and analysis of the beliefs and behavior of Chinese 
elites – particularly those directly involved in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy (Zhao 
1997, Christensen 2004, Bernstein and Munro 2004, Gries 2005) – but have at the same time 
tended to relegate the question of nationalistic attitudes of the general Chinese public to 
anecdotes and assertion rather than comprehensive empirical investigation.  Meanwhile, those 
studies that have looked at nationalism at the non-elite level in China have tended to focus on 
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only extreme instances of patriotic fervor and anti-foreign sentiment, as in the case of the May 
1999 protests following the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (Zhao 2003).  
Little attention has been paid to national attachment in China as an underlying, enduring socio-
psychological phenomenon, let alone its impact on the process of value change as described by 
modernization/postmaterialist theory.   
No Postmaterialists in Foxholes? 
Of critical importance to this endeavor of bridging the gap between modernization/ 
postmaterialist theory on the one side and the nationalism/patriotism literature on the other – in 
both China and beyond – is an investigation of the impact of national threat on the 
modernization/value transformation dynamic (i.e. economic development  postmodern values 
 regime change).  Recent research on authoritarianism has emphasized the critical role of 
perceived external threat in activating authoritarian predispositions and making them politically 
relevant, translating into such “democracy unfriendly” phenomena as decreased tolerance of 
minority groups (Feldman and Stenner 1997), increased preference for social order over 
individual freedom (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Huddy et al. 2005), heightened opposition to 
gay rights policies (Hetherington and Weiler 2005), increased support for military spending and 
military solutions to international problems (Hetherington and Weiler 2005; Feldman and 
Stenner 1997; Huddy et al. 2005), and decreased criticism of existing governmental authority 
(Huddy et al. 2005).  Yet, despite these strong and robust findings – which would appear to 
suggest strong obstacles for the development of effective democracy in a nation that perceives 
high levels of external threat – national threat remains a critically under-theorized and under-
investigated issue in the modernization/democratization research program. 
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This general neglect of national affect and national threat in the modernization literature is 
particularly glaring in light of the fact that the primary instruments utilized within this research 
program to gauge the development of “modern” or “emancipative” values – namely, the 4-item 
and 12-item postmaterialism question batteries developed by Inglehart et al. (Inglehart 1971, 
1977) – are, as the findings presented in this study will demonstrate, themselves quite sensitive 
to citizens’ perceptions of the degree to which the external international environment is either 
threatening and hostile to, or supportive and respectful of, the interests, identity and integrity of 
their own nation-state.  Failure to acknowledge the existence of such contextual effects – 
particularly in the case of countries in which citizens may perceive high levels of 
societal/national threat, such as the People’s Republic of China – has the potential to seriously 
impede both our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of modernization and value 
transformation, as well as our attempts to measure and predict value changes and their influences 
on political liberalization/democratization at the national level.     
Is Postmaterialism Patriotic? 
It is the central premise of this study that if a country’s citizens have even a modicum of 
regard for the prestige and relative power of their homeland in the international order, then 
perceptions of a hostile and threatening global environment may have profound consequences for 
political value change and popular demand for political liberalization (or lack thereof).  Taking 
the modern People’s Republic of China as the primary case for analysis, this paper presents 
findings and analysis strongly indicating that modernization theory can be greatly enriched by 
drawing upon theoretical and empirical insights from the nationalism/patriotism literature, as 
well as recent developments in the authoritarianism research program vis-à-vis the dynamic 
relationship between perceptions of societal-level threat and the manifestation of authoritarian 
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social and political attitudes.  Accordingly, once we allow for the roles that national attachment 
and perceptions of national threat may play in the processes of popular value change and 
political transformation, it becomes clear that a development-minded authoritarian regime may 
not be quite as “damned” as it first appeared – or that, at the very least, the question of when an 
modernizing authoritarian regime will find itself damned for its efforts becomes a much more 
interesting and complex one.   
 Chapter Outlines 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. 
Chapter 2, “Postmaterialism and its Discontents,” provides an overview of the theoretical 
underpinnings of (and empirical support for) modernization/postmaterialist values theory, 
focusing primarily on the investigations of such scholars as Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel, 
and their colleagues, into the role of postmodern/postmaterialist values as an intervening variable 
or between economic growth on the one hand and political democratization on the other.   This 
chapter also includes a broad survey of the most fundamental critiques of the postmaterialist 
values paradigm’s theoretical foundations and empirical findings, with a particular focus on 
issues related to the operationalization and measurement of its key concepts. 
In Chapter 3, entitled “Is Postmaterialism Patriotic?” I expand upon several key critiques of 
modernization/postmaterialist value theory highlighted in Chapter 2, offer an investigation of the 
conceptual and empirical linkages between postmaterialist values, national attachment and 
authoritarianism, and propose a new approach to modernization and value transformation as 
processes that occur within a broader international environment.  Of particular focus here 
(following Feldman and Stenner 1997 and Hetherington and Weiler 2005) is the role of 
perceived threat to the nation-state – whether internal or external – in both driving nationalist and 
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authoritarian sentiments and in making them more politically relevant.  I also call upon findings 
and insights from authoritarianism-threat literature to suggest refinements to the political 
behavior literature’s approach to, and conceptualization of, the phenomena of national affect and 
attachment.  This chapter concludes with a formal statement of my hypotheses for testing in the 
subsequent chapters.  
In Chapter 4, “Chinese Nationalism and National Threat” I provide a brief overview of the 
major themes and findings in the extant literature on modern Chinese nationalism, national 
attachment and national identity.  This examination of the literature is utilized primarily as a 
means through which to identify the types of perceived threats at the national level to which the 
average Chinese citizen would be the most sensitive, and thus the most likely to produce the type 
of authoritarian-nationalistic reactions that would tend to result in lower levels of 
postmaterialism as measured by the values priority batteries.  I conclude this chapter with a 
review of the findings from a preliminary survey conducted among Chinese university students 
in Guangzhou in the fall of 2009 to gauge emotional reactions to a selection of media images and 
news stories, as pre-testing for their use as “national threat” and “national assurance” 
experimental treatments in the main survey that is the focus of Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 5, “No Postmaterialists in Foxholes: Postmaterialism, National Threat and 
National Assurance in the People’s Republic of China,” I  present findings and analysis from the 
2010 Chinese University Students Values Survey, a public opinion survey incorporating 
experimental treatments (arrived at through the pre-testing survey discussed in Chapter 4) aimed 
at testing the impact of threatening (or reassuring) experimental stimuli on respondents’ 
measured levels of postmaterialist values.   The results presented here are argued to provide 
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strong empirical support for the refinements to modernization/postmaterialist theory (and related 
hypotheses) suggested in the previous chapters.   
Chapter 6 provides a summary and review of the findings from the previous sections, a 
general discussion of the key themes and issues raised and addressed, and a discussion of 
possible directions for future research into these areas.  In the first part of the chapter I focus on 
the general implications of the current study’s findings for the conceptual and empirical 
foundations of the modernization/emancipative values paradigm and the “damned if they do, 
damned if they don’t” corollary that it implies for authoritarian regimes.  In the latter half of the 
chapter I discuss some of the ramifications of these findings for political trends in the People’s 
Republic of China (the substantive case from which these findings were derived) as well as 
prospects for Chinese democratization in the context of an international environment that may be 
increasing ill-at-ease with the realities of Chinese modernization. 
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CHAPTER TWO: POSTMATERIALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Postmodern Values and Democratization 
The core proposition of classic modernization theory is summed up neatly in Lipset’s (1959, p. 
68) observation that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy.”  As noted in the previous chapter, the major contribution of the post-modern values 
research agenda of Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel and others has been to identify and 
elaborate the key causal mechanism lying between socioeconomic development on one hand and 
democratization on the other – value transformation.  As Inglehart and Welzel (2006, p.2) 
themselves observe, there now exists “a massive body of cross-national data demonstrating that 
(1) socioeconomic modernization, (2) a cultural shift toward rising emphasis on self-expression 
values, and (3) democratization, all reflect a single underlying process.”   
It is also worth noting that another key contribution of the post-modern values paradigm to 
modernization theory has been to fix the arrow of causality from development to democracy, and 
not the other way around.  As Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) observe, economic 
modernization within a given country unleashes an interrelated “bundle of processes,” such as 
increased educational and information resources, higher incomes, increased urbanization and job 
specialization, which in turn precipitate the emergence of postmodern values emphasizing 
individual rights and political participation; once these new values come to be held by a majority 
of the country’s population, democratization (or increased democratization) at the national level 
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is the result (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  In other words, the robust global correlation between 
wealth and democracy does not exist because democratization leads to development, but rather 
because development – through the causal pathway of a cultural shift to postmodern values – 
leads to democratization.  It is important to keep this in mind, as it is precisely this direction of 
causality that lies at the root of the Catch-22 “damned if you do” dilemma faced by modernizing 
authoritarian regimes: by succeeding in their developmental goals, they create the preconditions 
for their own demise. 
But precisely what kind of “post-modern” values must take hold amongst a society’s 
population to create the necessary pressures and preconditions for democratization, and how 
should these orientations be identified and measured? Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2006) argue 
that the definitive test is to gauge the degree to which such attitudes, measured at time one time 
point, are actually predictive of effective democracy at the national level (as measured by 
indicators such as Freedom House scores) at a later time point.  Analyzing the impact of a broad 
range of political attitudes and orientations (measured in the 1990-95 World Values Surveys) on 
subsequent measures of societal democracy for the 2000-2005 period, Inglehart and Welzel 
identify a cluster of attitudes – which they term the “self-expression values syndrome” – as the 
strongest predictor of effective democracy at the national level (2006, p. 14).  This self-
expression or “emancipative values” syndrome breaks down into the components of 
postmaterialism, elite-challenging activities (e.g. protest behavior), personal life satisfaction, 
tolerance of homosexuality, and interpersonal trust.  
 Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2006) observe that each individual component of syndrome has a 
strong and significant positive impact on subsequent measures of democracy – relationships 
which persist even after controlling for a society’s previous levels of democracy (i.e. temporal 
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autocorrelation).  They also note that the self-expression values syndrome as a whole has greater 
explanatory power than any of its components, explaining 55 percent of variance in effective 
democracy at the national level after controlling for previous democratic tradition (2006, p. 16).  
At the same time, however, Inglehart and Welzel privilege postmaterialism as the element of the 
syndrome that is most directly and intrinsically focused on aspirations for human freedom, and 
thus the strongest individual predictor of societal-level democracy at a later time point, 
explaining a full 37 percent of variance in democracy (with controls for previous experience with 
democratic rule) (2006, p. 15).   
As Inglehart and Welzel note, protest behavior and other forms of elite-challenging activities 
can be directed toward democracy-enhancing goals, but can just as easily be geared towards non-
democratic ones; similarly, they assert that neither interpersonal trust, nor life satisfaction, nor 
tolerance of homosexuality “are as sharply focused on civil and political liberties as are 
postmaterialistic values” (2006, p. 15).  As well as enjoying an impact on subsequent measures 
of democracy that is considerably higher than all of the other elements of the syndrome, 
postmaterialist values also have the highest factor loadings on the self-expression values 
syndrome as a whole, followed by protest behavior, personal life satisfaction, tolerance of 
homosexuality, and finally interpersonal trust (Inglehart and Welzel 2006, pp. 15-16).  It would 
be fair to assert, then, that postmaterialism constitutes the critical, democracy-enhancing core of 
the self-expression values syndrome. 
Postmaterialism: The Silent Revolution 
Given the central role that the self-expression values syndrome has come to occupy in 
contemporary modernization theory as a key intervening variable between socioeconomic 
development and democratization, it is easy to forget that the core foundation of this value 
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change paradigm – postmaterialism – was not originally formulated with any explicit reference 
to democracy.  Rather, Inglehart’s (1971) original concern in postulating this value change thesis 
was primarily with explaining and predicting changes in patterns of partisanship in post-
industrial societies, rather than any explicit concern with democratization or regime liberalization 
at the national level.  Drawing on theoretical and empirical insights from Abraham Maslow’s 
(1954) hierarchy of human needs model, Inglehart postulated that citizens in West European 
societies who had come of age during periods of relative scarcity would place higher priority on 
material concerns related to economic stability and security, whereas younger generations who 
had known only the more prosperous and secure economic conditions of the post-WWII era 
would be more likely to prioritize what he originally termed “post-acquisitive” or “post-
bourgeois” values, emphasizing individual freedom and political participation. 
In order to test these hypotheses Inglehart formulated a rather parsimonious, four-item survey 
question battery, which read: 
“If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to 
you? 
 Maintaining order in the nation. 
 Giving people more say in important political decisions. 
 Fighting rising prices. 
 Protecting freedom of speech.” (Inglehart 1971, p. 994, italics in original) 
 
Inglehart labeled the first and third options “acquisitive” (later termed “materialistic”) value 
priorities, with the explicitly-stated assumptions that an emphasis on maintaining domestic order 
“is presumed to relate, above all, to the protection of property,” and that “the relevance of rising 
prices to acquisitive motivations is fairly self-evident.” (pp. 994-995).  The remaining two items 
– “Giving people more say in important political decisions” and “Protecting freedom of speech” 
were designated as “post-bourgeois” or “post-acquisitive” choices (termed “postmaterialistic” 
choices in later works), reflecting a shift in value priorities away from concerns with economic 
 18 
security and towards an emphasis on higher-order needs related to self-expression and individual 
political empowerment.    
A central theoretical proposition of Inglehart’s concept of postmaterialism – both in its 
original treatment and as it has been developed in downstream writings and research – is the 
notion that core socio-political value orientations are largely determined by the societal 
economic conditions prevalent during one’s formative years and are unlikely to change once an 
individual enters adulthood (Inglehart 1971, p. 998).  This “socialization hypothesis” has 
generated a great deal of controversy in the downstream literature, and discomfort with the 
arguably deterministic role that Inglehart ascribes to the relative affluence of an individual’s 
youth lies at the heart of a number of major critiques of postmaterialist theory.   
Duch and Taylor (1993) in particular are critical of the “simple Maslowian argument” lying at 
the heart of Inglehart’s original formulation of postmaterialist theory, namely, that “the level of 
economic security during early years of political maturation results in postmaterialist values that 
persist through the life cycle” (pp. 748-49).  According to Duch and Taylor, the fact that older 
cohorts tend to rank lower on Inglehart’s postmaterialism measure, and younger cohorts tend to 
rank higher on it, is not due to differences in the economic conditions prevalent at the time of 
maturation (more insecure conditions in the case of older generations, more stable in the case of 
younger generations).  Rather, Duch and Taylor conclude, the intergenerational differences in 
levels in postmaterialism are most readily attributable to education, a factor that Inglehart 
himself (Inglehart 1971; Abramson and Inglehart 1987) observes to be one of the strongest 
predictors of postmaterialist values.   
But whereas Inglehart concludes that the strong relationship between education and 
postmaterialism exists largely because education is a proxy measure of “parental affluence 
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during the respondent’s formative years” (1971, p. 1005), Duch and Taylor argue the alternative 
hypothesis that 
Education is important because certain items in the postmaterialist measure [i.e. ‘giving people 
more say in important political decisions’ and ‘protecting freedom of speech’] are more likely to 
be prioritized by those who, through years of education, have learned to appreciate the values 
they represent. (p. 754) 
 
Postmaterialism scores are also influenced by economic factors, Duch and Taylor observe, but 
not the ones identified by Inglehart (i.e. macroeconomic conditions present at the time of one’s 
political maturation); rather, Duch and Taylor conclude that “the only relevant effect of the 
economy on [postmaterialist] preferences occurs in the time period in which respondents are 
interviewed” (p. 749). 
Postmaterialism: It’s the Economy, Stupid 
Clarke and Dutt (1991) and Clarke et al. (1999) offer similar critiques following this last point, 
namely that postmaterialism scores, as they have been measured, are highly sensitive to 
contextual economic conditions present at the time that respondents are interviewed.  Clarke and 
Dutt (1991) (see also Duch and Taylor 1993, 1994) observe that in addition to his socialization 
hypothesis, which attributes political value priorities largely to the levels of economic security 
prevalent at the time of an individual’s youth, Inglehart also posits a scarcity hypothesis, which 
allows for the (limited) influence of contemporary macroeconomic conditions on 
postmaterialism scores.  In essence, the scarcity hypothesis – which Duch and Taylor (1993, p. 
749) define as the intuitive notion that “individuals will value those things that are scarce and 
tend to take for granted those things that are relatively abundant” acknowledges that when 
economic conditions are worse (i.e. when material security is scarce) respondents might place 
greater emphasis on economic concerns and thus register as less postmaterialistic than they 
otherwise would.  As Clarke and Dutt (1991) note, Inglehart (1990) himself has recognized that 
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adverse macroeconomic conditions – specifically, high rates of inflation – might have a negative 
impact on postmaterialism scores due to the presence of the “fighting rising prices” materialist 
item. 
However, as Clarke and Dutt (1991) and Clarke et al. (1999) demonstrate, the problem of 
contextual economic influences on the measurement of postmaterialism is much more 
complicated, even perverse, than the simple scarcity hypothesis would allow.  Following 
Flanagan (1982a, 1982b), Clarke and Dutt propose that whereas selection of the “fighting rising 
prices” item might be indicative of a materialistic “deep-seated aversion to inflation,” it might 
also simply be an indication of the relative importance of inflation as a contemporary social and 
political issue (p. 910).  This potential for confusion is compounded by the lack of an item that 
makes reference to the problem of unemployment, another socio-economic issue that also varies 
with contemporary societal circumstances and thus may also be of greater or lesser salience to 
individual respondents at different time points.   
Clarke and Dutt observe that, following the scarcity hypothesis, during time periods such as 
the 1970s in which inflation is high, and thus a salient, immediate concern to respondents, 
individuals would indeed be more likely to select the “fighting rising prices” item, and thus score 
as less postmaterialistic than they otherwise would.  But when inflation has ebbed and 
unemployment has reared up to become the critical socio-economic concern – as was the case for 
much of the world in the decade of the 1980s – respondents no longer have a materialist item to 
select that best reflects the issue of greatest salience to them.  Clarke and Dutt propose that under 
such conditions, individuals would abandon the “fighting rising prices” item, and, lacking a 
choice that makes explicit reference to unemployment, would – following an instrumental logic – 
opt for the “giving people more say in government” statement out of a desire “to express their 
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preference for policies to alleviate the problem at hand” (p. 910).  In their analyses of aggregated 
Euro-Barometer survey data for the 1976-1986 time period, Clarke and Dutt find empirical 
verification for these hypotheses, specifically, a substantial and significant negative relationship 
between unemployment levels and selection of the “fight rising prices” materialist item, as well 
as a robust positive correlation between unemployment and respondents’ likelihood of choosing 
the “more say in government” postmaterialist item.  Based on these results, the authors conclude 
that the “apparent postmaterialistic trend” (Clarke and Dutt 1991, p. 918) evidenced in 
Inglehart’s own analyses of the Euro-Barometer data from the past two decades is largely an 
artifact of the postmaterialism question-battery format, coupled with a historical shift from 
inflation to unemployment as the critical contemporary socio-economic issue. 
Clark et al. (1999) further develop the above critique of postmaterialism measurement issues, 
utilizing an experimental research design that included two different versions of the values 
battery – one in the standard format and another in which the “fighting rising prices” item was 
replaced by a “creating more jobs” option.  Implementing the two versions of the questionnaire 
with a split sample of Canadian respondents in 1996 – a time of low inflation but relatively high 
unemployment – Clark et al. found that while only 15 percent of respondents who received the 
standard battery selected the “fighting rising prices” option as one of their priorities, a full 52 
percent of respondents in the half-sample who received the altered version of the battery selected 
the “creating more jobs” option.  Clark et al. report similar results from a second iteration of their 
experimental research design, conducted with a German sample, noting that, as with Canadians 
“Germans respond to the values battery very differently if a statement about unemployment is 
substituted for one about inflation,” and also that this “impressive variation” is evident even 
when the two different versions of the values batteries “are administered to the same respondents 
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in the same survey” (pp. 642-43, emphasis in original).  Clark et al. conclude that given the 
values battery’s evidently high degree of sensitivity to contemporary economic conditions, 
combined with the fact that macroeconomic conditions have changed so dramatically over recent 
decades in advanced industrialized societies, “the values battery provides an inaccurate measure 
of the extent of transition from materialism to postmaterialism.”  (p. 637). 
Postmaterialism: The Dilemma of Constrained Choice 
Aside from specific observations regarding the values battery’s sensitivity to contextual 
economic influences, the above critiques from Clark and Dutt and Clark et al. (see also Clark, 
Dutt, and Rapkin 1997a) point to a more fundamental issue with the postmaterialism values 
battery – what Flanagan (1987, p. 1311) has termed the dilemma of constrained choice.   It is not 
simply that the battery forces respondents to rank certain goals over others; indeed, that is the 
essential purpose of the battery, reflecting Inglehart’s rationale that 
It is not a question of valuing one thing positively and the other negatively…in politics it is 
sometimes impossible to maximize one good without detriment to the other.  In such cases, the 
relative priority among valued objectives becomes a vital consideration.  (Inglehart 1971, p. 995, 
emphasis in original) 
 
What the dilemma of constrained choice refers to is not the fact that respondents are only able to 
choose a limited number of options, but rather that they are presented with a very limited range 
of options from which to choose.  Clarke and Dutt (1991) and Clark et al. (1999) illustrate this 
point effectively in their discussion of the postmaterialism battery’s sensitivity to inflation rates. 
The critical issue in this instance is not that lowered inflation makes respondents less likely to 
choose the “fight rising prices” item, but rather that, when inflation has ebbed, “respondents 
eschew the rising prices item but are forced by the format to choose one of the remaining three, 
none of which deals with other economic problems they may have [e.g. unemployment].” (Clark 
et al. 1999, p. 638, emphasis in original).  As Clark and Dutt (1991) and Clark et al. (1997a) 
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observe, it is this constraint that creates the artificial and “perverse” positive relationship 
between inflation and postmaterialism, as respondents who are no longer fixated on inflation – 
but who still have very pressing economic/materialist concerns – tend to settle on the “giving 
people more say” (postmaterialist) item as the “least bad” alternative option.    
To some extent this problem may be mitigated by use of the expanded 12-item 
postmaterialism values battery (Inglehart 1977, 1990), which Layman and Carmines (1997) 
observe to be “less sensitive to the effects of short-run economic changes” and thus “a more 
valid and reliable measure of value orientations” (p. 755).  The 12-item measure retains the 
original 4-item question battery (with the choices of maintaining order in the nation, giving 
people more say in important political decisions, and fighting rising prices) as well as two new 
batteries, each of which – as with the original measure – ask respondents to make two choices 
from a list of two materialist and two postmaterialist options.  Specifically, these two additional 
sets of options are: 
 A high level of economic growth. 
 Making sure this country has strong defense forces. 
 Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their 
communities. 
 Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 
and 
 A stable economy. 
 Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society. 
 Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money. 
 The fight against crime. 
In the first of these two additional batteries the “economic growth” and “strong defense forces” 
items are coded as materialist choices, with the “seeing that people have more say” and “trying 
to make our cities and countryside more beautiful” items coded as postmaterialist goals.  In the 
second of the two batteries the “stable economy” and “fight against crime” options are coded as 
materialist aspirations, while “progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society” and 
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“progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money” are labeled as postmaterialist.  
The complete 12-item postmaterialism scale is constructed with the original 4-item scale 
appearing between the two additional batteries above – that is, respondents are first asked to 
choose two goals from the grouping that begins with “a high level of economic growth,” then the 
grouping that begins with “maintaining order in the nation,” and finally the set of items that 
begins with “a stable economy.”  As Layman and Carmines note, while asserting the expanded 
12-item scale to be a more accurate instrument for measuring postmaterialist values, Inglehart 
and Abramson (1994) at the same time “vigorously defend” the original 4-item battery as a valid 
measure of value change (Layman and Carmines 1997, p. 755). 
Question-order Effects 
Tranter and Western (2003) present an interesting meta-critique of the postmaterialism scales, 
focusing on the specific manner in which they have been implemented in public opinion surveys 
over the last two decades and how the data derived from these scales have been interpreted.  
Their argument is simple and straightforward.  Analyses of postmaterialist value change over 
time, conducted by Inglehart and others, have relied on World Values Survey data derived from 
the original 4-item values battery, as the expanded 12-item battery did not appear until the 
second (and subsequent) waves of the survey.  That is to say, even though the expanded 12-item 
measure of postmaterialism is available in the later waves of the survey, researchers are forced to 
confine themselves to the 4-item battery so as to have a consistent and comparable measure of 
postmaterialism scores at each time point.  The problem, according to Tranter and Western, is 
that comparing postmaterialism scores from the first wave of the World Values Survey, which 
included only the original 4-item scale, with subsequent waves of the WVS, in which the original 
4-item battery is immediately preceded by an additional 4-item battery, invites the very real risk 
 25 
of contamination of the analysis by question-order effects.  That is to say, respondents taking 
part in later waves of the World Values Survey may provide responses to the original 4-item 
battery that are strongly influenced by the responses that they have just provided to the similar 
values priority battery immediately preceding it, an effect not present in the original wave of the 
World Values Survey. 
Employing an experimental research design similar to that of Clark et al. (1999), Tranter and 
Western find evidence of just such a question order effect, with Australian subjects found to 
score significantly more postmaterialist on the 4-item index when it is presented to them as part 
of the standard 12-item values scale (in which the original 4-item battery is preceded 
immediately by another 4-item battery) than when the short index is presented to them stand-
alone.  Although they do not hypothesize or identify a clear reason why the presence of the 
preceding battery would affect respondents’ answers to the core 4-item ‘short index’ in this 
particular direction – towards higher postmaterialism – Tranter and Western’s findings justify 
healthy skepticism regarding the precise nature and magnitude of the apparent global shift 
toward postmaterial values at the close of the twentieth century. 
Postmaterialism, Authoritarianism and Traditionalism 
But the strongest critiques of the postmaterialist values scale (in both its original and extended 
forms), as well as the data and analyses that have been derived from it, focus not on its 
sensitivity to short-term economic conditions or vulnerability to question-order effects, but rather 
on fundamental conceptualization problems.  While these critiques generally acknowledge 
Inglehart et al.’s core thesis that industrialization and modernization have eroded the role of 
traditional socio-economic class-based cleavages in explaining social and political behavior, they 
go on to question whether the materialist-postmaterialist dichotomy is the best framework for 
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describing and measuring these new orientations (Flanagan 1980, 1987; Savage 1985; Layman 
and Carmines 1997; Todosijević and Enyedi 2000).  Indeed, several studies (Flanagan 1987; 
Middendorp 1989, 1992; Todosijević and Enyedi 2000) have argued effectively that Inglehart’s 
“materialist” measures include items that are actually more valid and reliable measures of what 
the political psychology literature has long identified as authoritarian socio-political dispositions. 
Flanagan (1987) offers the most in-depth and compelling critique in this vein.  The core 
premise of his argument is that value change in the postindustrial West has been occurring along 
not just one but two different dimensions, and that Inglehart’s approach “has obscured this 
distinction by collapsing indicators of both in a single scale” (p. 1303).  What Inglehart labels as 
postmaterialist value indicators – such as “protecting freedom of speech” – Flanagan views 
instead as measures of a libertarian orientation.  Flanagan’s core disagreement with Inglehart’s 
value priorities battery lies, however, at the other end of the scale, with the items that Inglehart 
identifies as measures of a materialist orientation.  According to Flanagan, the materialism 
indicators in Inglehart’s scale actually tap into two very different value orientations.  Half of 
these items – such as “fighting rising prices” – are indeed valid measures of a materialist 
disposition, as defined by Flanagan “in a more limited sense than Inglehart to identify the 
emphasis attached to economic concerns, both for oneself and one’s society” (pp. 1304-05).  At 
the same time, Flanagan notes, Inglehart has included in his materialism measure a second set of 
indicators – such as “maintaining order” – that have no direct bearing on strictly material, 
economic issues and are in fact much more valid indicators of an authoritarian orientation. 
By conflating measures of the two conceptually distinct phenomena of materialism and 
authoritarianism, Flanagan asserts, Inglehart’s values battery scale presents respondents with a 
“dilemma of constrained choice” (p. 1311) even more pernicious than the one described by Clark 
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and Dutt and Clark et al., above (in terms of the postmaterialism scale’s omission of an 
unemployment measure).  In both the original 4-item and longer 12-item versions, Flanagan 
observes, respondents are asked to choose two items from a grouping of four choices, a listing 
that invariably is comprised of two libertarian items, one authoritarian item and one materialist 
item.  Libertarians who are also non-materialists will pick the two libertarian items and be 
labeled as pure postmaterialists, whereas authoritarians who are also materialists will pick the 
one authoritarian option and the one materialist option and be labeled as pure materialists.  
 But the true dilemma, according to Flanagan, is faced by authoritarians who are also non-
materialists.  Asked to pick two options, this respondent finds only one (authoritarian) item that 
actually reflects their values.  The two libertarian items are diametrically opposed to their views, 
and thus such respondents are most likely to settle on the materialist option as the “least-bad” 
choice.  Thus, according to Flanagan, the format of Inglehart’s postmaterialist scale “artificially 
forces an association between his materialist and authoritarian items,” (p. 1311) conflating what 
are otherwise two distinct dimensions of value change.   
One of these two dimensions is, indeed, the shift away from issues of basic material and 
economic security toward an emphasis on non-material ones.  Flanagan finds no real fault with 
Inglehart’s theory or findings  in regards to this species of value change, and the authors are in 
agreement that this secular shift from material to non-material concerns is explained by the 
“diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism” (Inglehart 1987, p. 1289; Flanagan 1987, 
p. 1308).  This principle reflects the observation that once the level of economic development 
has reached a certain level in a given society, immediate economic factors come to have less and 
less of an impact on “such objective characteristics as life expectancy and economic equality,” 
resulting in the “tendency for the pursuit of economic self-interest itself to reach a point of 
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diminishing returns in advanced industrial societies” (Inglehart 1987, p. 1292).  In other words, 
in economically advanced societies, further gains in income and material equality come to have a 
decreasing benefit to fewer and fewer people, while coming at an increasing cost to a larger and 
larger proportion of the population.  Thus, one witnesses the “eclipse of the salience of economic 
issues” (Flanagan 1987, p. 1310) in favor of non-material concerns.   
It is at this point, however, that Flanagan and Inglehart part ways, as Flanagan eschews 
Inglehart’s postmaterialist label in favor of the more neutral appellation of nonmaterialist – a 
term indicating simply an individual who places a greater priority on either authoritarian or 
libertarian value preferences than they do on economic issues (Flanagan 1987, p. 1306).  
Individuals on the nonmaterial end of the material-nonmaterial spectrum may be either 
authoritarians or libertarians, just as materialists – who are primarily focused on economic issues 
– might exhibit either authoritarian or libertarian leanings.  The crucial point of Flanagan’s and 
related critiques is that there exist not one but two distinct dimensions of value change associated 
with economic development, and that these two dimensions have been conflated – both 
theoretically, through the concept of postmaterialism, and empirically, through the values 
batteries designed to measure this concept.   
Furthermore, not only does the artificial association between materialism and authoritarianism 
generated by postmaterialist theory (and its measurement instrument) conflate the libertarian-
authoritarian and materialist-nonmaterialist dimensions, it also obscures the fact that the 
libertarian-authoritarian dimension is the more politically relevant of the two (Flanagan 1987; 
Middendorp 1992; Todosijević and Enyedi 2000).  Todosijević and Enyedi (in summarizing and 
building directly upon Flanagan’s conclusions) observe that whereas the materialist and 
nonmaterialist categories signify two relatively static (or “stagnant”) cultures, a “genuine world-
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wide revolution is detectable along the libertarianism-authoritarianism axis,” with younger 
generations in postindustrial societies tending to take more tolerant and open-minded positions 
than their parents on a host of social and cultural issues (2000, p. 5).   
Flanagan asserts that this generational shift from authoritarian to libertarian orientations in 
advanced democracies has been driven primarily by certain critical changes in “the basic 
conditions of life under which successive generations have been socialized,” such as dramatic 
increases in socio-economic equality and greatly elevated levels of (higher) education (pp. 1307, 
1311).  It is interesting to note here that Flanagan’s explanation for the authoritarian-to-
libertarian generational value shift is essentially a socialization hypothesis, and as such bears 
certain similarities to Inglehart’s emphasis on the circumstances of an individual’s early years as 
the driving force behind the crystallization of core political values that persist throughout 
adulthood.  The key difference is that Flanagan’s socialization hypothesis focuses on factors that 
are present as a result of heightened levels of economic development and security (such as 
increases in education and other informational resources), whereas Inglehart’s emphasis – 
particularly in the original statements of postmaterialist theory – is on these economic conditions 
themselves, in terms of the relative abundance or scarcity of material and economic security 
during one’s formative years. 
In regard to the conceptual content of the authoritarian-libertarian dimension of value change, 
in addition to the security and law and order preferences tapped by the postmaterialism index 
(maintaining order in the nation, making sure the country has strong defense forces, the fight 
against crime) Flanagan (1987) also identifies as part of the authoritarian mindset such values as 
“respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance for minorities, 
conformity to customs, and support for traditional religious and moral values” (p. 1305).  
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Flanagan observes that such stances and priorities are quite characteristic of the “New Right” 
movement that emerged in postindustrial societies in the latter part of the twentieth century as a 
response to the libertarian (or in Inglehart’s terms, postmaterialist) agenda of the “New Left.”  
Thus, rather than the “materialist reaction” predicted by Inglehart’s theory, opposition to the 
libertarian-postmaterialist New Left has taken the form of calls for a return to traditional social, 
moral and religious values, and in this sense “the New Right is as much nonmaterialist as the 
New Left.” (Flanagan 1987, p. 1308; emphasis in original).  Flanagan concludes that 
The conceptualization of the politically salient value cleavage that divides the advanced 
industrial democracies has been dominated by the notion of materialism for too long…we now 
need to cast our nets much more broadly to determine what clusters with what, and in this regard 
much works remains to be done.  (Flanagan 1987, p. 1317; emphasis in original) 
 
Middendorp (1992) derives similar conclusions from his study of ideology, postmaterialism 
and political party identification in the Netherlands.  As with Flanagan, Middendorp presents a 
two-dimensional model of value orientations as an alternative to Inglehart’s unidimensional 
paradigm of materialism-postmaterialism.  Flanagan and Middendorp differ in their 
conceptualization of the material-economic axis of their respective ideological maps, with 
Flanagan’s “material-nonmaterial” continuum replaced in Middendorp’s analysis with a “socio-
economic left-right dimension” (p. 250).  The authors are in general agreement, however, on the 
libertarian-authoritarian component of ideological orientations and value change.  Closely 
echoing Flanagan, Middendorp observes that the libertarian (e.g. giving people more say, 
protecting freedom of speech) and the authoritarian (order, a strong defense, the fight against 
crime) items in Inglehart’s postmaterialism index tap into a libertarian-authoritarian dimension 
that is much more important in political terms (i.e. voting) than the attitudes and preferences 
measured by the remaining items in the scale (that is, non-authoritarian materialist choices such 
as “fighting inflation” and non-libertarian postmaterialist options such as a “friendlier and less 
 31 
impersonal society”) (Middendorp 1992, p. 257).  Middendorp expresses close agreement with 
Flanagan as well in his conclusion that postmaterialism as a theoretical paradigm is flawed, in 
that its political “kernel” – the libertarian-authoritarian dimension – has been conflated with 
other ideological components (e.g. economic materialism) that are much less politically relevant. 
Todosijević and Enyedi (2000) find similar limitations to the materialist-postmaterialist 
framework in their analysis of political value orientations and political behavior in post-
Communist Hungary.  In this study the authors utilized a slightly modified version of the 4-item 
postmaterialism index together with a 25-item authoritarianism measure – derived from Adorno 
et al.’s (1950) fascism scale and Altemeyer’s (1981, 1988) Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
scale – to test the relative explanatory and predictive power of postmaterialism and 
authoritarianism vis-à-vis political preferences and behavior among Hungarian teenagers and 
their parents.  Todosijević and Enyedi’s findings indicated that authoritarianism has a 
significantly stronger impact among Hungarians than postmaterialism on a number of attitudinal 
and behavioral indicators, namely voting, ideological self-identification, electoral participation, 
political interest, and protest activity (pp. 19-20).  In their results postmaterialism emerges as a 
robust predictor only of electoral participation and political interest, and is still out-performed by 
the authoritarianism measure in these two domains (pp. 20-21).  Todosijević and Enyedi 
conclude that, at least for the Hungarian case, authoritarianism is the “preferable theoretical 
construct” for understanding and explaining citizens’ value orientations and political behavior (p. 
21). 
While not directly addressing the libertarian-authoritarian dimension at the heart of 
Flanagan’s critique, other studies have also presented findings and analysis supportive of 
Flanagan’s general assertion that the materialist-postmaterialist paradigm has oversimplified the 
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complexities and nuances of value change and value conflict in postindustrial societies.  Layman 
and Carmines (1997) argue that, while important new political cleavages have indeed emerged in 
the post-industrial age in the United States, the postmaterialist framework has limited 
explanatory power for addressing these changes as it makes no allowance for “the unique 
features of the American political context and of cultural conflict in the United States” (p. 752). 
Directly in line with Flanagan (1987) (and following also on Savage 1985), Layman and 
Carmines note that the dramatic increase of postmaterialists in the American population in the 
last two decades of the twentieth century did not, as Inglehart’s theory would predict, provoke a 
materialist reaction in the sense of elements of society uncomfortable with the postmaterialist 
agenda clamoring for a renewed emphasis on issues of economic growth and security.  Rather, as 
a reflection of the continuing importance and salience of religion in American society (where 
religiosity is much higher overall than in other areas of the postindustrial world), in the United 
States the principal reaction to the postmaterialist phenomenon came from conservative 
Christians (Layman and Carmines 1997, p. 753).  Thus, Layman and Carmines characterize the 
critical cultural-political cleavage that has emerged in postindustrial American society as a 
contention between religious traditionalists and non-traditionalists, rather than one between 
materialists and postmaterialists.  
Specifically, Layman and Carmines analyze National Election Studies (NES) survey data 
from 1980-1992 and obtain that a five-indicator measure of religious traditionalism has, overall, 
significantly greater power vis-à-vis the 4-item postmaterialism measure in predicting party 
identification, ideological self-placement, and presidential vote.  On the strength of these 
findings, Layman and Carmines concur with Flanagan (1982, 1987) and Savage (1985) that, at 
least in the American case, the important political cleavage that has emerged in the postindustrial 
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era is not one between materialists who focus on economic issues and postmaterialists who 
embrace value-based concerns.  Rather, the critical divide “is between those who hold more 
progressive stances on Postmaterial, value-based concerns and those who hold more traditional 
positions on these matters” (Layman and Carmines, p. 768; emphasis added).  Such a position, it 
may be noted, is very much in line with the critiques of Flanagan, Savage, and Middendorp, and 
also quite consistent with the position of Todosijević and Enyedi, who note that  
[W]here militaristic, religious fundamentalist or chauvinistic forces oppose the left-libertarian 
agenda (multi-culturalism, sexual equality, etc.), one needs a bit too much imagination to label 
any of the opposing camps as more or less materialistic. (2000, p. 6)  
 
Postmaterialism, Nationalism, and Patriotism 
Most critically for the purposes of the current study, it must be noted that neither 
postmaterialist theory nor its various critiques have addressed issues of national identity and 
national attachment with any great depth or probity.  Inglehart (1971) touches on the subject 
briefly in his discussion of the high levels of postmaterialism found among members of Flemish 
separatist political parties in Belgium.  Conceding that – at first glance – the Belgian separatist 
movement appears to have little in common with the “New Left” parties to which postmaterialists 
are more typically drawn, Inglehart opines that a commonality of purpose between the two groups 
can be found in satisfying a “need for belongingness” (p. 1011).  The Flemish separatist parties 
address – or embody – this need in a fairly self-explanatory manner, being by their very nature 
focused primarily on the goals of asserting the distinctiveness of a certain cultural-national 
identity, defining the boundaries of membership of this group, and securing autonomy and other 
rights for its members.   
As for the parties of the New Left, Inglehart proposes that insofar as these groups are 
essentially “protest movements” in radical and protracted conflict with the existing social-political 
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establishment, it is very likely that such an ‘us-versus-them’ dynamic may similarly provide 
members of such groups with a “sense of belongingness” (pp. 1011-1012).  Inglehart observes that 
belongingness is recognized by the Maslowian paradigm as a higher-order need that becomes 
prioritized only after the most basic requirements of human survival (food, shelter, physical 
security) have been fulfilled; thus, the striving for belongingness at the heart of nationalist 
separatist movements can be viewed as just as post-materialist as the agenda of the New Left 
parties, and “[i]nsofar as the drive for belongingness is an important component of these 
movements, their ideological content can be quite flexible” (p. 1012). 
Todosijević and Enyedi (2000) are sharply critical of Inglehart’s above explanation for 
relatively high levels of postmaterialism amongst separatist nationalist movements, arguing that 
Inglehart’s interpretation of the data demonstrates that he has “stretched his conceptual framework 
to the limit in order to accommodate reality” (p. 5).  Drawing on the authoritarianism critique of 
postmaterialism explicated by Flanagan and others, Todosijević and Enyedi propose a different 
interpretation of these data.  In their view, traditionalist and nationalist movements that are 
separatist in nature are, by definition, characterized by an opposition to existing authority, and 
this anti-establishment aspect tends to attract non-authoritarians (libertarians), who, following 
Flanagan’s argument, register as postmaterialists in Inglehart’s values priority battery.  Thus, 
Todosijević and Enyedi assert, the high degree of postmaterialism found amongst separatist 
nationalist movements can be explained readily in terms of the authoritarian-libertarian dimension 
of political ideology and value change, without resorting to Maslowian needs-hierarchy arguments.  
At the same time, following this same logic, we would expect that members of non-separatist 
(majority) nationalist movements – which emphasize communion with, rather than opposition to, 
the existing social-cultural-political establishment – would tend to be more authoritarian (and thus 
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register as more materialistic) than the constituents of separatist (minority) nationalist groups 
(Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, p. 5, footnote 1). 
As noted previously, Inglehart has in more recent writings dropped virtually all references to 
Maslow’s theories, together with discussion of this “sense of belongingness” as a higher-order 
human need (consistent with other post-materialist aspirations) in the downstream literature.  
Unfortunately, one also finds little further discussion of the issues of national attachment and 
national identity and their relationship to the processes of modernization and value change.  One 
exception is found in Inglehart and Baker’s 2000 piece on “Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
the Persistence of Traditional Values,” in which the authors observe that elites in developing 
nations can – and often do – utilize appeals to traditional national culture and identity to help rally 
popular support for modernization programs, as in the case of Japan’s Meiji Restoration (p. 21, 
footnote 1).  Inglehart and Baker note also that this type of strategy can have unanticipated 
political consequences, holding up as an example of this the case of Algeria, in which reform-
minded elites “used Islam to gain peasant support, but as an unintended result strengthened 
fundamentalist religious values (Stokes and Marshall 1981)” (Ibid.).  Inglehart and Baker 
conclude that political appeals to (a monolithic) traditional cultural identity tend to give rise 
(instead) to cultural pluralism and diversity, citing from McMichael (1996, p. 42) that “[a]s global 
integration intensifies, the currents of multiculturalism swirl faster [and] the politics of identity 
tends to substitute for the civic (universalist) politics of nation-building” (Ibid.).  Thus, Inglehart 
and Baker appear to assert that in the era of globalization, elites who promote a traditional, 
monolithic, statist, “nation-building” breed of national character (Todosijević and Enyedi’s 
‘majority’ nationalism) will tend to find themselves confronted with a multiplicity of competing 
ethnic, cultural and religious identities (Todosijević and Enyedi’s ‘minority’ nationalisms). 
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Inglehart’s Two Revolutions 
While relatively little attention has been paid to nationalism and national identity in explicit 
reference to postmaterialism (or the broader “self-expression values” syndrome in which it is 
nested), references to these issues can be found elsewhere in the writings of Inglehart and his 
colleagues, in their discussion of another key dimension of cultural value change.  Inglehart and 
Baker (2000) conducted factor analysis of data from the 1990-91 and 1995-98 waves of the 
World Values Survey, from which they concluded that the processes of socio-economic 
development and modernization give rise to not one but two distinct species of cultural change 
and cross-national cultural variation.  One of these is the survival vs. self-expression values 
dimension, at the core of which lies the opposition between materialist and postmaterialist values.  
The other key dimension of cultural variation identified by the authors is that of traditional vs. 
secular-rational orientations toward authority.  Whereas societal shifts from material/survival to 
postmaterial/self-expression values tend to occur as countries move from the industrial to 
postindustrial phases of economic development – that is, from economies that are mainly focused 
on manufacturing to ones in which the service sector is dominant – shifts from traditional to 
secular/rational values tend to occur at a much earlier phase of development, namely, the 
transition from a preindustrial to an industrial economy (Inglehart and Baker 2000, pp. 21-22). 
According to Inglehart and Baker, the traditional vs. secular-rational dimension of cultural 
variation encompasses a broad range of variables (i.e. World Values Survey question-items) but 
can be measured rather parsimoniously with just a small set of indicators.  Specifically, a 
traditional orientation is typified by the following characteristics and attitudes: 
1. God is very important in respondent’s life. 
2. Respondent feels it is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than 
independence and determination. 
3. Respondent feels abortion is never justifiable. 
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4. Respondent has a strong sense of national pride. 
5. Respondent favors more respect for authority.  (Inglehart and Baker 2000, p. 24, Table 1)  
Note that in addition to national pride (item 4), Inglehart and Baker also include an 
authoritarian disposition (item 5; the “obedience” component of item 2) and a conservative 
moral-religious outlook (items 1 and 3; the “religious faith” component of item 2) as elements of 
a traditional value orientation.  These latter two components – authoritarianism and traditional 
morality/religiosity – would appear to overlap, respectively, with the authoritarian-libertarian 
dimension discussed in the postmaterialism critiques by Flanagan, Savage, Middendorp and 
Todosijević and Enyedi, and the religious traditionalism dimension suggested by Layman and 
Carmines as an alternative measure of cultural change and cultural conflict in the United States.  
Inglehart and Baker’s measure combines these elements of authoritarianism moral-religious 
conservatism, together with “high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook,” to form a 
construct of traditionalism characterized by “deference to the authority of God, Fatherland and 
Family” – a set of allegiances that are tightly linked and closely constrained (Inglehart and Baker 
2000, p. 25).        
  Inglehart and Baker’s primary concern with the traditional/secular-rational dimension of 
cultural change, it would appear, is in simply documenting its existence, as well as the existence 
of cross-national variations along this spectrum (together with those along the survival/self-
expression values continuum) that have persisted even in the face of the supposedly 
homogenizing effects of economic modernization.  In this way, Inglehart and Baker do explicitly 
concede some part of the Huntington (1993, 1996) “Civilizations” hypothesis, noting that 
whereas (post-)industrialization does tend to yield predictable changes in societies’ value 
structures, at the same time “distinct cultural zones [e.g. Confucian, Orthodox, Catholic, 
Protestant] persist two centuries after the industrial revolution began” (Inglehart and Baker, p. 
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30).  And, at first glance, Inglehart and Baker’s acknowledgement of this second dimension of 
cultural variation would appear to concede to at least some extent the key thrust of the 
abovementioned critiques by Flanagan and others, namely that the postmaterialism paradigm has 
tended to oversimplify value change and cultural variation with a simple materialist-
postmaterialist dichotomy, while overlooking cleavages along what might be termed the 
authoritarian-traditional vs. libertarian-progressive dimension.   
Critically, however, it should be noted that Inglehart and Baker present their concept of 
traditionalism/secular-rationalism as theoretically and functionally distinct from postmaterialism, 
and not in any way as a sub-dimension or sub-component of value change that has been folded 
into the postmaterialism paradigm (as Flanagan, Savage, Middendorp and others would argue).  
And, most critically, Inglehart and Baker do not appear to consider their traditionalism construct 
or any of its subcomponents (e.g. authoritarianism, nationalism, moral absolutism) in terms of 
their relationship with societal democracy, as they do with the survival/self-expression values 
dimension. 
As mentioned above, Inglehart and Baker present empirical justification in the form of 
confirmatory factor analysis for maintaining a careful distinction between traditional/secular-
rational orientations toward authority on the one hand and survival/self-expression values on the 
other.  But given strong the face-value similarity between several aspects of the traditionalism 
scale (e.g. an emphasis on authority and obedience, a nationalistic outlook) and certain items in 
the postmaterialism scale highlighted in Flanagan, Savage, Middendorp’s critiques (e.g. 
“maintaining order in the nation” and “a strong national defense”), Inglehart and Baker’s failure 
to address the possibility of conceptual and/or functional overlaps between the 
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression values dimensions is somewhat 
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disconcerting.  This omission is all the more troubling in light of the considerable body of 
evidence (Adorno et al. 1950; Rokeach 1960; Altemeyer 1981, 1988; Duckitt 1989; Kosterman 
and Feshbach 1989; Staub 1989, 1991, 1997; Schatz 1993, 1995; Feldman and Stenner 1997; 
Schatz et al. 1999; De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Huddy et al. 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 
2005) regarding the strongly negative relationship between the type of 
authoritarian/dogmatic/nationalistic attitudes contained in Inglehart and Baker’s traditionalism 
scale and “democracy-friendly” principles and orientations – such as tolerance for minority 
groups/opinions and support for freedoms of speech and expression – which would appear to be 
precisely the type of “intrinsic support” for democracy and democracy-building that the self-
expression values syndrome, with postmaterialism at its core, is intended to measure.   
Summary of Findings 
Several key points and observations can be derived from the above review – however brief 
and incomplete – of the postmaterialism literature and its various critiques. 
The postmaterialism paradigm, first developed by Ronald Inglehart to explain and predict 
intergenerational shifts in political party alignments in post-industrial western Europe, has 
evolved to become the “leading account of the nature of cultural conflict in advanced industrial 
democracies” (Layman and Carmines, p. 751).  In the modernization literature, the 
postmaterialism construct enjoys a privileged position as the core component of a “self-
expression values syndrome” that is the intervening variable between economic development on 
the one hand and national-level democratization on the other.  According to Inglehart and his 
colleagues, measures of self-expression values among a nation’s populace at time point A are 
highly predictive of effective, societal-level democracy within that country at time point B, even 
when controlling for previous experience with democracy and host of other relevant factors.  In 
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short, economic development gives rise to a shift from materialist/survival values to 
postmaterialist/self-expression values, which in turn precipitate the emergence of national-level 
democracy where it does not yet exist, and a deepening and expansion of democracy where it has 
already taken hold. 
The broad claims of the postmaterialist theory have, unsurprisingly, drawn a wide variety of 
critiques and alternative explanations.  Duch and Taylor (1993) provide a strong critique of the 
“socialization hypothesis” lying at heart of the postmaterialism paradigm – the notion that 
deeply-rooted political values and orientations are determined by the levels of economic 
development and security present at the time of one’s formative years – arguing instead that 
sharp intergenerational differences in support for ‘postmaterialistic’ values such as political 
participation and freedom of expression are the result of dramatic increases in educational levels 
in the latter half of the twentieth century.   
Two of the most prominent veins of criticism of postmaterialism could be termed the 
economic and conceptual counter-arguments.  The central thrust of the former is that the 
sociotropic economic conditions (notably inflation and unemployment) prevalent at the time of 
the survey – rather than at the time of one’s political maturation – have a strong and significant 
impact on the answers respondents tend to provide to the question batteries intended to measure 
the postmaterialist orientation.  Meanwhile, conceptual critiques of postmaterialism theory have 
focused on the simplistic materialist-postmaterialist value dichotomy, arguing that Inglehart’s 
paradigm has conflated an indicator of economic materialism with a measure of 
authoritarian/traditionalist attitudes.  Furthermore, this vein of criticism argues that the 
authoritarian-traditionalist/libertarian-progressive cultural divide has considerably more 
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descriptive and explanatory value than the materialist-nonmaterialist one; as Flanagan (1987) 
states 
The conceptualization of the politically salient value cleavage that divides the advanced 
industrial democracies has been dominated by the notion of materialism for too long…we now 
need to cast our nets more broadly…and in this regard much work remains to be done. (p. 1317) 
 
A key theme common to both the economic and conceptual critiques of postmaterialism is 
Flanagan’s notion of the “dilemma of constrained choice.”  In the economic vein, according 
Clark and Dutt (1991) and Clark et al., contemporary economic conditions have a strong impact 
on the levels of postmaterialism measured at a given time point because the postmaterialism 
question battery provides an incomplete range of items from which respondents can choose to 
express their concerns over the national economy.  At times of high inflation the “fighting rising 
prices” item captures materialist concerns over current sociotropic conditions quite well; at times 
of high unemployment, respondents are left without a materialist option that directly speaks to 
their most prominent economic concern, and may gravitate toward the postmaterialist “giving 
people more say” item as a catch-all, fallback position.    
In the conceptual vein, the problem of constrained choice is much more fundamental and 
pernicious.  The postmaterialism question battery, in both its original and extended forms, offers 
respondents groupings of items from which they are asked to choose their two top priorities.  
Individuals who are of a non-materialist bent but who also hold authoritarian/traditionalist views 
run out of authoritarian/traditionalist options after their first choice has been made.  Of the three 
remaining options, two are libertarian-progressive items that are diametrically opposed to their 
most deeply-held values, whereas the third is a materialist priority that is only irrelevant to their 
primary beliefs.  Thus, they settle on the materialist option as the least inappropriate second 
choice.  And since Inglehart’s scale codes the authoritarian-traditionalist items (maintaining 
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order in the nation, a strong national defense, the fight against crime) as ‘materialist’ options as 
well, these respondents come to be categorized as pure materialists, when in fact their basic 
socio-political orientation is defined by their (authoritarian-traditionalist) emphasis on very non-
materialist moral and cultural issues. 
Finally, it can be stated that issues of nationalism, national identity and national attachment 
have received only very limited attention in both the postmaterialist literature and its various 
critiques.  Inglehart (1971) touched briefly on the subject in his explanation for high levels of 
postmaterialist values amongst Flemish separatist parties, positing that the higher-order “need for 
belongingness” was the common touchstone between the members of nationalist separatist 
parties and the constituents of the progressive, New Left political parties.  Todosijević and 
Enyedi (2000) criticize the unfalsifiability of Inglehart’s post hoc theorizing on this subject, 
further noting that Inglehart’s notion of ‘progressive nationalism’ in the case of a minority 
nationalist separatist movement could not be generalized to instances of majority nationalism, 
which are much more likely – by their very nature – to be dominated by authoritarian-
traditionalist rather than libertarian-progressive overtones.  This (worthwhile) discussion has not 
been carried much further in the literature, due in part perhaps to the fact that Inglehart and his 
colleagues have largely abandoned the Maslowian human needs hierarchy paradigm to which he 
originally ascribed this higher-order, post-materialist “need for belonging.”  Instead, references 
to nationalism – together with authoritarianism and traditionalism – appear in Inglehart’s 
downstream writings as components of a traditionalist/secular-rational value dimension that is 
presented as theoretically, empirically and functionally distinct from the survival-materialist/self-
expression-postmaterialist continuum. 
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In the following chapter I present a new theoretical approach to the understanding and 
measurement of postmaterialist values that seeks to address some of the key issues highlighted in 
the brief summary above.  Specifically, I draw on insights from the nationalism literature, as well 
as recent findings in the study of authoritarianism, to integrate the concepts of national 
attachment and national threat into the postmaterialism paradigm in a much comprehensive and 
systematic manner than has been done previously, in order to formulate concrete hypotheses for 
empirical testing in the latter chapters of this study.     
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CHAPTER THREE: IS POSTMATERIALISM PATRIOTIC? 
In the previous chapter I provided a brief summary of the major theoretical and empirical 
foundations of both postmaterialist theory and its major critiques, focusing particularly on the 
authoritarianism-traditionalism counter-argument of Flanagan, Savage, Middendorp and others 
(Flanagan 1987; Savage 1985; Middendorp 1992; Layman and Carmines 1997; Todosijević and 
Enyedi 2000).  I also called attention to the relatively limited degree to which issues of national 
identity and national attachment have been addressed in this literature.  In this chapter I seek to 
demonstrate that, taken together with recent insights and findings from the authoritarianism 
literature, closer attention to nationalistic sentiment and the perception of national threat on the 
part of citizens/respondents is critical to improving our understanding and measurement of value 
changes taking place in modernizing societies in the contemporary global environment.   
This chapter is divided into three sections.  In the first section, I revisit and attempt to refine 
the authoritarianism-traditionalism critique of postmaterialism theory proposed by Flanagan et 
al., by integrating into it fresh insights from the downstream literature on authoritarianism – 
specifically, recent findings that focus squarely on the phenomenon of external threat as the 
catalyzing force driving the manifestation of authoritarian attitudes in the political realm.  In the 
second section, I draw on relevant findings and theoretical insights from the political behavior 
literature on nationalism and patriotism for the purpose of formulating a more nuanced and 
dynamic conceptualization of the phenomena of national attachment,  national threat and (what I 
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term here) national assurance.  In the third and final section I explicate specific hypotheses 
regarding the relationships between measured postmaterialism, underlying 
authoritarian/nationalistic sentiments, and individuals’ perceptions of the nature of the external 
international environment (as being either hostile and threatening or benevolent and reassuring). 
Postmaterialism and Authoritarianism Revisited  
The critiques of postmaterialist theory by Flanagan, Savage, Middendorp and others presented 
in the previous chapter are squarely on point in their criticism of Inglehart’s paradigm as 
describing a rather “stagnant” and overly simplistic divide between materialists and 
postmaterialists at the expense of giving the much more vibrant authoritarian-traditional vs. 
libertarian-progressive dimension of societal value change and value conflict its due attention.  
That being said, this line of inquiry can be carried much further.  I propose that the 
authoritarianism critique can be greatly deepened and enriched by taking a note from the 
“economic” critiques of postmaterialist theory and measures.  As described in the previous 
chapter, these critiques (Clark and Dutt 1991; Clark, Dutt and Rapkin 1997a; Clark et al. 1999) 
argue for the impact of contextual economic factors – such as current rates of national inflation 
and unemployment – on the likelihood of respondents choosing either materialist or 
postmaterialist responses to the values priority question battery.  Interestingly, precisely this 
notion of “situationism” has in fact breathed fresh life into the authoritarianism research program 
as a whole, and it is time for these new insights to be carried back into the authoritarianism 
critique of postmaterialism and its measures.   
From Authoritarianism to an Authoritarian Dynamic 
In their classic study of authoritarianism, Adorno et al. (1950) identified and operationalized 
an “authoritarian personality” as measured by an F-Scale (fascism scale) consisting of nine 
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distinct traits: conventionalism, submission to authority, aggressiveness, subjectivity, superstition, 
“toughness”, cynicism, projectivity (a tendency to project one’s own desires, fears, etc. onto the 
outside world), and preoccupations with sex.  While the Adorno et al. treatment of 
authoritarianism remains a groundbreaking study, their methods and conclusions have been the 
subject of extensive criticism in the downstream literature.
3
  Robert Altemeyer’s (1981, 1988, 
1996) Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale was developed as direct improvement on 
Adorno et al.’s original operationalization of the concept.  Of the nine above features of an 
authoritarian personality contained within the Adorno et al. F-Scale, Altemeyer obtained that 
only three were actually correlated empirically, specifically (1) submissiveness to authorities, (2) 
aggression toward “deviants, outgroups, and others perceived to be targets by authorities,” and 
(3) conventionalism – “adherence to traditions and social norms” (Altemeyer 2007, p. 27).   
More recent studies in the authoritarianism literature (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Huddy et al. 
2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2005) have shifted from the notion of an authoritarian 
personality to the concept of an authoritarian dynamic.  A key argument of this new approach is 
that previous research on authoritarianism (in the vein of Adorno et al. and Altemeyer, above) 
has attempted to identify and measure authoritarianism as a core, relatively fixed personality trait 
using items that are much more valid indicators of the behaviors and attitudes – such as 
intolerance – for which authoritarianism as a concept was intended to predict.  Put more plainly, 
in the words of Karen Stenner (2005), the classic approach to authoritarianism “is tautological 
                                                 
3
 Major methodological critiques included objections to the lack of adequate random sampling, question format 
effects and response bias, and lack of systematic coding of the varied replies to the many open-ended questions 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2005, pp. 11-12).  Most critically, subsequent research revealed fundamental issues with 
the F-Scale’s lack of internal consistency; rather than reliably measuring a single unidimensional construct, the scale 
actually taps into a number of disparate attitudes and characteristics that are only loosely related to one another 
(Altemeyer 1981).      
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with the dependent variables it is supposed to explain” (p. 21).  Stenner (2005) holds that 
Altemeyer’s RWA scale can be viewed as a “highly reliable, empirically validated measure of 
authoritarian attitudes [but] not of an authoritarian predisposition” (p. 23; emphasis in original). 
A critical concern in the new authoritarianism literature – both in terms of conceptualization 
and measurement – thus focuses on making a clear and careful distinction between an 
authoritarian predisposition on the one hand and the types of behaviors and attitudes that 
constitute the manifestation of authoritarianism on the other.  An authoritarian predisposition, 
according to Stenner (2005), is a core value orientation “concerned with the appropriate balance 
between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity 
on the other” (p. 14).  Pure authoritarians, in this conceptualization, are characterized by “the 
belief that the personal needs, inclinations, and values of group members should be subordinated 
as completely as possible to the cohesion of the group and its members” (Duckitt 1989, p. 71; 
quoted in Feldman and Stenner 1997, p. 768), whereas pure non-authoritarians would be typified 
by the mindset that “the requirements of group cohesion should be subordinated as completely as 
possible to the autonomy and self-regulations of the individual member” (Ibid.). 
As Hetherington and Weiler (2005) note, measuring “core values” (a label appropriate to the 
above conceptualization of an authoritarian predisposition) that are causally prior to other social 
and political attitudes presents a formidable empirical challenge (p. 12).  What are needed are 
measures that do not unwittingly “sneak in” the dependent variables that the concept is intended 
to explain.  Contemporary researchers in this area have thus largely settled on the National 
Election Studies (NES) battery of forced-choice “child-rearing preference” questions, which 
contain no references to explicitly political attitudes or priorities, as a valid measure of an 
authoritarian predisposition (as distinct from authoritarian behaviors or attitudes in the political 
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realm).  Specifically, this scale classifies as the strongest authoritarians those individuals who 
hold that, for early childhood rearing: 
 Respect for elders is preferable to independence; 
 Obedience is preferable to self-reliance; 
 Good manners are preferable to curiosity; and 
 Being well-behaved is preferable to being considerate; 
 
with the strongest non-authoritarians those individuals who hold the opposite preferences on 
each of the above item pairings.   
Hetherington and Weiler (2005) observe that whereas the items contained within this battery 
“do not tap all three of the domains identified by Altemeyer (1996), they [do address] two of 
them – conformity to social conventions and submission to legitimate authority” (p. 12).  Most 
importantly, the key advantage of this approach to measuring authoritarianism as an underlying 
predisposition is that this scale is targeted specifically at core values and attitudes that should be 
causally prior to the inherently political behaviors and attitudes (intolerance of minority groups 
and opinions, submissiveness to political authority, xenophobia, etc.) which this new approach 
views as the consequences of an authoritarian predisposition being activated and made politically 
salient – rather than as aspects of authoritarianism itself. 
If an authoritarian predisposition on the one hand and authoritarian behaviors and attitudes on 
the other are two distinct phenomena – and can be empirically measured as such – how does the 
former manifest into the latter? Karen Stenner (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005) offers 
the concept of the “authoritarian dynamic” to answer this question.  In this new model, 
authoritarianism is viewed as a highly situation-specific phenomenon characterized by the 
interaction between an authoritarian predisposition and the perception of external threat.  
Feldman and Stenner (1997) observe that although it has long been held that threat and insecurity 
contribute to authoritarianism (Fromm 1941; Adorno et al. 1950; Rokeach 1960; Wilson 1973) 
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the precise relationship between threat and authoritarianism was never properly specified in these 
earlier studies.  Drawing in part on previous work by Sales (1972, 1973, Sales and Friend 1973), 
Doty, Peterson and Winter (1991) and McFarland, Ageyev and Hinton (1995), as well as 
findings in the political psychology literature on “terror management theory” (Rosenblatt et al. 
1989; Greenberg et al. 1990), Feldman and Stenner (1997) explicitly reject the implicit 
conventional wisdom that external threat somehow “causes” authoritarianism, proposing instead 
that: 
[I]t is not authoritarianism itself that increases in the face of transient environmental threat, but 
rather the relationship between authoritarianism and its attitudinal and behavioral manifestations 
or consequences, like intolerance. (Feldman and Stenner 1997, p. 744; emphasis in original) 
 
Thus, under low-threat conditions, authoritarians (that is, individuals with a predisposition 
towards authoritarianism) could be expected to exhibit political attitudes and behaviors that are 
not greatly different from those of their non-authoritarian fellows.  When threats to society 
become evident, however, this sense of perceived threat activates these latent authoritarian 
predispositions and makes them politically relevant.  Under these conditions, citizens possessing 
these predispositions will tend to exhibit precisely the types of behaviors and attitudes that 
Adorno et al. and Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996, 2006) identified as part of an authoritarian 
personality or “right wing authoritarian” (RWA) orientation – e.g. intolerance of minority groups 
and minority views, uncritical deference to authority, xenophobia, and general aggressiveness 
and hostility toward out-group members.   
(Post-)materialism, Authoritarianism and Threat 
How does this relate back to the authoritarianism critiques of the postmaterialism scale? If the 
new thinking on authoritarianism is correct in its assumptions and conclusions, then the items 
within the postmaterialism values priority battery (in both its short and long forms) that Flanagan, 
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Savage, Middendorp and others have identified as measures of authoritarianism are actually 
better understood as indicators of the expression or manifestation of an authoritarian 
predisposition.  If this is the case, then just as the economic nature of certain items in the 
postmaterialism index (e.g. “fighting rising prices”) cause the scale to be sensitive to 
contemporary, contextual macroeconomic conditions (e.g. inflation, unemployment), the 
presence of measures of authoritarian behaviors and attitudes should cause the index to be highly 
sensitive to respondents’ perception of threatening conditions that may be non-economic in 
nature. 
But what types of “threat” are most likely to activate an individual’s underlying authoritarian 
predispositions and make them politically relevant, both generally, and in the specific instance of 
individuals providing answers to the postmaterialism values priority index? Speaking to the 
general case, the findings in the new authoritarianism literature are both quite consistent and 
highly specific: the strongest catalyst for the manifestation of authoritarian behaviors and 
attitudes are perceived threats at the societal or national level, rather than immediate or direct 
danger to one’s own personal (physical, material, or economic) well-being (Feldman and Stenner 
1997; Stenner 2005; Huddy et al. 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2005).  In their analysis of 
1992 National Election Studies data, for example, Feldman and Stenner (1997) found the 
strongest interactive effects between an authoritarian predisposition (operationalized by the NES 
four-question child-rearing values battery) and individuals’ perceptions of threats to the United 
States as a nation, rather than threats to their own personal safety or household socio-economic 
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security.
4
 The authors conclude that, contrary to earlier treatments of the relationship between 
authoritarianism and threat,  
[R]ather than threats to individuals’ immediate well-being – for example, to their household 
economic situation – it is perceived threat at the societal level that arouses the ire of 
authoritarians and amplifies the impact of authoritarian predispositions on intolerant and punitive 
attitudes.  (Feldman and Stenner 1997, p. 761)
5
 
 
For the purposes of the present study, it is interesting to note that several of the items that 
Feldman and Stenner utilize to operationalize their dependent variables – and which they find to 
be significantly impacted by the interaction between an authoritarian predisposition and various 
forms of societal threat – are quite similar to the measures of authoritarian (vs. libertarian) 
attitudes contained within the postmaterialism values battery scale.  In fact, for their measure of 
an authoritarian preference for “order versus freedom,” Feldman and Stenner make direct use of 
the original four-item postmaterialism battery (as presented in the NES), constructing a 
dependent variable that reflects the relative priority that respondents give to “maintaining order 
in the nation” and “protecting freedom of speech.”6  Also, one of the items that Feldman and 
Stenner use to measure authoritarian attitudes toward the use of force – support for higher 
defense spending – is quite similar in face content to the “making sure our country has strong 
                                                 
4
 Feldman and Stenner observed  the two most pronounced and consistent interactive effects between (1) an 
authoritarian predisposition and perceived ideological diversity in the American political landscape and (2) an 
authoritarian predisposition and negative assessments of the presidential candidates (2005, p. 765).  The authors did 
also note strong and significant interactive effects between an authoritarian predisposition and perceptions of 
economic threat, but only in instances in which individuals viewed the national economic situation as in peril, rather 
than their own personal finances or employment status. 
5
 The specific “intolerant and punitive attitudes” that Feldman and Stenner include as dependent variables in their 
analyses are authoritarian attitudes toward minority groups (e.g. racial stereotyping and opposition to gay rights), 
authoritarian social and political attitudes (e.g. aggrandized in-group attachment and preference for order over 
freedom), and authoritarian attitudes toward the use of force (e.g. support for the death penalty and retrospective 
support for the first Persian Gulf War).   
6 Feldman and Stenner create two separate variables – an “order” variable (coded as 1 if “maintaining order in the 
nation” was a respondent’s first choice, 0.5 if it was there second choice, and 0 if it was selected) and a “freedom” 
coded in the same manner based on respondents’ choices vis-à-vis the “protecting freedom of speech” option.  A 
final measure of net preference for order over freedom was then created by multiplying the order variable by the 
inverse of the freedom variable (Feldman and Stenner 1997, pp. 749-50). 
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defense forces” (materialist) item in the extended twelve-item postmaterialist index.  
Interestingly, despite the fact that they utilize a core component of the original postmaterial 
index as one of their key dependent variables, the authors do not explicitly consider the 
implications of their theory or findings for postmaterialist theory or the measure of 
postmaterialist values.   
Hetherington and Weiler (2005) present evidence strongly supportive of Feldman and 
Stenner’s (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005) core proposition that a perception of 
external societal threat – or “normative threat” – is critical to activating the authoritarian 
predisposition and making it politically salient and apparent.  Noting that “the most noteworthy 
feature of an authoritarian disposition is an aversion to difference and adherence to militarism 
and conventionalism,” Hetherington and Weiler propose that the emergence and predominance 
of both (1) the gay marriage debate and (2) the war on terrorism as major issues on the national 
scene during the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency could be expected to have 
heightened authoritarians’ perceptions of threat and thus brought the disposition to the surface 
politically (Hetherington and Weiler 2005, p. 7).   
Specifically, Hetherington and Weiler assert that as authoritarians place “high value on 
conformity” and “tend to be staunch defenders of existing norms mores,” an authoritarian 
predisposition will be predictive of greater opposition to gay rights, now that gay rights issues 
have become prominent on the national agenda (and thus “threaten” the normative social order) 
(p. 16).  Similarly, as authoritarians “tend to prefer responses to threat that are more aggressive 
than those of non-authoritarians,” in the post-9.11 era one would expect an authoritarian 
predisposition to be predictive of more hawkish attitudes toward external military intervention 
and defense spending, as well as more positive affect toward the military (Hetherington and 
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Weiler 2005, p. 16).  The authors conduct analyses of 2004 National Election Studies data to 
arrive at conclusions highly supportive of these hypotheses.
7
 
It is worth noting here that Hetherington and Weiler’s “support for a strong military” item, 
like Feldman and Stenner’s “defense spending” variable, is quite similar to the “making sure our 
country has strong defense forces” authoritarian-materialist item in the extended twelve-item 
postmaterialism index.  Also interesting to note is that while Hetherington and Weiler explicitly 
ground their theoretical approach in the “authoritarian dynamic” approach of Feldman and 
Stenner (1997) and Stenner (2005), unlike those other studies Hetherington and Weiler include 
no direct measure of threat or of interactive effects between an authoritarian predisposition and 
(various types of) normative threat.  Rather, they make the strong (if quite reasonable) 
assumption that authoritarians have perceived a more threatening social, political and even 
physical environment in the post-9.11 period, and, as a result, the effect of authoritarianism on 
attitudes toward these (now more threatening) stimuli – the gay rights agenda and “homeland 
security” – has increased accordingly.  As Hetherington and Weiler themselves put it: 
[E]xternal threat increased exponentially after Sept. 11, 2001.  And a threat of a different sort 
increased as well with the national dialogue about the propriety of gay marriage in 2003 and 
2004.  As a result, the effect of authoritarianism essentially doubles in the four short years 
between Bush’s election and re-election. (p. 25) 
                                                 
7
 On opposition to gay rights, they find the effect of an authoritarian predisposition (as measured by the forced-
choice child rearing values battery) to have a positive impact that is both “quite significant and large,” both in 
absolute terms and in comparison to other relevant variables, such as partisanship (p. 18).  Similarly, Hetherington 
and Weiler find that an authoritarian predisposition is high predictive of (1) greater inclination “to favor the use of 
the military over diplomacy, (2) preference for higher defense spending, and (3) more positive feelings toward the 
military (p. 20).  For defense spending, the authoritarian predisposition variable outperforms all of the demographic 
variables in their models (e.g. age, gender, income, religion), and in the case of affect toward the military the impact 
of authoritarianism outstrips that of partisanship and is roughly equivalent to that of left-right ideology (p. 20).  
Hetherington and Weiler also find evidence of the strong impact of authoritarianism (that is, the authoritarian 
predisposition) on party identification, indicative of a “working class” authoritarian shift toward the Republican 
Party. 
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Huddy et al. (2005) are strongly in agreement with Hetherington and Weiler that perceptions 
of external/societal threat have increased markedly in the United States in the post-9.11 period, 
and that this more threatening environment has had profound political consequences in the form 
of increased manifestation of authoritarian attitudes toward a variety of issues.  In contrast to 
Hetherington and Weiler, however, Huddy et al. incorporate very concrete measures of threat 
into their analyses, rather than taking for granted that it is the threatening nature of the changed 
geopolitical environment that is driving this authoritarian resurgence.  Also, in contrast to 
Feldman and Stenner (2005), Huddy et al. are more willing to allow for the “direct” impact of 
threat on authoritarian attitudes and behaviors as separate from (and in addition to) the indirect 
impact of threat on such “intolerant and punitive” stances as mediated through an authoritarian 
predisposition.   
Huddy et al.’s emphasis is on threat itself as the motivating agent behind the manifestation of 
authoritarian political attitudes; the authors also focus on distinguishing the political 
consequences of external threat and those of anxiety.  Threat, Huddy et al. observe, has been 
found to have “remarkably consistent effects in past social science research,” notably as a strong 
predictor of such authoritarian political attitudes as “intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and 
xenophobia” (p. 594).  Perceptions of external threat cause individuals not only to derogate the 
“outgroups” viewed as the sources of these threats, but also to support punitive and/or retaliatory 
action against them (p. 594).  Feelings of anxiety, on the other hand, tend to lead individuals 
instead to “overestimation of risk and risk-averse behavior” and thus tend to undercut support for 
such punitive or retaliatory measures to the extent that such action is viewed as dangerous to 
their own personal well-being (Huddy et al. 2005, p. 594; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; 
Raghunathan and Pham 1999). 
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Huddy et al. find, consistent with their expectations, that in the months following the 9.11 
attacks, individuals who perceived higher levels of external threat were more likely to hold more 
authoritarian (i.e. punitive and retaliatory) attitudes in the form of heightened support for direct 
and aggressive U.S. military intervention overseas as a means to combat the terrorist threat. 
Meanwhile, feelings of anxiety in the wake of the 9.11 attacks were found to have precisely the 
opposite effect, consistent again with Huddy et al.’s expectations. 8   Americans who felt 
threatened (rather than anxious) vis-à-vis the possibility of future terrorist attacks against the U.S. 
were also more likely to endorse negative stereotypes of Arabs and more likely to support 
immigration policies and more intensive surveillance programs aimed at this “threatening” group 
(Huddy et al. 2005, p. 602).  
While in clear agreement with Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Stenner (2005) that 
perceptions of societal threat result in heightened manifestation of authoritarian (that is, 
intolerant and punitive) attitudes, Huddy et al. focus on threat itself as the primary motivator 
behind these phenomena, with the interaction between threat and the authoritarian predisposition 
a secondary consideration.  Rather than interacting their measures of threat with the (forced-
choice childhood rearing values) authoritarianism measure, Huddy et al. enter the threat and 
authoritarian predisposition variables as separate indicators in their models, and find that in each 
case threat has a stronger positive impact on the likelihood of respondents expressing 
                                                 
8
 Relevant data derived from a telephone poll conducted with adult American respondents between October 2001 
and March 2002) (p. 596). Threat in Huddy et al.’s analysis was measured by two items, one asking respondents 
“How concerned are you that there will be another terrorist attack on the United States in the near future?” (national 
threat) and “How concerned are you personally about you yourself, a friend, or a relative being the victim of a 
future terrorist attack on the United States?” (personal threat) (p. 596).  Anxiety was gauged by an item asking 
respondents “How much, if any, have the terrorist attacks shaken your own sense of personal safety and security?” 
and another item asking individuals how often they have felt anxious, scared, worried or frightened in the wake of 
the attacks (p. 596). 
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authoritarian stances on civil liberties issues (e.g. the implementation a national identification 
card and monitoring of email and telephone communication) than the authoritarian 
predisposition itself.  At the same time, Huddy et al. observe that an individual with an 
authoritarian predisposition tends to perceive higher levels of perceived external threat in the 
first place, and that this heightened sense of threat – as noted above – is predictive of 
authoritarian attitudes such as prejudice, intolerance, and support for punitive action (p. 599) 
No Libertarians in Foxholes? 
A central theme common to all of these studies above is the critical role of perceived threat as 
the catalyzing agent behind the manifestation of authoritarian attitudes and behavior.  Feldman 
and Stenner (1997) and Stenner (2005) emphasize the interaction of threat with the authoritarian 
predisposition in giving rise to these “intolerant and punitive” stances, whereas Hetherington and 
Weiler focus more on the predictive power of the authoritarian predisposition itself, with the 
critical underlying assumption that this predisposition has been made salient by the perception of 
a more threatening environment.  Finally, Huddy et al. (2005) make perhaps the strongest case 
for the direct impact of perceived threat on the manifestation of authoritarian behaviors and 
attitudes.  Huddy et al. also make a useful distinction between threat and anxiety, and the distinct 
antecedents and consequences of both.  The critical point is that a sense that the normative social 
order is endangered or under siege is predictive of more intolerant, punitive, and hawkish 
political stances – that is, more authoritarian attitudes – while a sense of anxiety about one’s own 
personal well-being and safety is predictive, in many cases, of effects that are precisely opposite 
to those of perceived threat.  The threat to which these studies refer, thus, is not the same as fear.  
Rather, it is threat as defined as a highly sociotropic concern with the health and well-being of 
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the normative social order as a whole that is the critical catalyst for the manifestation of 
authoritarian attitudes in the political sphere.
9
 
Postmaterialism, National Threat and National Attachment 
What specific types of threats are likely to have the greatest impact on respondents’ answers 
to the postmaterialism values priority battery? That is to say, what forms of perceived threat 
would be most likely to impact upon respondents’ likelihood of selecting the authoritarian-
materialist choices in the postmaterialism index as opposed to the libertarian-postmaterialist ones, 
thus producing a likely shift – whether “real” or apparent – towards lower levels of 
postmaterialism? I would argue that the postmaterialism index should demonstrate acute 
sensitivity to the presence, real or imagined, of a hostile international environment – that is, to 
the existence (or absence) of national threat in the minds of individuals.   
                                                 
9
 A few caveats should be noted at this point.  First, while the literature to date is in fairly unanimous agreement 
regarding the central role played by societal threat as a catalyzing force behind the manifestation of authoritarian 
attitudes, one cannot simply assume that heightened levels of perceived threat will result in elevated levels of 
punitive and intolerant behavior, either in the aggregate or across all segments of the population.  Consistent with 
Greenberg et al. (1990), Feldman and Stenner (1997) obtained in their findings that whereas high authoritarians do 
indeed exhibit more intolerant attitudes under threatening conditions, “those low in authoritarianism become even 
less punitive and ethnocentric under these conditions” (p. 762; emphasis in original).  McFarland, Ageyev and 
Hinton (1995) note a similar “polarizing” effect in their cross-national study of economic threat and authoritarianism 
in America and Russia, though only within their American sample, as Russian non-authoritarians do not become 
significantly less intolerant or punitive under conditions of perceived threat.  As Feldman and Stenner (1997) note, 
“the absence of the polarization effect in the Russian data indicates that more cross-national research is needed to 
determine the generalizability of this finding” (p. 762).  The important point to be noted here is that one cannot 
automatically assume that heightened societal threat will result in elevated manifestation of authoritarian attitudes in 
each and every case, as the presence (or absence) of an authoritarian predisposition may be a critical consideration in 
determining the actual impact of threat on measurable political attitudes. 
A second point to consider is that certain types of societal threat may be so overwhelming or universally 
compelling that they do not require mediation through an authoritarian predisposition to translate into authoritarian 
political behaviors and attitudes.  Huddy et al., as noted above, find considerable evidence of this in regard to the 
terrorist threat.  Of course, the threats in these cases cannot truly be said to have a truly “direct” effect on political 
attitudes, any more than any external stimulus can be said to directly impact on subsequent opinions and behaviors.  
Perceived societal threats may exhibit influence on authoritarian stances independent of interaction with the 
authoritarian predisposition (as measured by the four-question NES child-rearing values battery), still, they must be 
mediated through some aspect of our psychology or biology to have a measureable impact on the manifestation of 
intolerant, punitive and xenophobic stances and behaviors. 
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There are several reasons to expect this to hold true.  First, a perception of threat to the 
interests and image of one’s national community as a whole would certainly seem to qualify as 
precisely the type of sociotropic, normative threat that the above-mentioned “authoritarianism 
dynamic” research program (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2005, Hetherington and 
Weiler 2005, Huddy et al. 2005) asserts would generally make individuals more likely to 
prioritize authoritarian values and priorities (e.g. the materialist option of “maintaining order in 
the nation”) over libertarian ones (e.g. the postmaterialist option of “protecting freedom of 
speech”), resulting in a net shift in favor of higher materialism, all other things being equal.   
Second, the postmaterialism values priority batteries contain at least two materialist options – 
“ensuring our country has strong defense forces” and “maintaining order in the nation” – that can 
be viewed as not only indicators of an authoritarian preoccupation with order, obedience and 
strength, but also a nationalistic concern with the strength and integrity of one’s nation as a 
whole and (most especially) its relative power as compared to other global actors (Conover and 
Feldman 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Feshbach 1994; Schatz et al. 1999; de Figueiredo 
and Elkins 2003).   
Schatz et al. (1999) have noted a strong positive correlation among American subjects 
between nationalism
10
, individuals’ perceptions of national vulnerability and their concerns over 
cultural contamination.  Although direction of causality is not established in Schatz et al.’s study, 
unless one holds to the rather untenable notion that the line of causality runs only and always 
                                                 
10
 Nationalism was operationalized in Schatz et al.’s study by gauging subjects’ level of agreement with statements 
such as “In view of America’s moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have more say in 
deciding United Nations policy”; similarly, national vulnerability was measured by gauging subjects level of 
agreement with items such as “The United States would probably be attacked if it weakened its defenses”; and 
cultural contamination was measured by gauging subjects’ level of agreement with items such as “Widespread 
adoption of cultural practices from foreign countries would trouble me because it might change or water down 
American culture too much” (Schatz et al. 1999,  p. 187). 
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from nationalistic attitudes to feelings of national vulnerability/threat, and not the other way 
around, then one is left with the strong possibility that higher levels of perceived national threat 
will tend to result in heightened levels of expressed nationalism in the form of increased 
preoccupation with the relative power and prestige of one’s own nation vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world.  The critical implications of this for the current study would be an expected tendency for 
individuals who perceive higher levels of external threat to their nation to place greater emphasis 
on the nationalistic concerns embodied in the materialist priorities of “ensuring our country has 
strong defense forces” and “maintaining order in the nation,” resulting once again, all other 
things being equal, in a net shift in favor of materialism. 
 Finally, if nationalistic attitudes do indeed tend to be aggrandized among individuals as a 
consequence of heightened perceptions of national threat, it would not be unreasonable to 
assume that other orientations and attitudes that are positively correlated with nationalistic 
attitudes may tend to be heightened as well.  Numerous studies have obtained that nationalism – 
together with its close cousin “blind patriotism” (see below) – correlate positively and strongly 
with intolerance toward recognized outgroups, as well as intolerance of minority, dissenting or 
critical opinions (Conover and Feldman 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Staub 1989, 1991, 
1997; Schatz et al. 1999; de Figuereido and Elkins 2003).  Thus, if a heightened sense of national 
threat does indeed tend to translate into exaggerated nationalistic/blindly patriotic attitudes, it 
would not be unreasonable to assume that the generalized intolerance toward dissent and 
difference that tends to accompany these types of attitudes would in turn result in a tendency for 
individuals to be less likely to prioritize such (libertarian) postmaterialist values as “protecting 
freedom of speech” and “giving people more say in important political decisions” – tending to 
result, once again, in a net shift in favor of materialism. 
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National Attachment 
The authoritarian dynamic research program holds that the tendency for a perception of 
heightened societal/normative threat to translate into increased manifestation of authoritarian 
attitudes will be more pronounced among individuals who are more “authoritarian” in the first 
place, in the sense of possessing a stronger authoritarian predisposition as measured by the NES 
child-rearing values question battery.  If it is indeed the case that, similarly, the perception of 
increased national threat tends to result in heightened manifestation of nationalistic and/or 
blindly patriotic attitudes, one might reasonably expect that such a tendency would be more 
pronounced among individuals who are more nationalistic/patriotic in the first place, as 
measured by some instrument that gauges individual national attachment/affect as a “core value” 
causally prior to other socio-political attitudes.  But does such an instrument currently exist? To 
answer this question, a mercifully brief review of the relevant literature and the established 
measures and terminologies is appropriate here. 
The terms nationalism and patriotism (and their sub-variants) have very specific and 
distinction meanings in the political behavior literature, which has long recognized the multi-
dimensional nature of the phenomenon of national attachment.  Adorno et al. (1950), for 
example, asserted a distinction between a form of “pseudo” patriotism characterized by blind and 
unquestioning loyalty and attachment to the nation, and a “genuine” patriotism entailing 
devotion to one’s country and its values based on an informed, “critical understanding” (p. 107).  
Staub (1989, 1991, 1997) and Schatz et al. (1999) draw a similar distinction between “blind” and 
“constructive” patriotism.  Blind patriotism, similar to Adorno et al.’s (1950) notion of “pseudo” 
patriotism, is a “rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning 
positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism” (Schatz et al. 1999, p. 153).  
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Meanwhile, constructive patriotism, like Adorno et al.’s (1950) “genuine” patriotism, is a species 
of attachment to one’s nation informed by a “critical loyalty” (Staub 1989) in the sense of a 
healthy “questioning and criticism of current group practices…driven by a desire for positive 
change” (Schatz et al. 1999, p. 153).  Both of these species of patriotism share a “core sense of 
positive identification with and feelings of affective attachment to country,” but are distinguished 
by the blind patriot’s intolerance of national criticism as “inherently disloyal,” an attitude which 
is not shared by the constructive patriot (Schatz et al., p. 153).
11
   
Theorists in this area of inquiry also draw a distinction between patriotism (of both the “blind” 
and “constructive” varieties) on the one hand and nationalism on the other.  As de Figueiredo 
and Elkins (2003, p. 178) observe, whereas patriotism is understood generally as a self-
referential, positive regard for and attachment to one’s nation, institutions, and principles, 
nationalism is defined as an intrinsically comparative orientation or process.  Nationalism, in this 
view, entails “feelings of superiority of one’s own country vis-à-vis other countries” (Conover 
and Feldman 1987, p. 1), an “orientation toward national dominance” (Kosterman and Feshbach 
1989, p. 271), a fixation on “competition with other nations, and [on] the importance of power 
over other nations” (Feshbach 1994, p. 281), and, consequentially, a psychological “commitment 
to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation’s institutions and principles” (de Figueiredo 
and Elkins 2003, p. 178; emphasis added).  Patriotism and nationalism thus represent 
“functionally different psychological dimensions” (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, p. 272) as 
two separate and distinct processes by which individuals relate to their nation – one self-
referential, the other comparative.  Still, the two orientations find common ground in a general 
                                                 
11
 Blind patriotism, which Schatz et al. define as a “My country right or wrong” form of uncritical and unquestioning 
loyalty to one’s country, is measured in their study by agreement with items such as “It is un-American to criticize 
this country,” whereas constructive patriotism is characterized by endorsement of more nuanced statements such as 
“If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country.” (pp. 152, 159). 
 62 
sense of “national attachment” (Schatz et al, 1999).  Patriots (whether “blind” or constructive”) 
and nationalists are united in their concern for the nation; the distinction lies in how this concern 
is expressed.  As de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) observe, “patriotism often takes the form of 
beliefs in the social system and values of one’s country,” whereas expressions of nationalism 
often manifest themselves as “appeals to advance the national interests in the international order” 
(p. 178; emphasis in original). 
Thus, while correlated in their core concern for the well-being of the nation, patriotism (at 
least in its “constructive” form) and nationalism are quite divergent in their impact on key 
dependent variables, such as xenophobia and support for aggressive foreign and defense policies 
at the national level.  Patriotism, which de Figueiredo and Elkins define (very much in line with 
Schatz et al.’s definition of “constructive patriotism”) as “an attachment to the nation, its 
institutions, and founding principles” (p. 175) is found in their analysis to have a weakly 
negative relationship with intolerance toward outgroup members (i.e. immigrants to the United 
States). Meanwhile, nationalism, which they identify as “a belief in national superiority and 
dominance” and “a commitment to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation’s institutions 
and principles” (p. 175) is determined to have a strongly positive correlation with prejudice 
toward foreigners.  Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), utilizing similar definitions and 
operationalizations of patriotism and nationalism, found the latter to be (among their U.S. sample) 
highly correlated with support for the maintenance and/or expansion of America’s nuclear arms 
arsenal, with the former orientation correlated to this stance only quite weakly.  Conover and 
Feldman (1987) note similar patterns in their analysis of patriotism and nationalism items in the 
1987 National Election Studies (NES), with the two orientations having significantly different 
relationships with attitudes towards international engagement, cooperation, and conflict. 
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“The Nationalist Dynamic” 
I propose that the political behavior research program on national attachment can be 
strengthened by integrating the “situationism” insight of the authoritarian dynamic paradigm into 
its theoretical foundations and empirical investigations.  As it currently stands, the contemporary 
political behavior literature’s conventional wisdom recognizes a fairly static distinction between 
at least one “positive” species and one or more “negative” strains of national attachment.  One 
may also note that the conventional wisdom running through the current literature would appear 
to hold that patriotism – that is, a self-referential regard and concern for one’s own nation – may 
have either positive or negative consequences, whereas nationalism – viewed as a comparative 
and competitive form of national attachment – is viewed as an inherently negative (“My country 
right or wrong, but yours always wrong”) orientation that can only have negative 
consequences.
12
 
I argue here that the rigid understanding of the (sometimes) positive “patriotic” side of 
national attachment as inherently self-referential and the (always) negative “nationalistic” side as 
intrinsically comparative should be questioned.  A more useful way to approach and analyze the 
multidimensional nature of national attachment – following recent developments in the 
authoritarianism literature – would be to focus on the differences in nationalistic/patriotic 
response to different stimuli.  I believe that the distinction between the “positive” and “negative” 
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 Take, for example, the concepts of “patriotism” and “constructive patriotism” as operationalized by de 
Figuereido and Elkins (2003) and Schatz et al. (1999), respectively.  Both are “positive” in that they are 
characterized by a prideful regard for one’s own nation without necessarily entailing derogation of other nations (as 
in the case of that other species of national attachment, which de Figuereido and Elkins and Schatz et al. both term 
“nationalism”) or intolerance of or hostility toward domestic critics and their dissenting opinions (as in the case of 
Schatz et al.’s “blind patriotism”).  Note that the current literature does not appear to allow room for the possibility 
of a breed of national attachment that makes reference to other nations and actors in the international order but does 
not do so in purely derogatory or conflictual terms.  In other words, as the conventional wisdom currently stands, 
while patriotism may be good or bad, nationalism is invariably bad.  
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species of national attachment may become less rigid after we incorporate the notion of 
situationism – specifically, the concepts of perceived national threat and national assurance.   
I propose that an outwardly-focused form of national attachment can have positive as well as 
negative consequences, contingent on individuals’ perceptions of the nature of the international 
environment in which their nation exists.  If citizens in a given country perceive a highly 
threatening global environment characterized by fierce, zero-sum competition and open conflict 
– that is, if they perceive a high degree of national threat – one would expect to find an increased 
manifestation among these individuals of precisely the types of “negative” behaviors and 
attitudes that the current literature ascribes to nationalism and blind patriotism, such as 
xenophobia, intolerance toward immigrants and other “out-group” interlopers, and desires for 
increased dominance over other nations and actors in the global scene.  By the same token, if 
individuals perceive an international order that is characterized more generally by camaraderie, 
mutual encouragement and positive-sum cooperation – what I term here national assurance – it 
is not unreasonable to assume that one would observe decreased manifestation of these same 
attitudes and behaviors.
13
 
For the practical purposes of the current study, an important issue to address is that the 
currently proposed and employed measures of the various forms of patriotism and nationalism do 
not include an agreed-upon measure of national attachment as an underlying “core value” 
                                                 
13
 This is not, by any means, a radically new idea.  For example, as noted above, Schatz et al. (1999) observe that 
nationalism correlates positively with the degree to which individuals feel their nation to be “vulnerable” or in 
danger of “cultural contamination,” however, the authors do not explore in depth the causality or specific 
conditionality of these relationships.  Elsewhere in their study, Schatz et al. (1999) posit a similar situational 
relationship vis-à-vis (blind) patriotism, noting that “increased patriotism would be expected when a society 
experiences ‘difficult life conditions’ (Staub 1989) of either an internal nature (e.g., economic hardship or very great 
and rapid societal change) or an external nature (e.g. war)” (Schatz et al. 1999, p. 171), but once again the authors do 
not test this relationship empirically. 
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equivalent to the NES child-rearing values battery used to measure individuals’ latent 
predisposition toward authoritarianism.  The 4-question NES battery measures an authoritarian 
predisposition as a coherent cluster of core attitudes toward early child upbringing that are 
causally prior to individuals’ attitudes in the political realm, where the expression of 
authoritarian values may or may not actually place (as a consequence of the presence or absence 
of perceived societal threat).  The national attachment literature to date has not drawn a similar 
theoretical and empirical distinction between individuals’ core sense of attachment to and affect 
towards their nation, on the one hand, and the situation-specific manifestation of that core value 
in the form of patriotic (whether “blind” or “constructive”) and nationalistic attitudes in the 
political realm on the other.   
I thus precede cautiously (and agnostically) in the formulation of my specific hypotheses 
below, and in the execution and analysis of the empirical study that follows, by utilizing a 
general measure of national attachment that incorporates a broad range of items that have been 
utilized in previous studies to measure the various dimensions of national attachment 
(nationalism, patriotism and their sub-varieties). 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses – National Threat and Measured Postmaterialism 
Let us proceed under the assumption that the attitudinal and behavioral manifestations of a 
“nationalistic” and/or “blindly patriotic” orientation – xenophobia, desires for national 
dominance over other nations and global actors, intolerance of “outgroups” and dissenting 
opinions, etc. – can indeed be expected to be more pronounced under conditions of higher levels 
of perceived national threat.  Let us then pair this assumption with the (much more firmly 
theoretically and empirically grounded) proposition that the attitudinal and behavioral 
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manifestations of an “authoritarian” orientation – intolerance of minority groups and minority 
views, uncritical deference to authority, xenophobia, general aggressiveness and hostility toward 
out-group members – can also be expected to be manifested more strongly under such conditions 
of heightened perceived external threat.  What then, are the expected implications of heightened 
levels of perceived national threat for the measured levels of postmaterialism within a given 
population sample? 
First, let us turn our attention the original 4-item postmaterialism question battery, which is 
still widely used as an alternative to the full-length postmaterialism index, and also appears as 
the middle values-priority battery within the full-length 12-item scale.  In this battery 
respondents are offered the options of: 
1. Maintaining order in the nation. 
2. Giving people more say in important political decisions. 
3. Fighting rising prices. 
4. Protecting freedom of speech. 
 
I take issue with Inglehart’s (1971) original assertion that the “maintaining order in the nation” 
item offered as the first option in this list can be “presumed to relate, above all, to the protection 
of property” (p. 944).  Whatever such purely materialistic sentiments this item might also capture, 
it could also clearly be viewed, as suggested by Flanagan (1987) and others (Savage 1985; 
Middendorp 1989; Todosijević and Enyedi 2000) as an expression of an authoritarian 
preoccupation with societal order and obedience to authority as intrinsic goods in and of 
themselves.  Furthermore, this priority could also be viewed as highly consistent with 
nationalistic concerns for the strength, security and unity of the nation-state. 
Thus, given the assumption of increased levels of authoritarian and nationalistic sentiment 
among a given sample population as a consequence of heightened levels of perceived national 
threat, one could expect individuals under such conditions to be significantly more likely to 
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select the “maintaining order” in the nation materialist item as a valued priority.  Furthermore, 
one could expect increased preference for the “order” authoritarian-materialist item to come at 
the expense of the two libertarian-postmaterialist options of “giving people more say in 
important political decisions” and “protecting freedom of speech.”  At the same time, one would 
expect preference for the remaining materialist item – “fighting rising prices” – to be relatively 
immune to the effects of increased perceptions of national threat, as this item is (relatively) 
removed from both the authoritarian-libertarian value conflict and from nationalistic 
preoccupations with national strength and relative power.  Following from the above predictions 
one would expect that the measured level of postmaterialism among a given population 
perceiving a heightened level of national threat would be significantly lower (that is, further 
toward the materialist end of the scale) than it would be in the absence of such perceived threat. 
Thus, as the first set of testable hypotheses, we have: 
(H1) In their responses to the original four-item postmaterialism index, individuals perceiving 
higher levels of national threat will be significantly more likely to be classified as materialists 
and/or significantly less likely to be classified as postmaterialists, as they will be 
 (H1a)  more likely to select the ‘maintaining order in the nation’ materialist item; 
(H1b) less likely to select the ‘giving people more say in important political decisions’ 
postmaterialist item; 
(H1c) less likely to select the ‘protecting freedom of speech’ postmaterialist item; and 
(H1d) no more or less likely to select the ‘fighting rising prices’ materialist item. 
In the full-length postmaterialism index, respondents are presented first with what I designate 
for the purposes of this study as the “country aims”14 4-item battery, which offers the options of: 
1. A high level of economic growth. 
2. Making sure this country has strong defense forces. 
                                                 
14
I choose the “country aims” short-hand for this battery following the wording of the standard preamble that 
appears before the options are offered, namely that “People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country 
should be for the next ten years” (1999-2002 World Values Survey English Questionnaire; emphasis added). 
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3. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their 
communities. 
4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 
 
As with the original 4-item postmaterialism battery, the “country” aims battery contains a 
materialist item that should be highly appealing from both an authoritarian and a nationalistic 
viewpoint, in this case, “making sure this country has strong defense forces.”  It thus seems 
highly plausible that individuals who perceive higher levels of national threat – and who thus 
exhibit both more authoritarian and more nationalistic attitudes – would be significantly more 
likely to select this item as a priority.  At the same time, and in contrast with the original 4-item 
battery above, the other materialist item offered in this instance – “a high level of economic 
growth” – is likely to have considerable appeal for individuals with heightened nationalistic 
concern and sensitivity regarding their country’s relative power vis-à-vis other global actors, as 
this item speaks far more directly to a nation’s comprehensive power than does the rather 
bloodless “fighting rising prices” item offered in the original battery.   
Increased manifestation of authoritarian and/or nationalistic attitudes among individuals who 
perceive high levels of national threat should decrease the likelihood that they will select the 
libertarian “seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their 
communities” item, though it is less clear what effect, if any, heightened authoritarian or 
nationalistic attitudes would have on respondents’ likelihood of selecting the “trying to make our 
cities and countryside more beautiful” item, which is actually more indicative of aesthetic or 
“quality-of-life” concerns then it is of libertarian ones.  Simple logic, however, would suggest 
that the perception of a more threatening external environment would cause individuals to place 
less emphasis on such “higher-order” priorities.  Finally, following the predictions above, one 
would expected the net effect of a heightened level of perceived national threat to tend to push 
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individuals towards a lower level of postmaterialism as measured by this battery  I thus offer the 
following formal hypotheses for testing: 
(H2) In their responses to the first (‘country aims’) battery comprising the full twelve-item 
postmaterialism index, individuals perceiving higher levels of national threat will be 
significantly more likely to be classified as materialists and/or significantly less likely to be 
classified as postmaterialists, as they will be 
 (H2a) more likely to select the ‘making sure our country has strong defense forces’ 
materialist item; 
(H2b) less likely to select the ‘seeing that people have more say about how things are done 
at their jobs and in their communities’ postmaterialist item; 
(H2c) less likely to select the ‘trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful’ 
postmaterialist item; and 
(H2d) more likely to select the ‘a high level of economic growth’ materialist item.15 
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 The third and final battery appearing in the full twelve-item postmaterialism index, which for the sake of 
convenience I refer to hereafter as the “most important aims” [following the wording of the typical question 
preamble, which reads: “In your opinion, which one of these is the most important?” (World Values Survey 1999-
2002 English Questionnaire; emphasis added) battery, offers respondents the following four options: 
1. A stable economy. 
2. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society. 
3. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money. 
4. The fight against crime. 
Of the three individual 4-item batteries comprising the full-length postmaterialism index, this last grouping of 
postmaterialist and materialist value priorities would appear to be the least likely to exhibit strong sensitivities to 
respondents’ perceptions of heightened levels of national threat.  While “the fight against crime” materialist item is 
reflective of an authoritarian concern with social order – and the need to punish those individuals who violate social 
norms – it is quite removed from nationalistic concerns with comprehensive national power and competitiveness 
with other global actors.  In fact, an argument could be made that a heightened sense of threat to the nation-state 
might even make individuals less likely to emphasize the need to punish domestic criminals, in light of the existence 
of a common, external enemy.   
The “most important aims” battery would appear to be the only one of the three values priority batteries that does 
not contain at least one materialist item that speaks simultaneously to both authoritarian and nationalistic concerns 
(as do the “maintaining order in the nation” and “making sure this country has strong defense forces” items in the 
previous two batteries).  One could argue that the “stable economy” materialist option could become more attractive 
to individuals with heightened nationalistic sensibilities – and thus greater concern with their nation’s overall 
comprehensive power and wealth – but on the face of it this item would appear to lack the dynamism of the “high 
level of economic growth” option, and is closer to the “fighting rising prices” item as a laudable but relatively 
inglorious goal for the nation.  Furthermore, as has been observed previously (Flanagan 1987; Middendorp 1989; 
Todosijević and Enyedi 2000), the two postmaterialist options offered in this battery are both fairly well removed 
from the authoritarian-libertarian value conflict, and thus the likelihood of their selection by respondents is unlikely 
to be influenced by the heightened levels of authoritarian attitudes that an increased perception of national threat is 
expected to produce.   
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Hypotheses – National Assurance and Measured Postmaterialism 
If heightened levels of perceived national threat tend to manifest into lower levels of 
postmaterialism – as measured by the values priority batteries – it stands to reason that lower 
levels of perceived national threat would tend to produce effects in the opposite direction.  Thus, 
I explicate below a separate set of hypotheses concerning the impact of lower levels of perceived 
national threat – or in my preferred terminology, higher levels of perceived national assurance – 
on individuals’ responses to the postmaterialism index questions. 
Hypotheses in the vein are, understandably, more tentative than those proposed in the section 
above.  The extant literature on authoritarianism (and to a much lesser extent, that on national 
attachment) offers fairly robust and straightforward conclusions regarding the impact of 
heightened normative or societal-level threat on political and social values such as tolerance, 
pluralism, and freedom of expression (as well as attitudes such as xenophobia and punitiveness 
toward norm-violators).  These literatures have much less to say regarding the likely 
consequences of the relative absence of threat on these types of values and attitudes – values and 
attitudes that, as described above, can be expected to have significant and profound 
consequences levels of measured postmaterialism.  Still, the available data – combined with 
simple logic – allow for the formulation of some reasonably plausible and testable predictions. 
In regard to the core, original four-item posmaterialism values priority battery, one could 
expect the perception of a lower levels of national threat (that is, of a less hostile international 
environment) to cause individuals to de-emphasize the authoritarian priority of “maintaining 
                                                                                                                                                             
In consideration of these factors, and in light of limitations on time and resources, the “most important aims” 4-
item battery was not included in either phase of the 2010 Chinese University Student Values Survey, and no specific 
hypotheses regarding this battery are presented here.  
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order in the nation.”  This prediction is supported both by a simple reversal of the authoritarian 
dynamic logic (here, lower threat  reduced manifestation of authoritarian attitudes) and by the 
common sense proposition that the perception of lower levels of external threat would cause 
individuals to place less priority on the need for internal order and unity.   
In a similar vein, one could expect that individuals perceiving lower levels of national threat 
would be more likely to emphasize the libertarian values of “giving people more say in important 
political decisions” and “protecting freedom of speech” – as “higher-order” priorities that 
become more attractive and attainable when the security and position of the nation in the global 
system is less in question.  Also, as above, there is no a priori reason to believe that the relative 
perception of national threat or national assurance will have any impact on individuals’ emphasis 
on “fighting rising prices” as a value priority.   
Finally, as all of the hypothesized individual effects of heightened national assurance are in 
the direction of increased likelihood of individuals’ selecting postmaterialist items over 
materialist ones, one would expect an increased perception of national assurance to precipitate a 
significant net shift in towards higher measured postmaterialism.  Thus, I offer the following 
hypotheses for testing. 
(H3) In their responses to the original four-item postmaterialism index, individuals perceiving 
higher levels of national assurance will be significantly less likely to be classified as materialists 
and/or significantly more likely to be classified as postmaterialists, as they will be 
(H3a) less likely to select the ‘maintaining order in the nation’ materialist item; 
(H3b) more likely to select the ‘giving people more say in important political decisions’ 
postmaterialist item; 
(H3c) more likely to select the ‘protecting freedom of speech’ postmaterialist item; and 
(H3d) no more or less likely to select the ‘fight rising prices’ materialist item. 
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In most respects, hypotheses H3-H3d above are simply the reverses of hypotheses H1-H1d 
(concerning the predicted impact of heightened national threat on responses to the original four-
item postmaterialism battery).  Similarly, predictions regarding the impact of increased national 
assurance on individuals’ responses to the first (‘country aims’) battery within the full twelve-
item postmaterialism index are essentially the reverses of the hypotheses (H2-H2d) offered in 
regard to the impact of heightened perceived national threat on responses to this battery: 
(H4) In their responses to the first (‘country aims’) battery comprising the full twelve-item 
postmaterialism index, individuals perceiving higher levels of national assurance will be 
significantly less likely to be classified as materialists and/or significantly more likely to be 
classified as postmaterialists, as they will be 
(H4a) less likely to select the ‘making sure our country has strong defense forces’ 
materialist item; 
(H4b) more likely to select the ‘seeing that people have more say about how things are done 
at their jobs and in their communities’ postmaterialist item; 
(H4c) more likely to select the ‘trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful’ 
postmaterialist item; and 
(H4d) less likely to select the ‘a high level of economic growth’ materialist item. 
 
Hypotheses – Interactive Effects 
As noted previously, recent theoretical developments and empirical findings in the 
authoritarianism literature have emphasized the “situational” nature of the authoritarian dynamic, 
specifically, the notion that an authoritarian predisposition requires the presence of a sense of 
societal-level, normative threat to be activated and be made politically relevant – resulting in 
manifestation of authoritarian attitudes.  I have suggested that such a situational dynamic may 
also be evident in the interaction between underlying national attachment and the presence of 
normative threat at the national level, with the perception of a more hostile international 
environment resulting in the heightened manifestation of more nationalistic or blindly patriotic 
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attitudes.  As noted above, heightened manifestation of both authoritarian and 
nationalistic/blindly patriotic attitudes can be expected to impact directly upon subjects’ levels of 
measured postmaterialism, specifically in the direction of increasing the likelihood that 
individuals will be classified as more materialistic based upon their responses the values priority 
batteries.  In other words, if these interactive effects are present, we would expect to see subjects’ 
levels of authoritarianism and national attachment to have greater (negative) impact on their 
levels of measured postmaterialism under conditions of perceived national threat than we would 
in their absence.  By the same logic, we would expect the impact of these underlying 
predispositions to be more muted – or mitigated completely – under conditions of heightened 
national assurance. Thus, I offer the following four general hypotheses for testing. 
Under conditions of higher levels of perceived national threat 
(H5a) individuals’ levels of authoritarianism will have a stronger negative impact on their 
levels of measured postmaterialism; and 
(H5b) individuals’ levels of national attachment will have a stronger negative impact on 
their levels of measured postmaterialism (as measured by the values priority batteries). 
Meanwhile, under conditions of heightened levels of perceived national assurance 
(H5c) individuals’ levels of authoritarianism will have a weaker negative impact on their 
levels of postmaterialism; and 
(H5d) individuals’ levels of national attachment will have a weaker negative impact on their 
levels of postmaterialism (as measured by the values priority batteries). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, it will first be necessary to operationalize the 
phenomena of ‘national threat’ and ‘national assurance’ in a concrete and practical manner 
within the context of a controlled research environment.  For the purposes at hand, the specific 
challenge is to identify and/or formulate usable content capable of producing heightened feelings 
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of national threat or national assurance in citizens of the country that is the substantive focus of 
this study, namely, the People’s Republic of China.  This challenge is the focus of the chapter 
that follows. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CHINESE NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL THREAT 
In the previous chapters I have attempted to demonstrate that postmaterialist theory may be 
improved by recognizing the possibility that individuals’ perception of national threat – or lack 
thereof – may have profound and significant effects on their ranking of the competing goals 
contained within the postmaterialism values priority batteries.  Building upon the arguments of 
Flanagan (1987) and others, and following recent findings in the authoritarianism literature, I 
have argued that the libertarianism-authoritarianism dimension contained within postmaterialism 
(as it is currently measured) should demonstrate high sensitivity to respondents’ perceptions of 
external threat.  I have also drawn upon theoretical and empirical insights in the national 
attachment literature to suggest that nationalistic attitudes, like authoritarian ones, may be 
expected to manifest themselves more strongly when individuals perceive a more hostile external 
environment.  Thus, given the fact that the authoritarian and nationalistic items contained within 
the values priority batteries are almost exclusively categorized as ‘materialistic’ – and the 
libertarian ones as ‘postmaterialistic’ – we have a strong theoretical and logical basis for 
expecting that perception of a more threatening external environment on the part of individuals 
within a society will result in a net shift away from postmaterialism, as the concept is currently 
measured. 
Thus, presuming that individuals have at least of modicum of attachment to and concern for 
the security, well-being and reputation of their nation, perceptions of threat to that nation will 
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result in lower levels of measured postmaterialism, all other things being held equal.  Conversely, 
one might expect to find higher levels of measured postmaterialism among individuals who feel 
relatively assured about the security, prosperity and dignity of their nation.  
As a substantive case for testing these hypotheses I focus on the People’s Republic of China.  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this study, various scholars writing in the 
modernization school have offered some very strong predictions regarding the future trajectory 
of China’s political system, based on the expectation that sustained economic growth will tend to 
transform citizens’ value orientations in ways that make authoritarian rule increasingly untenable, 
and a transition to some form of democratic regime more and more likely.  In other words, 
China’s continued economic growth and development will (continue) to effect a societal shift 
away from survival/materialist values and toward self-expression/postmaterialist ones, resulting 
in increasing popular demand for greater political liberalization and ultimately democratization 
at the national level.  Omitted from these predictions, however, is consideration of the role of 
national attachment, which – although much of the data available to date have been anecdotal – 
is likely to be quite strong and salient among the general Chinese public.   Considerable evidence 
also exists that the average Chinese citizen is relatively sensitive to the presence of external 
threat to both the material interests and international reputation of their nation from foreign 
powers.   I believe that these conditions make the modern People’s Republic of China a suitable 
test-case for the hypotheses proposed here, as a “likely case” for the predicted effects of national 
threat (and national assurance) on postmaterialist attitudes to be found.       
In the current chapter I first provide a very brief overview of the major themes in the Chinese 
attachment literature.  As will be demonstrated here, much previous research on this subject has 
focused primarily on the elite level, that is, on the desires and motivations of China’s political 
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leaders, with the beliefs of individual Chinese citizens either assumed or inferred from overt 
behavior and pronouncements on the occasion of certain high-profile events (such as student 
protests following the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade).  Another 
common theme in this line of inquiry has been to focus on the direct role that Chinese 
nationalism plays in shoring up support for the current regime, with much less attention paid to 
the indirect effects of Chinese national attachment – and perceptions of national threat – on 
regime support as mediated through their impact on individuals’ endorsement of democratic 
versus authoritarian values. 
In the second half of the chapter, I discuss the results of a survey conducted amongst Chinese 
university students in Guangzhou in the fall of 2009 to gauge reactions to a selection of media 
images and brief news stories (the content of which were suggested from the prior review of the 
extant Chinese nationalism literature) considered likely to produce either heightened feelings of 
anger/threat (national threat) or happiness/pride (national assurance).  Drawing directly on the 
findings from this preliminary study, I conclude this chapter by formulating the two distinct sets 
of experimental treatments utilized in the 2010 Chinese University Students Values Survey 
(CUSVS), the survey instrument used to test directly the hypotheses presented in this paper (the 
results of which are the focus of the following chapter). 
Modern Chinese Nationalism 
As noted above, much previous research on the subject of Chinese national attachment – 
inevitably labeled “Chinese nationalism” – has focused primarily on the elite level, that is, on the 
desires, motivations and maneuverings of China’s political leaders.  Christensen succinctly 
summarizes the prevailing conventional wisdom that as “the Chinese Communist Party is no 
longer communist, it must be even more Chinese,” with nationalism filling in the vacuum created 
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by the bankruptcy of the communist ideology (p. 65).  Bernstein and Munro (2004) similarly 
note that with “the decline of ideology and the passing of the country’s charismatic leaders, the 
government encourages and exploits [nationalistic] sentiments in an effort to enhance its 
legitimacy and control” (p. 159).  Dingxin Zhao (2003) asserts that the current Chinese regime 
has a “keen interest in promoting nationalism to gain the people’s loyalty and to divert their 
attention away from domestic concerns” (p. 28).   
A key area of debate among scholars of contemporary Chinese politics concerns the extent to 
which the promotion of Chinese nationalism by the current government actually resonates with 
the Chinese rank-and-file – as well as the extent to which such pronouncements and posturing 
actually reflect the genuinely held beliefs and concerns of the leaders themselves.  On the one 
hand, Dingxin Zhao argues that, as no Chinese in their right mind could ever imagine that United 
States or any other foreign power has actual “territorial ambitions” in China today, the Chinese 
government has no “strong nationalistic mandate” in the current era and therefore will be “unable 
to base its legitimacy on nationalism [or] rely on nationalism for survival” (pp. 10, 27, 31).  
Many others take a different view, however.  Quansheng Zhao (2004) identifies nationalism as 
“a leading ideological current behind China’s drive toward modernization,” with nationalistic 
feeling “particularly strong among intellectuals and government officials, as well as other circles 
in society” (p. 296).  Maria Hsia Chang (2000) observes that in China today nationalism serves 
not only as “an ideological replacement for an obsolete Marxism” but also “provides much-
needed identity and solidarity to a society experiencing the disruptive forces associated with 
rapid development” (quoted in Dingxin Zhao 2003, p. 7).  Finally, in sharp contrast with Dingxin 
Zhao’s (2003) assertion that “the Chinese government’s promotion of nationalism is mainly a 
response to domestic political issues that are quite isolated from its conduct of foreign affairs” (p. 
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28), Christensen (2004), Gries (2005), Quansheng Zhao (2004) all contend that nationalism is 
one of the key (if not the key) motivating force behind Chinese foreign policy decision-making 
today, with the actions and rhetoric of China’s leaders constrained by both their own nationalistic 
beliefs and by the stirrings of popular nationalistic sentiment among the Chinese citizenry. 
As Christensen (2004) observes, while the promotion of nationalism as a component of 
regime legitimacy by the Chinese central leadership is by no means an entirely new phenomenon, 
the emphasis and overall tone of this narrative have changed over the decades.  During the 
Maoist period of the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s, Chinese nationalism was espoused in the form of what 
Gries (2005) labels a “victor narrative” emphasizing the “heroic Chinese victories over Western 
and Japanese imperialism” (p. 106).  In more recent decades, however, this discourse has been 
transformed into a “victimization narrative,” emphasizing the indignities that the Chinese people 
suffered at the hands of foreign powers during the “Century of Humiliation” that China endured 
from the time of the Opium Wars of the mid-19
th
 century until the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949 (Gries 2005, p. 106).  As Kane (2004) notes, the Chinese look back 
on this period as “a time of national weakness, when Western countries humiliated them by 
forcing them to accept a wide variety of treaties on unequal terms” (p. 102).  The product of this 
victimization narrative, in the view of Bernstein and Munro (2004), is “a wounded nationalism, a 
sense of unredeemed historical suffering, and a powerful suspicion of foreigners” (p. 159).  Gries 
(2005), meanwhile, observes that this acknowledgement of China’s shame-filled recent history 
has  
created strong and widespread desires to ‘erase’ (xixue) the national humiliation by restoring 
China to the position of dominance in East Asia that most Chinese imagine China to have 
enjoyed before its defeat by the British in the first Opium War, 1839-1942 (p. 106). 
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As noted previously, most scholars of Chinese politics have examined the phenomenon of 
modern Chinese nationalism in the two often interrelated areas of (1) its direct impact on 
perceived regime legitimacy and (2) its influence on Chinese foreign policy.  The metaphor often 
used to describe the intersection of these two domains is that of a “two-edged sword.”  The 
regime plays up nationalistic sentiments to bolster its own legitimacy, which in turn creates 
heightened expectations among Chinese citizens that the goals embodied in these sentiments (e.g. 
Taiwan’s reunification with the motherland, China reclaiming its rightful position as the 
predominant power in the Pacific) will be met, and met sooner rather than later.  These elevated 
expectations – even demands – on the part of the mass Chinese public, in turn, constrain the 
actions of Chinese leaders in their conduct of foreign policy, forcing them to take a harder line in 
areas related to such sensitive nationalistic issues as Taiwanese independence, Chinese military 
dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, and China’s relations with other dominant global powers, 
such as the United States and Japan.  This is the “double edge” of Chinese nationalism, as far as 
the regime is concerned – a nationalistic mandate may bolster regime legitimacy, but failure to 
live up to that mandate may damage regime legitimacy, perhaps irrevocably.   
Chinese Nationalism and National Threat 
The focus of the cursory examination of the dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism 
presented here, however, is not on the direct impact of nationalism on regime legitimacy, or on 
the impact of nationalism on the conduct of Chinese foreign policy.  Of concern to the current 
study is what the existing literature suggests about the types of phenomena – rhetoric, policies, 
actions – most likely to be judged as threatening to the security and well-being of the Chinese 
state by individual Chinese citizens.  What conclusions can be drawn from the current body of 
evidence and conventional wisdom to provide guidance in this regard? 
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The available evidence – much of it anecdotal – suggests two broad categories of threatening 
phenomena to which we could expect the majority of Chinese citizens to demonstrate particular 
sensitivity: (1) perceived threats to the territorial unity, self-determination and/or sovereignty of 
the Chinese nation, and (2) perceived sleights against China’s national dignity, prestige, and 
international image.   
As Kane (2004) observes, “every nation values its own self-determination, but the Chinese 
cherish this principle with a passion that often seems to have faded in America and Western 
Europe”; to the Chinese, national sovereignty is a “tangible thing” that can and must be protected 
and preserved, but never be taken for granted (p. 103).  Such a mindset is understandable in light 
of China’s experiences in the century or so preceding the 1949 founding of the People’s 
Republic, particularly as seen through the prism of the official “victim narrative” that places the 
blame for China’s political weakness and territorial fragmentation during this period squarely on 
the imperialistic incursions and interventions of meddling foreign powers.   
At the core of this “victim narrative” lies the concept of the “century of national humiliation” 
(百年国耻 bainian guochi) China is said to have endured from her defeat in the Opium Wars of 
the 1840s until the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.  “The Unequal Treaties” forced 
upon the weak Chinese imperial state by the western powers through 19
th
-century “gunboat 
diplomacy” created colonial or semi-colonial enclaves on Chinese soil in which foreigners were 
subject only to the laws of their home countries and not to those of the Chinese government.  At 
the end of the 19
th
 century, and over the course of the first half of the 20
th
 century, China suffered 
massive losses of territory and control to the expansionist Japanese empire, beginning with the 
ceding of the island of Taiwan in 1895 (as a result of China’s disastrous defeat in the First Sino-
Japanese War) and culminating in Japan’s direct invasion and occupation of large swathes of 
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mainland Chinese soil during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945.  Even today, after 
the return of the former European colonies of Hong Kong and Macau to direct Chinese control, 
reunification of the island of Taiwan with the mainland remains an elusive goal, and one that is 
frustrated – in the Chinese view – by the continuing interference of foreign powers, most notably 
the United States. 
Perhaps the reason that Taiwan continues to be such a hot-button issue at both the elite and 
public levels in China is due to the fact that the question of the island’s fate so closely combines 
nationalistic sensitivities related to sovereignty and self-determination with those related to 
national prestige and dignity.  As Christensen (2004) observes, “In China’s century of 
humiliation…no event was more demeaning than the 1895 defeat at the hands of Japan, after 
which Taiwan was ceded to Tokyo” (p. 65).  Following Japan’s defeat in the second Sino-
Japanese War of 1937-1945, Taiwan was once again rent asunder from the Chinese mainland as 
it became the refuge of the remnants of the defeated Nationalist (Guomindang) army and party 
organization in the wake of the Communists’ 1949 victory in the second Chinese Civil War.  In 
the years and decades that followed, PRC attempts to “liberate” Taiwan were thwarted to a large 
extent by the U.S. policy of providing direct military aid and support to the island’s Nationalist-
led regime.   
With the normalization of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic and the United 
States in the 1970s and early 1980s, the mainland Chinese received assurances that American 
military support to Taiwan would be gradually decreased over time, and that the U.S. would 
respect the prerogative of the Chinese – on both sides of the Taiwan Strait – to decide the issue 
of Taiwan’s status on their own, without outside interference.  In light of this, continued U.S. 
arm sales to Taiwan and de facto American military intervention in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 
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1995-96 have, understandably, earned the rancor of many Chinese who view these actions as not 
only direct threats to China’s material interests and national sovereignty, but also as humiliating 
insults to Chinese pride – meted out, once again, by an arrogant western power that feels no 
obligation to the observe the spirit or the letter of its promises to China.  
Another reason that the Taiwan issue evokes such strong feelings and reactions at both the 
popular and elite levels in China is that the question of Taiwan’s independence poses 
consequences not only for the fate of the island itself, but for China’s future territorial integrity 
and unity more generally.   As Christensen observes, China’s leaders – and presumably many of 
the rank-and-file as well – adhere to a type of “domestic domino theory” which dictates that  
the loss of one piece of sovereign territory will encourage separatists elsewhere and hurt morale 
among the Chinese forces who must defend national unity [particularly in] the traditionally non-
Han regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia (Christensen 2004, p. 66).   
 
Of course, the corollary of this argument would be that Chinese nationalists should be expected 
to be all-the-more zealous in their fight against separatist forces – domestic and foreign – that 
seek to wrest these outlying areas from Chinese control due to the precedent that secession of 
these territories would set for the resolution of the Taiwan issue.  In other words, “losing” 
Taiwan would have devastating consequences for China’s continued control over its restive 
border regions, and loss of control over the Chinese hinterland would have similarly dire 
implications for the possibility of future reunification with Taiwan.  Thus, when foreign actors 
offer sympathy and support to “separatist forces” – such as the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan 
government-in-exile – they pose a threat not just to Chinese control over one particular region, 
but to China’s national unity and territorial integrity as a whole. 
Perceived threats to China’s sovereignty and perceived sleights against China’s dignity and 
international image often go hand-in-hand.  When, for example, dominant world powers such as 
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the United States provide moral and material support to Taiwan, or offer sympathy and succor to 
“separatist” leaders such as the Dalai Lama, Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty is 
potentially threatened – but China’s international image and reputation is unquestionably 
threatened.  Foreign interference (in whatever form it may take) vis-à-vis Taiwan, Tibet, or any 
other areas or issues related to China’s territorial and political unity constitutes a threat to the 
country’s objective and material interests, but can also be perceived as a shameful and infuriating 
reminder of the indignities of the “Century of Humiliation,” when much of China’s control over 
its own domestic territory and political affairs was forcibly abdicated to foreign powers. 
An illuminating example in this vein can be found by analyzing popular Chinese reaction to 
the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.  Chinese soil had 
been attacked, and three Chinese citizens – quickly labeled by the government as “martyrs” – 
had been killed in what was overwhelmingly believed to have been an intentional and 
premeditated attack.  Given this widespread understanding of the incident as an unprovoked, 
murderous assault, it is quite telling that much of the Chinese reaction, both at the official and 
public levels, appeared to focus at least as much on the violation of Chinese sovereignty 
contained within the incident as did on the fact of the bombing, and resulting loss of life, itself.   
As Gries observes, Chinese protestors who laid siege to American and British embassies in 
various Chinese cities in the wake of the NATO bombing frequently expressed their feelings 
about the incident in terms of fennu (愤怒) or qifen (气愤), “higher forms of anger” or “righteous 
indignation” such as those that “stem from feelings of injustice and ethical desires to right a 
wrong,” but much less frequently spoke or wrote of feeling shengqi (生气), what Gries identifies 
as “a lower or visceral form of anger, or even ‘blind fury,’ that is little more than  personal 
psychological satisfaction” (p. 104).  Certainly, Chinese anger and revulsion in the wake of the 
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incident was deep and widespread, but it was, by most accounts, a righteous and high-minded 
anger that focused at least as much on the principle that was violated – national sovereignty – as 
it did on the blood that was spilt.  This was an assault on Chinese soil, resulting in the deaths of 
Chinese citizens, but it was also an assault on China’s national dignity, sovereignty and self-
determination. 
  As Gries (2005) observes, Chinese nationalists (which can be taken to mean any Chinese 
citizens with some degree of regard for and attachment to the Chinese nation) “are frequently 
motivated by instrumentalist goals, such as growing China’s economy or increasing the strength 
of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army],” while at the same time are often “moved by desires to 
restore, maintain, or improve China’s ‘international image’” (p. 114).  In other words, Chinese 
nationalists are concerned with their nation’s relative power and position vis-à-vis other actors 
on the global scene, but also with ensuring that their nation receives its proper respect from the 
international community.  For the purposes of the current study, the key point is that one could 
expect the average Chinese to be sensitive not only to objective threats to their nation’s relative 
material power and national interests, but also to perceived attacks on the nation’s dignity and 
reputation.  
The Chinese University Students’ Values Survey – Preliminary Phase 
The 2010 Chinese University Students’ Values Survey (CUSVS) was the research instrument 
utilized to test the hypotheses outlined in this study regarding the impact of perceived national 
threat (or national assurance) on levels of postmaterialism, as measured by the traditional values 
priority batteries.  The CUSVS incorporated an experimental research design in which certain 
subjects were exposed to images and text designed to either increase or decrease their level of 
perceived threat to the Chinese nation.  Thus, as a preliminary step, it was necessary to select and 
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pre-test a selection of ‘candidate’ media treatments to determine if exposure to the stimuli had 
the intended effects on Chinese subjects.  Drawing on the insights derived from the above 
discussion of modern Chinese nationalism – and following the guidance of a number of Chinese 
colleagues – I canvassed Chinese news sites, blogs and chat forums to obtain an initial set of 
potential treatments deemed most likely to instill feelings of either national threat or national 
assurance in an experimental setting.    
Experimental Treatment Selection 
Conducting the initial selection of “negative” treatments in 2009, I was guided in part by a 
wealth of anecdotal evidence strongly suggesting that many Chinese citizens had reacted with 
great negativity to apparently increased international attention to, and criticism of, China’s 
human rights record and policies toward Tibet in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer 
Olympics.  Also, as noted above, yearnings for Taiwan’s reunification with the Mainland – and 
opposition to foreign interference in the resolution of Taiwan’s fate – are prevalent (and long-
standing) themes in Chinese nationalistic discourse, and an attempt was made to select one or 
more treatments that touched upon these concerns.  Finally, conventional wisdom holds that 
Chinese nationalistic sensibilities are particularly likely to be invoked when the United States or 
Japan are perceived to be the source of interference in China’s internal affairs, encroachment on 
Chinese territorial sovereignty, or challenges to Chinese national prestige and position in the 
global community; accordingly, I made an effort to see that content related to these two countries 
was well-represented in the initial set of candidate treatments.  Finally, in the interests of realism, 
I imposed the criteria that these media pieces be drawn directly from media content actually 
available to Chinese internet users (in Chinese) during the time-period of this preliminary phase 
of the study.  Some stories were edited, one or two were spliced together from separate articles, 
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and each story was accompanied by a photograph that may or may not have been originally 
featured with that piece.   
With these criteria and self-imposed guidelines in place, a list of 10 distinct media pieces 
(each with an accompanying photo or photos) was compiled for preliminary testing to gauge 
their suitability as “negative” experimental treatments – that is, news items that would be likely 
to instill a feeling of national threat into Chinese subjects.  Specifically, these candidate 
treatments comprised of the following: 
A. U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s March 21st, 2008 visit with the Dalai Lama, 
whom the Chinese government has long reviled as a dangerous separatist leader.  
 Photograph: Rep. Pelosi and the Dalai Lama embracing each other, apparently in 
greeting. 
 
B. Tibetan demonstrator’s attack on Olympic Games torch bearer and handicapped Chinese 
athlete Jin Jing, taking place on April 7
th
, 2008, in France. 
 Photograph: Ms. Jin being pulled part-way out of her wheelchair by her attacker. 
 
C. CNN commentator Jack Cafferty’s on-air remarks of April 9th, 2008, in which he referred to 
Chinese exports as “junk” and described China’s leadership as the same “bunch of goons 
and thugs that they have been for the last 50 years.”  
 Photograph: a stern-faced Mr. Cafferty from a different, unrelated broadcast.  
 
D. Actress Sharon Stone’s May 25th, 2008 remarks at the Cannes Film Festival that the May 12th 
earthquake in Sichuan may have been “karma” (i.e. cosmic justice) for China’s treatment of 
Tibet. 
 Photograph: still frame from a Chinese video re-broadcast of Ms. Stone’s interview, with 
the Chinese subtitles “This is karma” appearing at the bottom of the frame. 
 
E. The American government’s Oct. 3rd, 2008 announcement of a U.S. $6.5 billion sale of 
weapons to the Republic of Taiwan. 
 Photograph: a U.S.-made Patriot missile battery, with a missile being launched. 
 
F. Feb. 9th, 2009 report announcing that the Japanese government had openly claimed 
sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, in defiance of China’s own longstanding 
claim. 
 Photograph: a Japanese warship at sea, with the Japanese military flag in the foreground 
occupying the right-hand third of the frame. 
 
G. Mar. 9th, 2009 report quoting the U.S. Pentagon as stating that Taiwan would be allowed to 
possess its own nuclear weapons.  
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 Photograph: a ‘mushroom cloud’ resulting from the detonation of a nuclear device. 
 
H. March 17th, 2009 report quoting Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) chairwoman 
Tsai Ing-wen as calling for an alliance between Japan and Taiwan “against China.”  
 Photograph: Ms. Tsai holding a microphone and shaking one fist in the air in a defiant 
manner. 
 
I. A March 2008 report of misinformation being broadcast by various news agencies – in 
Germany, the U.K. and the United States – regarding the protests in Tibet taking place that 
month. 
 Four photographs, each a screenshot from the relevant broadcast described. 
 
J. Excerpt from a Chinese reprint of a U.S. Wall Street Journal article describing U.S. Defense 
Department’s increased weapons’ budgets and increased military cooperation with its East 
Asian allies as aimed at countering “the China threat.”  
 Four photographs: a U.S. aircraft carrier, U.S. president Barack Obama, a surface-to-air 
missile being launched from a ground-based launcher, and former Japanese prime 
minister Junichiro Koizumi. 
 
In a similar fashion, nine distinct media pieces judged to have the potential to elicit feelings of 
national assurance were selected as potential “positive” experimental treatments.  These items 
can be categorized into three distinct groups: 1) positive evaluations from foreign news sources 
of China’s response to the devastating May 12th, 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, 2) foreign media 
praise for the Summer Olympics opening ceremony held in Beijing in August of 2008, and 3) 
editorials from foreign news sources commemorating the People’s Republic of China’s 60th 
anniversary celebration (in 2009), providing strongly positive evaluations of China’s 
achievements over the past six decades.    Specifically, the list of candidate positive experimental 
treatments comprised of the following: 
K. Selections from a Russian media editorial, praising China’s heroic response to the May 12th 
Sichuan earthquake, and describing China as a country that “can never be defeated.”  
 Picture: a team of Chinese civilian volunteers engaged in rescue operations. 
 
L. Excerpts from a report by the U.K.’s [The] Independent, in which the rapidity of China’s 
response to the May 12
th
 earthquake is favorably contrasted with the Myanmar government’s 
sluggish response in the face of that country’s own national disaster.  
 Picture: an injured Chinese infant, evidently pulled from earthquake rubble, being given 
treatment by rescue workers. 
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M. Quotes from an American CNN broadcast in which the correspondent describes the self-
sacrifice of a local Chinese official in the earthquake disaster area who, despite having lost 
his entire family, refused to abandon his duties.  
 Picture: an injured adult Chinese woman on a stretcher being attended to by a group of 
rescue workers. 
 
N. An excerpt from a Wall Street Journal piece praising the 2008 Summer Olympics opening 
ceremonies held in Beijing as a wondrous fusion of traditional performance and modern 
technology, and the most-watched television event in history.  
 Picture: a scene from the Olympic opening ceremonies depicting a formation of 
uniformed Chinese soldiers saluting the national flag. 
 
O. A quote from a Washington Post editorial describing the Olympic opening ceremonies as 
both a showcase of 5,000 years of Chinese history and a celebration of China’s re-emergence 
as one of the world’s great powers. 
 Picture: a light-show display of the five interlocking Olympic rings, from the opening 
ceremonies performance. 
 
P. An excerpt from a Chicago Tribune article in which [Robert] Daly, mayor of Chicago (the 
city slated to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games), is quoted as saying of the Beijing 
opening ceremonies that “the Chinese people have spoken – this is a new beginning, a new 
century, and they will continue to march forward.”  
 Picture: an aerial view of the opening ceremonies stadium, with the light show in 
progress. 
 
Q. Excerpts from a French European Times editorial describing overseas Chinese feeling of 
pride on the occasion of the 60
th
 anniversary of the People’s Republic of China and 
remarking that “the Chinese Road” has been transformed into “the Chinese Miracle.” 
 Picture: Uniformed People’s Liberation Army soldiers marching in parade formation, 
from the 60
th
 anniversary celebration military parade. 
 
R. Excerpts from an editorial appearing in England’s The Financial Times, entitled “China’s 
Victory,” praising the People’s Republic’s achievements of the past 60 years and stating that 
opening and economic reform has “unleashed China’s great potential.” 
 Picture: Close-up photo of Chinese Olympian athlete Liu Xiang, wearing a laurel crown 
and holding up his just-awarded Olympic gold medal, at the 2008 Beijing Summer 
Games. 
 
S. Excerpt from an editorial appearing in the Los Angeles Business Paper16 commemorating the 
People Republic’s 60th anniversary celebration, opining that in the coming 60 years China 
will “change the world.” 
                                                 
16
 This article actually appeared originally in a Chinese-language newspaper published in Los Angeles, available for 
online reading by Mainland Chinese netizens.  For the purposes of this study the name of the publication (which 
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 Picture: Still-photo from a Chinese TV broadcast of a Chinese astronaut emerging from 
his orbiting spacecraft for China’s first spacewalk (September 27th, 2008). 
 
Experimental Treatment Pre-testing 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the candidate experimental treatments, three separate 
questionnaires were designed and administered to a sample of 450 undergraduate students 
enrolled in Guangdong University of Business Studies in December of 2009.  195 students were 
presented with a questionnaire containing only the “threatening” media treatments, 195 students 
received a questionnaire containing only the “reassuring” media treatments, and a group of 60 
students were asked to fill out a longer questionnaire containing both sets of candidate treatments.  
The core format and method of administration was identical for all three of the questionnaires. 
 Each questionnaire contained the heading “2010 University Students Values Survey” and led 
off with the straightforward preamble “We would like to know you feelings on the following 
news reports.”  Students were asked to read and then evaluate their emotional response to each 
media piece, one at a time, by ranking on a 0 to 10 feeling thermometer the degree to which the 
content caused them to feel angered, proud, threatened, happy/satisfied, or surprised.  At the end 
of the questionnaire (or questionnaire section) presenting the negative/threatening candidate 
treatments, respondents were asked to select the three pieces that made them feel the most 
angered (ranked 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
) and the three pieces that made them feel the most threatened 
(ranked 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
).  The same format was followed with the positive/reassuring candidate 
treatments questionnaire (or questionnaire section), the only alteration being that respondents 
were asked to select the top three pieces that made them feel the most proud and the top three 
that made them feel most happy/satisfied.   
                                                                                                                                                             
clearly indicated its Chinese-American background) was changed to the generic (and fictitious) Los Angeles Times 
Business Paper to emphasize the foreign origin of the praise contained within the editorial. 
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Altogether, 193 completed and usable negative/threatening candidate treatment questionnaires 
and 192 positive/reassuring candidate treatment questionnaires were obtained, together with 58 
viable combined questionnaires.  For the sake of brevity I have pooled the results from the 
negative/threatening and positive/reassuring treatment sections of the combined questionnaire 
with data derived from the separate negative/threatening and positive/reassuring candidate 
treatment questionnaires, respectively, as the results do not change appreciably when the results 
from the single and combined questionnaires are evaluated separately.  I focus below on the 
average feeling thermometer scores ascribed to each of the media pieces by the survey sample. 
Table 4.1 – Ranking of candidate treatments by respondents’ angered (愤怒) ratings 
Item Code Item Description NEG POS Rating Ranking 
D Sharon Stone Karma X  9.5       1 
H Taiwan DPP "Oppose China" X  9.4       2 
I Media Lies Tibetan Protests X  9.3       3 
C CNN Cafferty X  9.3       4 
B Jin Jing Attack X  9.3       5 
F Japan Diaoyutai X  9.0       6 
A Pelosi Dalai Lama X  8.6       7 
E U.S. Taiwan Weapons X  8.3       8 
G U.S. Taiwan Nukes X  8.2       9 
J U.S. Pentagon Report X  8.0 10 
L Sichuan Media Praise - U.K.  X 2.1 11 
R 60th Anniversary Praise - U.K.  X 0.5 12 
M Sichuan Media Praise - U.S. (CNN)  X 0.3 13 
O Olympic Media Praise - U.S. (Post)  X 0.3 14 
K Sichuan Media Praise – Russian  X 0.3 15 
Q 60th Anniversary Praise – France  X 0.2 16 
S 60th Anniversary Praise - U.S.  X 0.2 17 
P Olympic Media Praise - U.S. (Trib)  X 0.1 18 
N Olympic Media Praise - U.S. (WSJ)  X 0.1 19 
 
Presented in Table 4.1 are the average angered (愤怒 fennu) scores – ranked from highest to 
lowest – reported by the interviewed subjects (a total of 251 in the case of the 
negative/threatening candidate treatments and 250 in the case of the positive/reassuring ones) for 
all nineteen of the candidate treatments.  All of the negative/threatening items exhibit average 
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angered scores of between 8.0 and 9.5 on a scale of 10, whereas – with one exception – none of 
the positive/reassuring items obtain average anger scores of more than 0.5.  The twinge of anger 
(average rating of 2.1) evident in response to the “U.K. Sichuan Media Praise” item (L) seems 
most likely due to the fact that the story highlighted the unresponsiveness of the Myanmar 
government to its own people’s plight, a feature of the piece that may have incited feelings of 
anger among some subjects.   
Of the 10 negative/threatening items, respondents appeared to be most angered by Sharon 
Stone’s comments that the Sichuan earthquake of 2008 may have been “karma” for Chinese 
policy towards Tibet, and least angered by news of the Pentagon report calling for stronger U.S. 
ties with Japan and South Korea in order to counter China’s power in the region.  However, the 
difference in average angered response between these two items is relatively small, and it is 
notable that all of the negative/threatening candidate treatments receive anger ratings that cluster 
at the high end of the scale. 
Table 4.2 displays the average threatened (威胁  weixie) scores ascribed to each of the 
nineteen candidate treatments by the survey sample, with the items once again ranked from 
highest to lowest average scores.  As above, the negative/threatening and positive/reassuring 
items are rated, for the most part, in line with expectations.  None of the positive items receive an 
average score of more than 1.8 and, with one exception, none of the negative items receive an 
average score of less than 5.0.  The one (rather dramatic) exception here is the piece describing 
Sharon Stone’s “earthquake karma” comments, which respondents apparently found to be 
singularly unthreatening – even less threatening (at an average score of 0.4) than any of the 
positive items (all of which lie in the 0.6 to 1.8 range).  
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Table 4.2 – Ranking of candidate treatments by respondents’ threatened (威胁) ratings 
Item Code Item Description    NEG    POS Rating Ranking 
G U.S. Taiwan Nukes       X 
 
       7.8         1 
E U.S. Taiwan Weapons       X 
 
       7.6         2 
J U.S. Pentagon Report       X 
 
       7.5         3 
F Japan Diaoyutai       X 
 
       7.0         4 
I Media Lies Tibetan Protests       X 
 
       6.1         5 
A Pelosi Dalai Lama       X 
 
       5.8         6 
H Taiwan DPP "Oppose China"       X 
 
       5.8         7 
B Jin Jing Attack       X 
 
       5.4         8 
C CNN Cafferty       X 
 
       5.0         9 
S 60th Anniversary Praise - U.S. 
 
     X        1.8        10 
R 60th Anniversary Praise - U.K. 
 
     X        1.4        11 
Q 
60th Anniversary Praise – 
France  
     X        1.4 
       12 
O 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(Post)  
     X        1.3 
       13 
L Sichuan Media Praise - U.K. 
 
     X        1.3        14 
P 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(Trib)  
     X        1.0 
       15 
K 
Sichuan Media Praise – 
Russian  
     X        1.0 
       16 
N 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(WSJ)  
     X        0.7 
       17 
M 
Sichuan Media Praise - U.S. 
(CNN)  
     X        0.6 
       18 
D Sharon Stone Karma      X 
 
       0.4        19 
  
Of the remaining negative/threatening candidate treatments, respondents apparently felt most 
threatened by the news piece describing the U.S. government’s pronouncement that Taiwan 
should be allowed to have nuclear weapons (7.8) and least threatened by Mr. Cafferty’s “goons 
and thugs” comments on CNN (5.0).  The apparent overall pattern with the negative/threatening 
candidate treatments is one in which the items focusing specifically on official American 
government policies and pronouncements aimed against China elicit stronger average reported 
feelings of threat; also, we can observe a larger gap between the higher-threat and lower-threat 
items than was observed between the higher-anger and lower-anger items in the previous table.    
Still, it is striking that – with the exception of the item dealing with Ms. Stone’s comments – all 
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of the negative candidate treatments received average threat scores on the upper end of the 
feeling thermometer scale.  Respondents were certainly more threatened by items describing 
challenges to China’s material and strategic interests from the world’s remaining superpower, 
but – with the one conspicuous exception – they were certainly not unthreatened by more 
symbolic and rhetorical attacks on China’s dignity and reputation.  
Table 4.3 – Ranking of candidate treatments by respondents’ proud (骄傲/自豪) ratings 
Item 
Code 
Item Description NEG POS Rating Ranking 
N Olympic Media Praise - U.S. (WSJ)      X        8.9        1 
K Sichuan Media Praise – Russian      X        8.9        2 
Q 60th Anniversary Praise – France      X        8.8        3 
S 60th Anniversary Praise - U.S.      X        8.7        4 
O Olympic Media Praise - U.S. (Post)      X        8.6        5 
R 60th Anniversary Praise - U.K.      X        8.6        6 
P Olympic Media Praise - U.S. (Trib)      X        8.6        7 
L Sichuan Media Praise - U.K.      X        8.3        8 
M Sichuan Media Praise - U.S. (CNN)      X        7.1        9 
J U.S. Pentagon Report     X 
 
       0.9       10 
B Jin Jing Attack     X 
 
       0.4       11 
E U.S. Taiwan Weapons     X 
 
       0.2       12 
G U.S. Taiwan Nukes     X 
 
       0.2       13 
A Pelosi Dalai Lama     X 
 
       0.1       14 
C CNN Cafferty     X 
 
       0.1       15 
F Japan Diaoyutai     X 
 
       0.1       16 
H Taiwan DPP "Oppose China"     X 
 
       0.0       17 
D Sharon Stone Karma     X 
 
       0.0       18 
I Media Lies Tibetan Protests     X 
 
       0.0       19 
 
Table 4.3 reports the average reported levels to which respondents were made to feel proud  
(骄傲/自豪 jiao’ao/zihao) in reaction to the individual news items.  Once again, the results do 
not contain any major surprises, with all of the positive items achieving scores well at the higher 
end of the scale (7.1 to 8.9) and all of the negative items receiving scores of less than 1.0.  Of the 
negative/threatening items, the only one to register even a twinge of prideful feelings (0.9) was 
the item dealing with the U.S. Pentagon report labeling China a threat – perhaps due to the fact 
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that some subjects took the report of U.S. concern with China’s power as a gratifying indication 
of just high formidable China is becoming in the eyes of the world.   
With the exception of the CNN piece, the pride scores for the positive/reassuring candidate 
treatments are all clustered fairly tightly together at the upper end of the scale.  U.S. praise of the 
Beijing Olympic ceremonies, Russian admiration of earthquake relief efforts in Sichuan and 
French recognition of China’s achievements of the past 60 years are virtually tied as the 
“highest-pride” items, but with average scores that are generally only very slightly greater than 
the other items surveyed.  Overall, then, it would seem that the examples of foreign praise of 
China’s achievements tested here were quite effective in eliciting high levels of pride among the 
survey subjects, regardless of the particular source of the item, or the particular area of China’s 
achievements upon which the item focused. 
Table 4.4 displays the average degrees to which respondents reported feeling happy/satisfied 
(高兴 gaoxing/满意 manyi) in response to each of the nineteen candidate treatments.  As before, 
the positive and negative items sort themselves out in line with expectations.  The highest 
happy/satisfied score achieved by the negative/threatening pieces was still a rather negligible 0.4 
(evidently a handful of individuals may have been somewhat gladdened to hear that the U.S. 
Pentagon considers China to be such a threat), while none of the other items in this category 
obtain scores above 0.1.  All of the positive/reassuring pieces register at the upper end of the 
scale, with most clustered within 0.5 points of each other, in the 8.2-8.7 range.  The exceptions 
here are the three pieces describing foreign praise for China’s relief efforts in the wake of the 
2008 earthquake in Sichuan, all of which rate somewhat lower on the happiness/satisfaction scale.  
This finding is not terribly surprising, as we should expect subjects’ positive reaction to the 
praise for China’s response to the disaster contained within these pieces to be somewhat 
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tempered by the sad reminder of the tragic event itself.  This would appear to be particularly the 
case for the CNN report describing the heroic efforts of a government official to continue his 
work aiding earthquake victims after losing his own entire family; this piece achieved the lowest 
average happiness/satisfaction score (6.5) of all of the positive/reassuring candidate treatments. 
Table 4.4 – Ranking of candidate treatments by respondents’ happy/satisfied (高兴/满意) ratings 
Item Code Item Description   NEG    POS     Rating  Ranking 
N 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(WSJ)  
     X        8.7  
       1 
Q 
60th Anniversary Praise – 
France  
     X        8.5  
       2 
P 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(Trib)  
     X        8.3  
       3 
S 60th Anniversary Praise - U.S. 
 
     X        8.3         4 
O 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(Post)  
     X        8.3  
       5 
R 60th Anniversary Praise - U.K. 
 
     X        8.2         6 
K Sichuan Media Praise – Russian 
 
     X        7.9         7 
L Sichuan Media Praise - U.K. 
 
     X        7.3         8 
M 
Sichuan Media Praise - U.S. 
(CNN)  
     X        6.5  
       9 
J U.S. Pentagon Report      X 
 
       0.4        10 
B Jin Jing Attack      X 
 
       0.1        11 
E U.S. Taiwan Weapons      X 
 
       0.1        12 
A Pelosi Dalai Lama      X 
 
       0.1        13 
D Sharon Stone Karma      X 
 
       0.1        14 
G U.S. Taiwan Nukes      X 
 
       0.1        15 
F Japan Diaoyutai      X 
 
       0.1        16 
I Media Lies Tibetan Protests      X 
 
       0.0        17 
C CNN Cafferty      X 
 
       0.0        18 
H Taiwan DPP "Oppose China"      X 
 
       0.0        19 
 
Table 4.5 displays the average levels to which respondents reported feeling surprised/shocked 
(震惊 zhenjing) in response to reading each of the individual news pieces.  Interestingly, without 
any exceptions, all of the negative/threatening candidate treatments obtain scores in the upper 
half of the scale (5.6 to 7.5) and all of the positive/reassuring treatments receive scores that place 
them in the lower half of the scale (2.8 to 4.8).  Of the negative/threatening pieces, individuals 
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appeared to be most shocked by the pieces concerned with Ms. Stone’s “karma” comments and 
with western media misreporting of the 2008 Tibetan protests, and least shocked by the report of 
the U.S. sale of weapons to Taiwan.  Of the positive/reassuring pieces, respondents appeared to 
be most shocked by the CNN report of the selfless Chinese government official who stuck to his 
earthquake-relief duties after losing his entire family and least shocked by the U.K. editorial 
lauding China’s achievements of the past 60 years – closely followed by a number of the other 
stories and opinion pieces featuring foreign praise of China on the occasion of her 60
th
 
anniversary or of the Beijing 2008 Olympics opening ceremonies.   
Table 4.5 –Ranking of candidate treatments by respondents’ surprised/shocked (震惊) ratings 
Item Code Item Description    NEG    POS    Rating  Ranking 
D Sharon Stone Karma       X 
 
      7.5        1 
I Media Lies Tibetan Protests       X 
 
      7.5        2 
B Jin Jing Attack       X 
 
      7.3        3 
C CNN Cafferty       X 
 
      6.8        4 
G U.S. Taiwan Nukes       X 
 
      6.8        5 
H Taiwan DPP "Oppose China"       X 
 
      6.7        6 
J U.S. Pentagon Report       X 
 
      5.9        7 
F Japan Diaoyutai       X 
 
      5.9        8 
A Pelosi Dalai Lama       X 
 
      5.8        9 
E U.S. Taiwan Weapons       X 
 
      5.6       10 
M 
Sichuan Media Praise - U.S. 
(CNN)  
     X       4.8 
      11 
L Sichuan Media Praise - U.K. 
 
     X       4.3       12 
N 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(WSJ)  
     X       3.7 
      13 
K Sichuan Media Praise – Russian 
 
     X       3.5       14 
S 60th Anniversary Praise - U.S. 
 
     X       3.2       15 
P 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(Trib)  
     X       3.0 
      16 
Q 
60th Anniversary Praise – 
France  
     X       3.0 
      17 
O 
Olympic Media Praise - U.S. 
(Post)  
     X       2.9 
      18 
R 60th Anniversary Praise - U.K. 
 
     X       2.8       19 
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Of course, the higher average shock/surprise scores for the negative/threatening pieces were 
to some extent pre-determined by the nature of the material; these items all describe more or less 
concrete and specific incidents in which foreign governments, organizations or individuals took 
action or issued statements directly at odds with China’s interests or self-image.  One might 
expect such items to produce a more “visceral” reaction than the positive/reassuring pieces 
(which were both relatively unthreatening and, for the most part, much more abstract in content) 
and for this more visceral reaction to translate into higher average reported feelings of “shock” or 
“surprise.” 
Finalizing the Treatments 
Recall that the main purpose of the above phase of the current study was to evaluate the 
candidate experimental treatments in terms of their effectiveness in producing a general sense of 
either national threat or national assurance among Chinese subjects, that is, the degree to which 
these media selections serve to either heighten or mitigate subjects’ perceptions that the security, 
welfare and dignity of the Chinese nation as a whole is threatened by a hostile external global 
environment.   
Turning first to the set of media pieces selected as negative/threatening stimuli, I chose to 
eliminate the Sharon Stone “karma” piece from further consideration.  While survey subjects 
were more angered and shocked/surprised by Ms. Stone’s comments than they were by the 
content of any of the other candidate treatments, they at the same time also reported almost non-
existent feelings of threat in reaction to reading this particular story.  This may be due to the fact 
that Ms. Stone’s comments did not contain any concrete political agenda or specific policy 
proposals regarding China, and may also reflect the fact that Ms. Stone was perceived as lacking 
any real political clout or institutional backing through which to take any real action against 
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China’s interests.  It may also be the case the subjects felt that Ms. Stone’s comments were so 
beyond the pale – and so poorly received worldwide – that there could be no real injury even to 
China’s reputation or self-image.  In any case, given the availability of nine other potential 
negative/threatening treatments – all of which received average “threat” ratings that placed them 
in the upper half of the scale – eliminating the piece describing Ms. Stone’s comments seemed a 
logical and straightforward decision. 
Of the remaining nine negative/threatening candidate treatments, the fact remains that 
respondents reported, on average, being more angered by these pieces (low of 8.0 to high of 9.4) 
than threatened (low of 5.0 to high of 7.8).  But it should also be noted that the Chinese term for 
“anger” utilized in the questionnaire – 愤怒 (fennu) – translates best into English as a form of 
“righteous indignation” that Gries (2005) above defines as stemming “from feelings of injustice 
and ethical desires to right a wrong” – precisely the brand of anger most often voiced by Chinese 
protestors in the wake of the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing (Gries 2005, p. 104).  I would 
argue further that such feelings are quite consistent with commonly-held definitions of normative 
threat – a sense that the normative order embodied in the foundations of one’s society has been 
injured or imperiled (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005).  Guided by this understanding, 
all of the remaining nine negative/threatening news items were selected for use, collectively, as 
the national threat experimental treatment for first phase of the 2010 Chinese University 
Students Values Survey (CUSVS). 
Turning to the set of positive/reassuring items, the decision was made once again to eliminate 
one of the pieces from further consideration – in this case, the U.K. Independent news story 
praising China’s relief efforts in the wake of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.  While respondents 
on average reported feeling quite proud (8.3) and happy/satisfied (7.3) in their reactions to this 
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piece, I was uncomfortable with the relatively high average anger rating (2.1) ascribed to this 
news story as compared to the other positive/reassuring candidate treatments.   
The remaining eight “positive” news stories received average pride ratings of 7.1 to 8.9, 
happiness/satisfaction ratings of 6.5 to 8.7, anger ratings of 0.5 or less, and threat ratings of 1.8 
or less.  Do these findings justify these items being designated as stimuli that tend to engender 
feelings of national assurance among Chinese individuals? I propose that they do.  The key point 
here is not that these news pieces appeared to cause subjects to feel relatively proud and happy, 
and relatively un-angered and unthreatened, but that Chinese subjects were made to feel this way 
by media items that were attributed to foreign sources.  It is important that Chinese subjects felt 
good about what these media pieces had to say, but what is critical is that it was the foreign (and 
largely western) media that were saying them.  Following this logic, the remaining eight 
positive/reassuring media pieces were retained to be used, collectively, as the national assurance 
experimental treatment for the second phase of the CUSVS.    
The implementation of the above experimental treatments as a part of the 2010 Chinese 
University Students’ Values Survey, and the findings obtained, are the main focus of the chapter 
that follows. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: NO POSTMATERIALISTS IN FOXHOLES – RESULTS FROM THE 
2010 CHINESE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS’ VALUES SURVEY 
The 2010 Chinese University Students Values Survey 
In order to obtain data necessary to test the key hypotheses of this study, I collaborated with 
faculty at Guangzhou’s Sun Yat-sen University (SYSU) and South China Agricultural University 
(SCAU) to design and implement the Chinese University Values Survey (CUSVS), which was 
carried out among undergraduate students enrolled at South China Agricultural University during 
the 2010 spring semester.   
In both of the two phases of the CUSVS, a simple experimental research design was 
incorporated, with roughly half of the sampled group asked to fill out a questionnaire into which 
some version of the experimental treatment had been embedded, and the remainder of the group 
presented with a control version of the questionnaire that did not include any media content.  
This design allowed investigation into the direct effects of the experimental stimulus (the 
national threat or national assurance media content, arrived at in the previous chapter) on the 
primary dependent variable of interest, postmaterialism, which was measured by Inglehart’s 
forced-choice values batteries in the latter section of the questionnaire.  This design also allowed 
investigation of possible interaction effects between the experimental treatment and respondents’ 
underlying value orientations (i.e. authoritarianism and national attachment), which were gauged 
by question items appearing in the pre-treatment section of the questionnaire.  
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The complete Chinese and English versions of the full-length questionnaire and experimental 
treatments, together with detailed descriptions of individual question items, can be found in 
Appendix I. 
CUSVS Phase One: Postmaterialism under National Threat 
The first round of the CUSVS, which utilized the national threat experimental treatment, was 
administered from April 7
th
 to April 15
th
, 2010 to a total of one hundred and seventy-six 
undergraduate students enrolled in biology and mathematics courses at the South China 
Agricultural University of Guangzhou, People’s Republic of China.  As with the preliminary 
treatment pre-testing survey conducted at the Guangdong University of Business Studies, the 
CUSVS was administered by university faculty to their students in the same manner that an in-
class written exam would be conducted.  Anonymity was stressed, and students were asked not 
to put their names anywhere on the questionnaire form (an instruction with which all respondents 
complied).  In total, ninety-nine usable survey questionnaires (45 control and 55 treatment) were 
obtained.
17
   
First, I draw our attention to Table 5.1, which displays and compares the distribution of 
materialists, postmaterialists and “mixed” individuals within the control group and treatment 
groups as measured by the original 4-item and “country aims” 4-item batteries.  Following 
convention, subjects selecting two materialist options as their first and second choices in 
response to a battery are categorized as materialists, while those selecting two postmaterialist 
                                                 
17
 Seventy-six questionnaires, all administered to the same class on the same day (April 13
th
) had to be summarily 
rejected, as it was reported (by the co-investigator asked to monitor the survey administrations) that the attending 
professor had at one point grown impatient with how long it was taking his students to complete the survey, and had 
insisted that they rush to complete them as quickly possible.  Fortunately, no other such instances of adverse or 
disruptive conditions were reported for the other administrations of the survey, and from the remaining one hundred 
respondents only one questionnaire was disqualified due to an excess of unanswered questions (the student had, in 
fact, neglected to fill in the entire second half of the form).  The remaining ninety-nine usable questionnaires (45 
control and 55 treatment) contained only very few instances of omitted replies. 
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options are classified as postmaterialists.  All other respondents are categorized as “mixed.”  
Percentage Difference Index (PDI) scores are calculated by subtracting the percentage of pure 
materialists from the percentage of pure postmaterialists (Inglehart 1997).  The far right-hand 
columns of the table display the results of t-tests conducted to determine whether or not the 
differences in distributions or overall PDI between the control and treatment groups obtain 
statistical significance.
18
 
Table 5.1 – Differences in measured postmaterialism, control and national threat treatment groups 
(CUSVS Phase One) 
          Battery        Category     Control  Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
    2-tailed 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
   1-tailed 
Original 
4-Item Battery 
Materialist      13.3%      29.6%      0.0529     0.02645 
Mixed      77.8%      63.0%      0.1125          - 
Postmaterialist        8.9%        7.4%      0.7903      0.39515 
PDI        -4.4       -22.2      0.0998     0.04990 
“Country Aims”                      
4-Item Battery 
Materialist       20.0%       42.6%     0.0165     0.00825 
Mixed       57.8%       55.6%     0.8264          - 
Postmaterialist       22.2%        1.9%     0.0011    0.00055 
PDI        +2.2        -40.7    0.0005    0.00025 
 
                                                 
18
 Note that in the case of the differences in the proportions of pure materialists and pure postmaterialists 
and the differences in overall PDI (Percentage Difference Index) scores I have reported the results of both the 
standard two-tailed test and those of a one-tailed test.  Given my given my strong assumption that any differences 
between the two samples will be, as a result of the experimental treatment, in the direction of higher materialism 
and/or lower postmaterialism, and not the other way around, I feel that a one-tailed test is justifiable in these 
instances; however, both statistics are reported and the final decision as to which parameter is more appropriate is 
left to the reader. 
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The top half of the table illustrates differences evidenced between the control and treatment 
groups in regards to the original 4-item values priority battery, in which respondents are offered 
the two materialist options of “maintaining order in the nation” and “fighting rising prices” and 
the two postmaterialist options of “giving people more say in important political decisions” and 
“guaranteeing freedom of speech.”  Most strikingly, the proportion of materialists in the 
treatment group as measured by this battery is more than double than that of the control group 
(29.6% compared to 13.3%; p<0.05).  Note also that while the proportion of postmaterialists 
found in the treatment group is not significantly different from that of the control group, the 
sharp difference in PDI scores between the two groups (-4.4 in the control group, -22.2 in the 
treatment group) is significant at just under the .10 or just under the .05 level, depending on 
whether a two-tailed or one-tailed test is employed (H1 supported).    
Even more striking effects are evident in regards to differences between the control and 
treatment groups in regards to the “country aims” 4-item battery – the first battery in the full 12-
item postmaterialism index – as illustrated in the lower half of Table 5.1.  Once again, the 
proportion of pure materialists in the treatment group (42.6%) is more than double than that 
found in the control group (42.6% versus 20.0%; p<0.02).  Also evident in this case are 
substantial and highly significant differences in the proportion of postmaterialists found in the 
two groups, with the percentage evident in the treatment group (1.9%) less than one-tenth that 
found in the control group (22.2%).  These differences in proportions result in a massive and 
highly significant shift in PDI scores between the two groups, with the control group’s slight 
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inclination toward postmaterialism (+2.2) contrasting sharply with the treatment group’s strong 
tendency toward materialism (-40.7) (p<0.001; strong support for H2).
19
 
The core claim of this study would thus appear to be borne out by the survey data, with 
respondents exposed to the national threat treatment exhibiting a significantly and substantially 
lower level of net measured postmaterialism than individuals not exposed to this stimulus.  This 
effect is fairly strong within the original 4-item values priority battery, and even more striking in 
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 Of course, it is possible that – despite the random assignment employed in the experiment – the apparent 
effects of the treatment on subjects’ measured levels of postmaterialism may be an artifact of underlying differences 
in characteristics between the control and treatment groups.  Fortunately, a variety of other question items presented 
in the CUSVS questionnaire allow us to test this possibility.  The first page of the survey asked students to answer 
questions gauging basic socio-demographic information: age, gender, official residence status (rural or urban), 
ethnicity (Han Chinese or an ethnic minority group), and political affiliation (mutually-exclusive categories of 
general citizen, China Youth League member, or Chinese Communist Party member).  The breakdown of the 
obtained sample is illustrated in Table 5.2 in Appendix II.   
In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, the control and treatment groups divide up the overall sample 
fairly evenly, albeit with a few notable exceptions.  The treatment group is significantly younger (p=0.003) than the 
control group, but only by 0.6 years; also, while Communist Party members and China Youth League members 
divide up relatively evenly between the two groups, the politically unaffiliated are somewhat over-represented in the 
treatment group (constituting 11.1% of the treatment group as compared to 2.2% of the control group; p=0.087).  
Other questions contained in the CUSVS allow us to determine if the control and treatment groups differ 
significantly from each other in terms of social and political attitudes and orientations that might potentially have an 
impact on the main dependent variable of interest to this study (i.e. respondents’ level of measured postmaterialism).  
As indicated in the bottom half of Table 5.2 (Appendix II), the control and treatment groups differ significantly only 
in terms of treatment group subjects’ very slightly lower level of traditionalism (p=0.098). 
To address the possibility that the apparent effects of the experimental treatment on subjects’ measured levels of 
postmaterialism may to some degree be confounded by the modest differences evident between the control and 
treatment groups (in terms of age, unaffiliated political status and traditionalism), I estimated two separate 
multinomial logit models in STATA with the original 4-item and “country aims” 4-item categorical variables as the 
dependent variables and the national threat treatment, age, general citizen political status and traditionalism as the 
predictors.  The CLARIFY application was then used to predict the probable distributions of postmaterialism scores 
within each battery with the national threat treatment set to 0 or to 1 and the other three variables set to their mean 
values.  The full results are presented in Table 5.2a in Appendix II, with the actually observed percentages displayed 
side-by-side for comparison.  Generally, no major differences are evident between the observed and predicted 
distributions of postmaterialism for either battery or within either of the two groups.  In regards to the original 4-
item values battery, the observed and predicted distributions for the control group are virtually identical (PDI -4.4 
observed, PDI -4.3 predicted), whereas the predicted PDI for the treatment group (-27.4) is a bit further toward the 
materialist end of the spectrum than what was actually observed (-22.2) – suggesting that the impact of the 
experimental treatment might actually have been slightly muted by the moderate socio-demographic differences 
between the two groups.  For the “country aims” 4-item battery, the predicted PDI score of the control group is 0.8 
points further toward the materialist direction (+2.2 observed, +1.4 predicted) whereas the predicted PDI for the 
treatment group is 1.7 points further toward the materialist direction (-40.7 observed, -42.4 predicted), indicating 
that the impact of the experimental treatment in this case may have been only very slightly masked by the inherent 
differences between the two groups.  Overall, then, the picture portrayed by the prediction equations is quite similar 
to the actually observed results. 
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the case of the “country aims” 4-item battery that constitutes the first section of the expanded 
12-item postmaterialism index. 
National Threat: Order & Stability vs. Freedom & Enfranchisement 
An issue that remains to be explored concerns the precise micro-dynamics driving these 
differences in overall postmaterialism scores between the control and treatment groups.  The 
predictions were that exposure to the national threat treatment would result in a lower level of 
postmaterialism among the treatment group through, specifically, an increased tendency to 
prioritize the authoritarian-materialist options (e.g. maintaining order in the nation) over the 
libertarian-postmaterialist ones (e.g. guaranteeing freedom of speech).  Do these predictions hold? 
Table 5.3 displays the percentages of respondents in the control and treatment groups who 
selected each of the four items contained within the original 4-item battery as either a first- or 
second-choice selection, together with the results of a two-tailed t-test of the statistical 
significance of the difference in proportions between the two groups.   
The findings in Table 5.3 provide somewhat limited support for these hypotheses.  As 
predicted, no significant differences were found in control and treatment group subjects’ 
preferences for the “fight rising prices” materialist option (consistent with H1d), and treatment 
group respondents were significantly less inclined to choose the libertarian “freedom of speech” 
item (H1c supported).  At the same time, however, no significant differences were found 
between with the control and treatment group respondents in their overall preferences for the 
authoritarian-materialist “more order” or libertarian-postmaterialist “more say” priorities (H1a 
and H1b not supported).  Furthermore, to the extent that the two groups do differ in their 
preference for this last item, the difference is contrary to expectations, with a larger percentage 
of subjects’ exposed to the national threat treatment selecting the libertarian-postmaterialist 
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“giving people more say in important political decisions” as compared to their control-group 
counterparts. 
Table 5.3 – Original 4-item battery pooled 1st-choice and 2nd-choice priorities, control and 
national threat treatment groups (CUSVS Phase One) 
Priority          Control        Treatment 
    Pr(|T| > |t|) 
       2-tailed 
Maintaining order in the nation 82.2% 88.9%        0.3483 
Giving people more say in 
important political decisions 
22.2% 33.3%        0.2258 
Fighting rising prices 64.4% 66.7%        0.8189 
Guaranteeing freedom of speech 31.1% 11.1%        0.0133 
 
It should be kept in mind, however, that Table 5.3 provides only a partial picture of the 
precise effects of the experimental treatment on subjects’ value priority preferences in regards to 
the original 4-item battery.  Table 5.3a provides a closer investigation of these micro-dynamics 
by parsing out differences in first- and second-choices priorities between the control and 
treatment groups.   
Table 5.3a – Original 4-item battery 1st-choice and 2nd-choice priorities, control and national threat 
treatment groups (CUSVS Phase One) 
Ranking       Priority     Control  Treatment 
  Pr(|T| > |t|) 
     2-tailed 
First-Choice   Priority 
Selection 
Maintaining order in the 
nation 
48.9% 72.2% 0.0172 
Giving people more say in 
important government 
decisions 
33.3% 14.8% 0.0299 
Fighting rising prices       4.4%        7.4%       0.5432 
Guaranteeing freedom of 
speech 
     13.3%        5.6%       0.1837 
Second-Choice 
Priority Selection 
Maintaining order in the 
nation 
     33.3%      16.7%       0.0548 
Giving people more say in 
important political decisions 
     31.1%      51.9%       0.0379 
Fighting rising prices      17.8%      25.9%       0.3366 
Guaranteeing freedom of 
speech 
     17.8%        5.6%       0.0548 
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The top half of the table displays differences in distributions between the control and 
treatment groups in terms of their first-choice priority selections.  Note in this instance that the 
authoritarian-materialist option of “maintaining order in the nation,” while the single most-
popular first choice among respondents in both groups, is considerably and significantly (p<0.02) 
more popular among respondents in the treatment group (selected as a first choice by 72.2% of 
subjects) as compared to the control group (selected as a first choice by less than 50 percent of 
subjects).  Note also that the percentage of respondents in the treatment group selecting “giving 
people more say” as their first-choice priority is less than half that found in the control group 
(14.8% versus 33.3%; p<0.05).  A similar difference can also be noted in regards to selection of 
the other libertarian-postmaterialist item, “guaranteeing freedom of speech,” with 13.3% of 
individuals in the control group selecting this as their first-choice priority as compared to only 
5.6% in the treatment group; in this case, however, the difference does not obtain conventional 
statistical significance.  Finally, it should be noted that no significant differences are evident 
between the two groups in terms of the proportion of respondents selecting the economic-
materialist “inflation” item. 
The bottom half of Table 5.3a displays the distributions of respondents’ second-choice 
selections vis-à-vis the original 4-item battery.  Note first that, as before, no strong leaning 
toward the “fighting rising prices” economic-materialist item is evident among the treatment 
group as compared to the control group.  At the same time, however, the proportion of 
respondents in treatment group opting for the libertarian-postmaterialist “guaranteeing free 
speech” item as a second-choice priority is roughly one-third that of the control group (p=0.05).  
The distribution of second-choice priority selections between the control and treatment groups 
also contains an interesting reversal, to some extent, of the dominant pattern in the first-choice 
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priority selections, as respondents in the treatment group were – in the case of their second-
choice selections – significantly less likely to select the authoritarian-materialist “maintaining 
order in the nation” item and significantly more likely to select the libertarian-postmaterialist 
“giving people more say in important political decisions” item, differences that are in both cases 
significant at approximately the 0.05 level or better. 
Table 5.3b – Original 4-item battery 2nd-choice priorities for respondents choosing “maintaining 
order” as 1st-choice priority, control and national threat treatment groups (CUSVS Phase One) 
Priority Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Giving people more say in important 
government decisions 
50.0% 66.7% 0.2071 
Fighting rising prices 18.2% 30.8% 0.2910 
Guaranteeing freedom of speech 31.8% 2.6% 0.0009 
 
Of course, in analyzing and comparing these results, it may be helpful to recall the 
implications of the “dilemma of constrained choice” (Flanagan 1987) as it applies to the case of 
authoritarian and libertarian-minded subjects’ responses to the postmaterialism batteries.  
Individuals who emphasize libertarian values face no real dilemma, as they are presented with 
two libertarian items to select as their first- and second-choice priorities.  Those emphasizing 
authoritarian values, however, will likely have exhausted the only authoritarian option 
(maintaining order, strong defense, fighting crime) available to them with their first choice, and 
will be forced to select from the remaining three items (two libertarian, one economic).  
Flanagan proposes that authoritarians will tend to settle on the economic item as the least-bad 
option for their second-choice selection, following the logic that whereas the two libertarian 
items are antithetical to their authoritarian orientation, the economic item is merely irrelevant to 
the authoritarian-libertarian value conflict.  To test this possibility, and to investigate the 
dynamics of the differences in second-choice priorities across the control and treatment groups in 
more detail, I focus – in Table 5.3b – on the distribution of second-choice priorities among 
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individuals in both groups who selected the authoritarian-materialist “maintaining order in the 
nation” item as their first-choice priority. 
Note first that, within both the control and treatment groups, individuals who selected the 
authoritarian-materialist “order” item as their first-choice priority were most likely to select the 
libertarian-postmaterialist “more say” item as their second-choice priority.  This trend is more 
noticeable in the treatment group (with 66.7% of respondents who chose “order” as a first-choice 
priority selecting “more say” as a second-choice priority, compared to 50% in the control group), 
though the difference does not obtain statistical significance.  Note also that whereas the 
economic-materialist “fighting rising prices” item is – consistent with Flanagan – more popular 
among the treatment group than the control group as a second-choice option for those individuals 
choosing “order” as their top priority, the difference between the groups, again, does not achieve 
significance.   
The most remarkable finding evident in Table 5.3b is the much lower preference for the 
“guaranteeing free speech” libertarian-postmaterialist item as a second-choice priority among 
“order-first” respondents in the treatment group.  Compared to their treatment group counterparts, 
control group subjects who selected “more order” as their top priority where approximately a 
dozen times more likely to select “free speech” as their number two priority (31.8% versus 2.6%), 
a difference that is highly significant at the 0.001 level. 
Operating under the assumption that the experimental stimulus induced a heightened 
emphasis on authoritarian values amongst the treatment group, we would expect that individuals 
in this group would be more likely to select the one authoritarian-materialist item – “maintaining 
order in the nation” – as their first choice as compared to the control group, and this is indeed the 
case.  Following Flanagan, we would also expect respondents in the treatment group to tend to 
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gravitate toward the economic-materialist “fighting rising prices” item as a least-bad option for 
their second choice, as they continue to eschew the two libertarian-postmaterialist “giving people 
more say” and “protecting freedom of speech” priorities.  But whereas individuals in the 
treatment group were indeed significantly less likely to select “guaranteeing freedom of speech” 
as a second-choice option, it is the “giving people more say in government decisions” 
postmaterialist priority, and not the “fighting rising prices” materialist item, that is by the far the 
most popular second-choice selection among this group (both overall, and especially among 
respondents selecting the “maintaining order” item as their first-choice priority).   
National Threat: Defense & Growth vs. Participation & Aesthetics 
I now turn our attention to an examination of the effects of the national threat experimental 
treatment on subjects’ preferences for specific value-priorities contained within the “country 
aims” 4-item battery that constitutes the first section of the full 12-item postmaterialism index.  
Table 5.4 displays the differences in the percentages of respondents within each group selecting 
each of the items as either
20
 their first or second most-important priorities. Only one of the stated 
hypotheses is not borne out by the survey data, as treatment-group members’ moderate 
preference for the “rapid economic growth” materialist item does not achieve any conventional 
level of statistical significance (H2d not supported).  In regards to the other three options 
contained within this battery, all of the differences in proportions of subjects’ selections are both 
highly significant and consistent with expectations.  Respondents exposed to the national threat 
treatment were twice as likely to select the authoritarian-nationalist “strong defense forces” 
                                                 
20
 One respondent in the control group overcame the dilemma of constrained choice by simply choosing “working 
hard to make our cities and towns more beautiful” posmtaterialist item for both their first- and second-choice 
priority selections.  All of the other subjects chose different items for their first and second-choice selections to both 
of the two batteries. 
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materialist item, and only half as likely to select the libertarian “more say at work/in 
communities” postmaterialist item (strong support for H2a and H2b).  Treatment-group 
respondents were also significantly and substantially less likely (by a difference of 
approximately 22 percentage points) to select the “more beautiful cities and towns” 
postmaterialist item as either a first or second priority (strong support for H2c). 
Table 5.4 – “Country aims” 4-item values battery pooled 1st-choice and 2nd-choice priorities, 
control and national threat treatment groups (CUSVS Phase One) 
Priority Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Rapid economic growth 64.4% 74.1% 0.3041 
Ensuring our country has strong defense forces 33.3% 66.7% 0.0008 
Guaranteeing that people have more say at work 
and in their communities 
37.8% 18.5% 0.0323 
Working hard to make our cities and towns more 
beautiful 
62.2% 40.7% 0.0335 
 
The top half of Table 5.4a provides a breakdown and comparison of first-choice responses 
between the control and treatment groups in regard to “country aims” 4-item battery.  Most 
strikingly, the proportion of respondents within the treatment group selecting the authoritarian-
materialist (and nationalistic) “strong defense” item as a first-choice priority (37.4%) is more 
than eight times the proportion found in the control group, a difference that is overwhelmingly 
significant at the .0001 level.   
Note also that the proportion of respondents selecting the libertarian-postmaterialist priority of 
“guaranteeing that people have more say at work and in their communities” as a first-choice 
priority in the treatment group (9.3%) is less than half of that of the control group (22.2%), 
although in this case the difference is significant at only the .07 level.  We can also observe a 
substantial and highly significant difference in the percentage of respondents selecting the 
 113 
aesthetic-postmaterialist “making our cities and towns more beautiful” item as their first choice, 
with 40% of respondents in the control group making this their first choice, as opposed to less 
than half of that proportion in the treatment group (p<0.05).  Finally, the first-choice popularity 
of the “economic growth” materialist option appears to be largely insensitive to the effects of the 
experimental treatment. 
Table 5.4a – “Country aims” 4-item battery 1st-choice and 2nd-choice priorities, control and 
national threat treatment groups (CUSVS Phase One) 
Selection Priority Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
First-Choice 
Priority Selection 
Rapid economic growth 33.3% 35.2% 0.8487 
Ensuring our country has 
strong defense forces 
4.4% 37.4% 0.0001 
Guaranteeing that people 
have more say at work and 
in their communities 
22.2% 9.3% 0.0746 
Working hard to make our 
cities and towns more 
beautiful 
40.0% 18.6% 0.0179 
Second-Choice 
Priority Selection 
Rapid economic growth 31.1% 38.9% 0.4254 
Ensuring our country has 
strong defense forces 
28.9% 29.6% 0.9365 
Guaranteeing that people 
have more say at work and 
in their communities 
15.6% 9.3% 0.3442 
Working hard to make our 
cities and towns more 
beautiful 
24.4% 22.2% 0.7968 
 
The bottom half of Table 5.4a displays the differences in the distributions of responses 
between the control and treatment groups in regard to respondents’ selection of their second-
choice priority within the “country aims” 4-item battery.  In contrast to the distribution of 
second-choice responses vis-à-vis the original 4-item battery, here we do not observe any 
reversal of the treatment group’s first-choice preference for the authoritarian-materialist item 
(“strong defense forces”); nor do either of the two postmaterialist items (“guaranteeing that 
people have more say at work and in their communities,” “working hard to make our cities and 
 114 
towns more beautiful”) gain significant ground with the treatment group as compared to the 
control group.  Given this lack of cross-cutting effects, it is not surprising that the overall effect 
of the national threat experimental treatment is found to be much larger and more significant in 
its impact on the “country aims” 4-item battery than it is on the core, original 4-item values 
battery.     
Table 5.4b – “Country aims” 4-item battery 2nd-choice priorities for respondents choosing “order” as 
1
st
-choice priority, control and national threat treatment groups (CUSVS Phase One) 
Priority Control 
National 
Threat 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Rapid economic growth 100.0% 70.0% 0.3879 
Guaranteeing that people have more say at 
work and in their communities 
0.0% 5.0% 0.7603 
Working hard to make our cities and 
towns more beautiful 
0.0% 25.0% 0.4454 
 
Table 5.4b displays the distribution of second-choice responses for individuals in both groups 
who selected the authoritarian-materialist “strong defense” item as their first choice.  Note first 
that the “rapid economic growth” economic-materialist item is by far the most popular second 
option for “defense-firsters” in both the control and treatment groups, as 100% of such 
individuals (that is to say, both of them) in the control group selected this economic item as their 
second-choice priority, together with 70.0% of respondents in the treatment group.  There is also 
a smattering of postmaterialist priorities evident in the second-choice selections of the treatment 
group’s “defense-first” cohort, though these trends do not obtain significance.  Overall, the 
overwhelming trend is for respondents in both groups who privilege national defense as their 
first priority to opt for economic growth as their second choice.  
National Threat, Authoritarianism and National Attachment 
Up to this point I have focused primarily on the “direct” effects of the national threat 
experimental treatment in increasing the manifestation of authoritarian and nationalistic attitudes 
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among the subjects and, consequentially, impacting upon their levels of postmaterialism as 
measured by the values priority batteries.  One critical issue that remains to be explored is the 
degree to which the national threat experimental treatment may be interacting with subjects’ 
underlying value orientations to produce the effects exhibited in the data.  Specifically, the 
interest here is in deeply-held attitudes pertaining to subjects’ sense of identification with and 
attachment to the overarching normative social order.  The pre-treatment section of the CUSVS 
questionnaire provides measures of two different species of such a value orientation – an 
authoritarian predisposition, as measured by the standard NES forced-choice child-rearing 
values battery, and a 12-item measure of national attachment comprised of patriotism and 
nationalism question-items drawn from de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) and from the World 
Values Survey questionnaire.  
Table 5.5 – Exploratory factor analysis of responses to national question items (CUSVS Phase One 
and Phase Two) 
CUSVS 
Question 
CUSVS Wording Source Factor 1 Factor 2 
NA1 I am proud to be Chinese. WVS 0.7550 -0.2402 
NA2 China’s victory over other countries in international sports events is 
important to me. 
F&E-N 0.6044 0.1740 
NA3 I am proud of China’s economic achievements.  F&E-P 0.7031 -0.0738 
NA4 I am more willing to be a citizen of China than other countries. F&E-N 0.7958 -0.3488 
NA5 China’s history makes me proud.  F&E-P 0.4822 -0.1091 
NA6 China’s position in the international order is important to me. F&E-N 0.5798 0.4602 
NA7 If another war occurs, I am willing to fight for my country. WVS 0.5682 0.1145 
NA8 I am proud of China’s equal treatment of the country’s various 
groups (cultural, political, religious). 
F&E-P 0.5453 -0.1210 
NA9 It is important to me that China’s military strength is capable of 
competing with other countries. 
F&E-N 0.5247 0.5012 
NA10 Some things that happen in China make me feel ashamed of China.  F&E-P -0.1061 0.3818 
NA11 China’s unity is important to me. F&E-N/P 0.5369 0.2709 
NA12 Generally speaking, I feel that China is better than other countries.  F&E-N 0.6585 -0.2666 
WVS – World Values Survey item 
F&E-N – de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) nationalism item 
F&E-P – de Figueiredo and Elkins patriotism item 
F&E-N/P – de Figuereido and Elkins nationalism-patriotism (mixed) item 
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Given the centrality of issues of national affect to the current study, I devote space here for a 
brief examination of subjects’ responses to this latter question index.  First, as the national 
attachment battery appeared in the exact same format in the pre-treatment section of the 
questionnaire in both of the two phases of the CUSVS, it was possible to pool the results from all 
subjects surveyed in both administrations of the study (N=188, due to some missing responses).  
I then conducted exploratory factor analysis on the responses to these twelve question-items to 
determine whether the national attachment orientation measured by the battery is best treated as 
a uni-dimensional or multi-dimensional phenomenon.
21
 The results of the factor analysis are 
displayed in Table 5.5.  Reading across from left to right, the table displays the questionnaire 
code for and wording of each question, the original source – World Values Survey item or de 
Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) nationalism, patriotism, or nationalism-patriotism item – and the 
loadings that the item was found to have on the two factors retained by the analysis (Factor 1 
with an Eigenvalue of 4.26, Factor 2 with an Eigenvalue of 1.01).   
The data at hand do not appear to provide strong support for treating national attachment as 
multi-dimensional phenomenon in the context of the current study.  Of the twelve question-items 
appearing in the survey, only two exhibit loadings on Factor 1 of less than 0.5 (NA5 and NA10) 
and only two items exhibit loadings on Factor 2 of more than 0.4 (NA6 and NA9).  Based on 
these findings, I constructed two different measures of subjects’ national attachment – a 12-item 
measure that includes responses to all questions in the index, and a 10-item measure that 
                                                 
21
 This is a reasonable consideration, given the fact that the index was comprised primarily of items that de 
Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) found to be measures of two distinct species of national attachment, namely, 
patriotism (a self-referential, prideful orientation towards one’s nation) and nationalism (an inherently comparative 
attitude entailing evaluations of one’s own nation with explicit reference to other nations).   
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excludes responses to items NA5 and NA10.
22
  Both measures are reported in the descriptions of 
socio-demographic and attitudinal differences between the control and treatment groups in each 
phase of the survey, whereas I utilize only the 10-item measure of national attachment in the 
exploration of interactive effects, below. 
Of concern here is the possibility of interactive effects between the national threat 
experimental treatment and subjects’ underlying levels of authoritarianism and national 
attachment.  As detailed in Hypotheses H5a and H5b, we would expect to see subjects’ levels of 
authoritarianism and national attachment to have greater (negative) impact on their levels of 
measured postmaterialism under conditions of perceived national threat than we would in the 
absence of such conditions. 
To test these hypotheses four separate multinomial logit equations were estimated.  In the first 
equation the original 4-item battery categorical dependent variable (materialist, mixed, 
postmaterialist) was regressed against the national threat experimental treatment (coded 0 for 
control group, 1 for treatment group), authoritarianism, and a national threat*authoritarianism 
interaction term.  In the second equation national attachment and a national threat*national 
attachment interaction term were substituted.  These same two equations were then estimated 
with the “country aims” 4-item battery categorical outcome variable as the dependent variable.  
The regression results are presented in Tables 5.6 to 5.6c in Appendix II.  In regard to the 
original 4-item battery, no significant interactions were found between subjects’ authoritarianism 
and the experimental treatment (H5a not supported), whereas a significant interaction was found 
between national attachment and the treatment treatment in regard to the likelihood of 
                                                 
22
 These measures were calculated by summing the weighted responses to each item – weighted from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) – and dividing by the number of items in the scale to create a composite measure of 
national attachment on a 0-1 metric.  Weighting was reversed for item NA10 (“Some things that happen in China 
make me feel ashamed of China.”). 
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respondents being categorized as materialists rather than the “mixed” baseline category.  The 
nature of the interactive effect found, however, is not quite in keeping with expectations.   
The relevant hypothesis (H5b) predicted that national attachment would have a larger 
negative impact on subjects’ postmaterialism scores on subjects in the treatment group than it 
would on subjects in the control group.  The actual situation is not quite this simple.  As logit 
coefficients do not lend themselves easily to direct interpretation, I have presented the results 
below utilizing predicted probabilities (calculated by the CLARIFY application in Stata 11) to 
present the findings in a relatively straightforward manner.  Table 5.7 presents the predicted 
probabilities of respondents being categorized as materialists, mixed or postmaterialist at the 
minimum and maximum levels of national affect found in the data, first for the control group 
(left-hand side) and then the treatment group (right-hand side). 
Table 5.7 – National Attachment and Original 4-Item Values Battery Predicted Probabilities  
(CUSVS Phase One) 
National 
Attachment 
Control Group National Threat Treatment Group 
Pred. 
Mat. 
Pred. 
Mixed 
Pred. 
Post. 
Pred. 
PDI 
Pred. 
Mat. 
Pred. 
Mixed 
Pred. 
Post. 
Pred. 
PDI 
Low 31.4% 3.1% 65.6% +34.2 16.3% 25.1% 58.6% +42.3 
High 1.3% 98.2% 1.0% -0.3 28.2% 70.6% 1.3% -26.9 
Difference in PDI 
[High PDI-Low PDI] 
-34.5 
Difference in PDI 
[High PDI-Low PDI] 
-69.2 
 
As the table indicates, in both the control and the treatment groups, as level of national 
attachment increases the likelihood of respondents being classified as either materialists or 
postmaterialists, rather than the intermediate mixed category, decreases.  However, the impact of 
national attachment on the likelihood of subjects being categorized as materialist versus the 
mixed category differs between the control group and the treatment group. 
In the control group, at the lowest recorded level of national attachment individuals are 
approximately ten times more likely to be classified as materialists rather than mixed; at the 
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highest level of national affects individuals are seventy-five times more likely to be classified as 
mixed rather than materialists.  By comparison, at the lowest level of national attachment 
treatment-group members are 1.5 times more likely to be classified as mixed rather than 
materialists, and at the highest level of national attachment they are 2.5 times more likely to be 
categorized as mixed rather than materialist.  In both cases higher levels of national attachment 
are associated with higher probabilities of individuals being classified as mixed rather than 
materialist – but the impact of national attachment is much smaller for individuals exposed to the 
experimental treatment than it is for subjects in the control group.  (See Appendix II for the 
complete CLARIFY predicted probabilities output.) 
The differing impact of national attachment on the likelihood of subjects being categorized as 
materialist versus mixed translates into a much larger predicted shift in PDI scores within the 
treatment group (from +42.3 to -26.9, or a 69.2 point shift in the materialist direction) than in the 
control group (from +34.2 to -0.3, or a 34.5 point shift) in the control group.  In other words, 
going from the lowest to highest level of national attachment would appear to have 
approximately twice the negative impact on overall postmaterialism (PDI) scores in the treatment 
group as it does in the control group.  These results, however, must be taken with a very large 
grain of salt, as the predicted probabilities above are, after all, only point estimates or “best 
guesses” derived from a very limited number of observations.  Given the large confidence 
intervals – together with the lack of a direct test of the statistical significance of the difference in 
the difference in predicted PDI scores – these results should be taken as at best mild support of 
the proposition that national attachment has a stronger negative impact on overall 
postmaterialism (PDI) scores among individuals exposed to the national threat treatment than 
those who were not (results consistent with H5b).  
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In regard to the “country aims” 4-item battery, we once again find no significant interactions 
between authoritarianism and the national threat treatment (H5a not supported), and, once again, 
a significant interaction is found between national attachment and the experimental treatment 
vis-à-vis the likelihood of respondents being categorized as materialist versus the “mixed” 
baseline (suggestive of H5b).  The nature of this interactive effect is displayed in Table 5.8, 
which displays the results of predicted probabilities of individuals being classified as materialist, 
mixed or postmaterialist within the control and treatment groups at the lowest and highest levels 
of observed national attachment, calculated using the CLARIFY application in Stata 11. 
Table 5.8 – National attachment and “country aims” 4-item battery predicted probabilities 
(CUSVS Phase One) 
National 
Attachment 
Control Group National Threat Treatment Group 
Pred. 
Mat. 
Pred. 
Mixed 
Pred. 
Post. 
Pred. 
PDI 
Pred. 
Mat. 
Pred. 
Mixed 
Pred. 
Post. 
Pred. 
PDI 
Low 1.1% 68.2% 30.7% +29.6 24.3% 75.7% 0% +51.4 
High 61.7% 26.4% 11.9% -49.8 57.5% 42.5% 0% -15.0 
Difference in PDI 
[High PDI-Low PDI] 
-79.4 
Difference in PDI 
[High PDI-Low PDI] 
-66.4 
In both the control and treatment groups, as individuals’ level of national attachment 
increases the probability of their being categorized as materialists rather than “mixed” also 
increases.  However, in this instance, the effect is much more pronounced in the case of control 
group respondents than in the case of treatment group respondents.  Within the control group, at 
the minimum observed level of national attachment subjects are sixty-two times more likely to 
be categorized as mixed rather than materialist, while at the highest level of national affect they 
are 2.3 times more likely to be classified as materialist rather than mixed.  Within the treatment 
group, individuals as the lowest observed level of national attachment are approximately three 
times more likely to be classified as mixed rather than as materialist, whereas individuals at the 
highest level of national attachment are approximately 1.4 times more likely to be categorized as 
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materialist rather than mixed.  These effects translate into a PDI shift in the direction of greater 
materialism that is less pronounced in the case of the treatment group (from +51.4 to -15.0, or 
66.4 points) than it is in the case of the control group (from +29.6 to -49.8, or 79.4 points). 
These results would thus appear to contradict hypothesis H5b’s prediction that national 
attachment would have a larger negative impact on individuals’ overall levels of postmaterialism 
among individuals perceiving a higher level of national threat.  Again, however, one must be 
very cautious in claiming too much from these results, as all of the same caveats mentioned 
above (relatively small number of observations, large confidence intervals, lack of tests of 
significance) apply here as well.  At best one could conclude that findings are consistent with a 
pattern that is contrary to the hypothesized interactive relationship between national attachment 
and the national threat treatment. 
CUSVS Phase Two: Postmaterialism under National Assurance 
The second round of the CUSVS was administered on April 22
nd
, 2010 to a separate group of 
ninety-two undergraduate university students enrolled at South China Agricultural University 
(SCAU) in Guangzhou.  The only key difference from the first phase of the study was the 
substitution of the national assurance experimental treatment (comprised of eight “positive” 
media items) for the national threat media content in the treatment version of the questionnaire.  
Of the 92 students surveyed, a total of 91 usable questionnaires were obtained (46 control and 45 
treatment). 
Table 5.10 displays differences in the distribution of materialists, postmaterialists and mixed 
individuals and the differences in overall postmaterialism scores (PDI) between the control and 
positive treatment groups, as measured by the original 4-item and “country aims” 4-item 
batteries.  In the case of the original 4-item battery, the contrast is quite striking, with a massive 
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PDI score shift in the postmaterialist direction, from -39.1 in the control group to -2.2 in the 
treatment group (p=0.002; H3 strongly supported).  Note that this PDI shift is driven largely by 
treatment group’s substantially smaller cohort of pure materialists (17.8% versus 45.7%; 
p=0.002). 
Table 5.10 – Differences in distributions of postmaterialism, control and national assurance 
treatment groups (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Battery Category Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
1-tailed 
Original 4-
Item 
Materialist 45.7% 17.8% 0.0040 0.0020 
Mixed 47.8% 66.7% 0.0707 - 
Postmaterialist 6.5% 15.6% 0.1720 0.0860 
PDI -39.1 -2.2 0.0042 0.0021 
Country 
Aims  4-
Item 
Materialist 32.6% 31.1% 0.8798 0.4399 
Mixed 60.9% 51.1% 0.3539 - 
Postmaterialist 6.5% 17.8% 0.1018 0.0509 
PDI -26.1 -13.3 0.3419 0.1710 
Materialist: selected two materialist items 
Mixed: selected one materialist and one postmaterialist item 
Postmaterialist: selected two postmaterialist items 
Note: percentages rounded to nearest one-tenth of a percentage point; percentages within each group may not total 100% 
PDI: Percentage of postmaterialists-percentage of materialists 
 
National Assurance: Order & Stability vs. Freedom & Enfranchisement 
Table 5.11 examines differences in the proportions of respondents within the control and 
treatment groups selecting each of the four priority-items offered in the original 4-item values 
battery. In line with expectations, treatment-group members were less likely to choose the 
“maintaining order” materialist item and more likely to choose the “freedom of speech” 
postmaterialist item; however, neither of these slight-to-moderate differences achieves statistical 
significance at any conventional level (H3a and H3c both unsupported).  Respondents exposed 
to the national assurance experimental treatment were significantly more likely (by a difference 
of approximately 23 percentage points; p=0.027) to choose the “more say in politics” 
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postmaterialist item as a first or second choice.  Somewhat surprisingly, the largest and most 
significant difference evidenced in the table is the much lower proportion of treatment-group 
respondents selecting the “fighting rising prices” materialist option.  Only one-fifth of subjects in 
the treatment group selected this item as first or second choice, as compared to more than half of 
control-group subjects – a difference that is highly significant at the .001 level (contrary to H3d). 
Table 5.11 – Original 4-item battery pooled 1st-choice and 2nd-choice priorities, control and 
national assurance treatment groups (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Priority Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Maintaining order in the nation 87.0% 82.2% 0.5367 
Giving people more say in 
important political decisions 
41.3% 64.4% 0.0271 
Fighting rising prices 52.2% 20.0% 0.0012 
Guaranteeing freedom of speech 19.6% 31.1% 0.2094 
 
The top half of Table 5.11a examines differences in first-choice selections of priorities 
between the control and treatment groups in regard to the original 4-item battery.  Note first that 
“maintaining order in the nation” option is the most popular first-choice selection among all 
respondents in both groups, being chosen by somewhat more than half or subjects in each group 
as their number-one priority.  The most notable difference between the groups is the much higher 
proportion of respondents in the treatment group (35.6% versus 19.6%; p=0.09) selecting the 
“giving people more say in important political decisions” postmaterialist item, a difference that 
obtains moderate significance at under the 0.10 level.   
Interestingly, the proportion of respondents in the treatment group selecting the “guaranteeing 
freedom of speech” libertarian-postmaterialist item (2.2%) is approximately one-fifth that of the 
control group (10.9%), a difference that is once again only moderately significant, at just under 
the 0.10 level.  Finally, note that while the proportion of treatment-group respondents selecting 
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the “fighting rising prices” economic-materialist item as a first-choice priority is approximately 
half that of the control group (6.7% versus 13.0%), the difference does not obtain statistical 
significance by any traditional standard.   
Table 5.11a – Original 4-item battery 1st-choice and 2nd-choice priorities, control and national 
assurance treatment groups (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Question Category Control Treatment Pr(|T| > |t|) 
1
st
 Choice 
Priority 
Selection 
Maintaining order in the nation 56.5% 55.6% 0.9270 
Giving people more say in 
important political decisions 
19.6% 35.6% 0.0894 
Fighting rising prices 13.0% 6.7% 0.3137 
Guaranteeing freedom of speech 10.9% 2.2% 0.0986 
2
nd
 Choice 
Priority 
Selection 
Maintaining order in the nation 30.4% 26.7% 0.6947 
Giving people more say in 
important political decisions 
21.7% 31.1% 0.3158 
Fighting rising prices 39.1% 13.3% 0.0049 
Guaranteeing freedom of speech 8.7% 28.9% 0.0132 
 
Much more striking and significant differences in choice distributions between the control and 
treatment groups are evident when we turn to respondents’ selection of their second-choice 
priorities as gauged by the original 4-item battery, as displayed in the bottom half of Table 5.11.  
While no significant differences in selection of the “maintaining order” and “giving people more 
say” items are evident, the proportion of respondents in the treatment group selecting the 
“freedom of speech” libertarian-postmaterialist item is more than three times that of the control 
group (28.9% versus 8.7%), a difference that is highly significant at the .01 level.  Unexpectedly, 
the proportion of respondents in the treatment group selecting the “fighting rising prices” 
economic-materialist item as a second-choice priority (13.3%) is approximately one-third that of 
the control group (39.1%), a difference that is, again, highly significant at under the .01 level. 
Table 5.11b examines differences in distributions of second-choice priority selections 
between individuals in the control and treatment groups who selected “maintaining order in the 
nation” as their first-choice priority (recall that these proportions were virtually identical between 
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the two groups).  Having used up the one authoritarian-materialist item with their first choice, 
what options do these individuals gravitate toward for their second-choice selection? 
Table 5.11b – Original 4-item battery 2nd-choice priorities for respondents choosing “order” as 1st-
choice priority, control and national assurance treatment groups (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Priority Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Giving people more say in important 
government decisions 
30.8% 52.0% 0.1286 
Fighting rising prices 61.5% 24.0% 0.0061 
Guaranteeing freedom of speech 7.7% 24.0% 0.1138 
 
Within the control group, such “order-first” individuals tend to behave in line with Flanagan’s 
predictions, strongly favoring the economic-materialist “fighting rising prices” option (chosen by 
61.5%) over the two libertarian-postmaterialist items.  A very different pattern is evident among 
such respondents in the treatment group, however, with a much smaller proportion (24.0%) 
opting for the fighting rising prices item as their second-choice selection, a difference with the 
control group that is highly significant at under the .01 level.  The treatment group’s greater 
preferences for the “giving people more say” and “guaranteeing freedom of speech” libertarian-
postmaterialist items do not quite obtain traditional statistical significance on the our own, but 
taken together we can observe a highly significant difference between the two groups in terms of 
the proportions of “order-first” respondents who select either of the two postmaterialist items as 
their second choice – 38.5% in the case of the control group, and 76.0% in the case of the 
treatment group.  These proportions are, naturally, the percentages of respondents in both cases 
not selecting the “fighting rising prices” item.   
National Assurance: Defense & Growth vs. Participation & Aesthetics 
Given the much more muted effects of the experimental treatment on overall postmaterialism 
scores as measured by “country aims” 4-item battery (as compared to the original 4-item 
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battery), it is not surprising to find only relatively minor differences in first- and second-choice 
priority selections between the control and treatment groups.   
Table 5.12 – “Country aims” 4-item battery pooled 1st-choice and 2nd-choice priorities, control 
and national assurance treatment groups (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Priority Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Rapid economic growth 65.2% 53.3% 0.2534 
Ensuring our country has strong 
defense forces 
60.9% 60.0% 0.9333 
Guaranteeing that people have 
more say at work and in their 
communities 
24.0% 40.0% 0.1018 
Working hard to make our cities 
and towns more beautiful 
50.0% 46.7% 0.7537 
 
As Table 5.12 indicates, the only difference in priority selections between the control and 
treatment groups that achieves any conventional significance is found in the greater proportion of 
subjects exposed to the experimental treatment selecting the “more say at work/in communities” 
postmaterialist item as a first or second-choice selection (40.0% treatment group compared to 
24.0% control group, significant at 0.10 level; moderate support for H4b).  Perhaps the most 
interesting finding in this table, however, is the almost complete absence of any difference 
between the control and treatment groups in the proportions of subjects selecting the “strong 
defense forces” materialist item as a first or second choice.  Recall that in the previous phase of 
the survey selection of this item was found to be highly influenced by exposure to the national 
threat experimental treatment – consistent with the proposed hypothesis that a greater sense of 
threat would translate into greater authoritarian-nationalistic concern with national strength and 
relative power (and thus, lower levels of overall postmaterialism).  Respondents exposed here to 
the national assurance treatment, however, exhibit a less than one percentage point difference 
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from their control group counterparts in their tendency to select the “defense” materialist item as 
a first or second choice. 
Table 5.12a – “Country aims” 4-item battery first- and second-choice priority selections, control 
and national assurance treatment groups (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Question Category Control Treatment Pr(|T| > |t|) 
1
st
 Choice 
Priority 
Selection 
Rapid economic growth 39.1% 22.2% 0.0822 
Ensuring our country has strong 
defense forces 
26.1% 26.7% 0.9507 
Guaranteeing that people have 
more say at work and in their 
communities 
10.9% 15.6% 0.5143 
Working hard to make our cities 
and towns more beautiful 
23.9% 35.6% 0.2287 
 
2
nd
 Choice 
Priority 
Selection 
Rapid economic growth 26.1% 31.1% 0.6006 
Ensuring our country has strong 
defense forces 
34.8% 33.3% 0.8856 
Guaranteeing that people have 
more say at work and in their 
communities 
13.0% 24.4% 0.1666 
Working hard to make our cities 
and towns more beautiful 
26.1% 11.1% 0.0681 
 
Table 5.12a provides a further investigation of the national assurance experimental 
treatment’s impact on individual priority-item preferences (vis-à-vis the “country aims” 4-item 
battery) by examining differences in first- and second-choice selections between the control and 
treatment groups.  As the top half of the table indicates, respondents in the control and treatment 
groups differ significantly in their first-choice selections only in the case of the “rapid economic 
growth” economic-materialist item, chosen by 22.2% of treatment-group respondents as 
compared to 39.1% of subjects in the control group (p=0.08).  Note that the two groups are 
virtually indistinguishable in terms of their first-choice preference for the “ensuring our country 
has strong defense forces” authoritarian-materialist item, chosen by just over a quarter of 
respondents in each sub-sample as their top priority.  As for the remaining two (postmaterialist) 
items, while both of these options were selected as first-choice priorities with somewhat greater 
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frequency in the treatment group as compared to the control group, in neither case do these 
differences obtain any degree of statistical significance. 
The bottom half of Table 5.12a, which displays differences in the distributions of second-
choice selections for the “country aims” 4-item battery, contains an interesting finding that is at 
odds with the expected effects of the experimental treatment.  First, note the lack of substantive 
or significant differences between the two groups in the frequencies of selecting either of the two 
materialist options as a second-choice priority.  Also, while respondents in the treatment group 
do appear to exhibit a somewhat greater preference for selecting the “guaranteeing that people 
have more say at work and in their communities” postmaterialist item, the difference does not 
obtain traditional statistical significance.  The unexpected finding is the considerably lower 
proportion of treatment-group respondents (11.1%) selecting the “working hard to make our 
cities and towns more beautiful” postmaterialist item as compared to the control group (26.1%), 
a difference that obtains significance at close to the 0.05 level. 
Table 5.12b – “Country aims” 4-item battery 2nd-choice priorities for respondents choosing 
“defense” as 1st-choice priority, control and national assurance treatment groups 
Priority Control Treatment 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
2-tailed 
Rapid economic growth 50.0% 66.7% 0.4298 
Guaranteeing that people have more say at 
work and in their communities 
16.7% 33.3% 0.3676 
Working hard to make our cities and 
towns more beautiful 
33.3% 0.0% 0.0284 
 
The treatment-group’s apparently diminished enthusiasm for this item as a second-choice 
priority becomes even more evident when we focus on the second-choice priority selections of 
individuals in both groups who select the one authoritarian-materialist option – “ensuring our 
country has strong defense forces” – as their top priority (approximately 26% of respondents in 
both sub-samples).  As Table 5.12b indicates, for “defense-first” respondents in both groups, the 
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“rapid economic growth” economic-materialist item is by far the most popular second choice out 
of the three remaining items, chosen by 50.0% of such subjects in the control group and 66.7% in 
the treatment group (difference does not obtain statistical significance).  The “guaranteeing 
people have more say at work and in their communities” postmaterialist option is twice as 
popular as a second-choice selection among “defense-first” individuals in the treatment group as 
compared to the control group, though again the difference does not achieve significance at any 
traditional level.  The real story, once again, is the greatly diminished popularity of the “working 
hard to make our cities and towns more beautiful” option as a second-choice among “defense-
first” respondents in the treatment group (chosen by 0.0%) versus the control group (chosen by 
33.3%), a difference that in this case is quite significant at well under the 0.05 level. 
National Assurance, Authoritarianism and National Attachment 
I turn now to the issue of interactive effects between the national assurance experimental 
treatment and subjects’ underlying levels of authoritarianism and national attachment.  
Hypotheses H5c and H5d predicted that the negative impact of both of these two value 
orientations on individuals’ levels of measured postmaterialism would be less pronounced 
among subjects in the treatment group than among their counterparts in the control group.  Are 
these predictions borne out by the data at hand?   
Following a similar procedure as utilized in Phase One, four separate multinomial logistic 
equations were estimated to test these hypotheses.  In the first equation the categorical dependent 
variable original 4-item battery was regressed against the national assurance treatment, 
respondent authoritarianism, and a national assurance*authoritarianism interaction term.  In the 
second equation the authoritarianism variables were replaced by respondent national attachment 
and a national assurance*national attachment interaction term.  These same two equations were 
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then estimated with the “country aims” 4-item battery categorical outcome variable as the 
dependent variable.  The logistic regression results are reported in Tables 5.13 to 5.13c in 
Appendix III.  In the case of the original 4-item battery, a significant interaction is found 
between the national assurance treatment and respondent authoritarianism vis-à-vis the 
likelihood that subjects will be categorized as postmaterialist versus the mixed baseline 
(suggestive of H5c), but not vis-à-vis the likelihood that they will be categorized as materialist 
versus the mixed baseline.  No significant interactions were evident between the national 
assurance treatment and national attachment (H5d not supported).  In the case of the “country 
aims” 4-item battery, no significant interactive effects were found, either between the positive 
treatment and respondent authoritarianism or national attachment (no support for H5c or H5d). 
A closer examination of the interaction found between the national assurance treatment and 
respondent authoritarianism reveals a curious and unexpected effect.  Once again, predicted 
probabilities generated by the CLARIFY application in Stata 11 are utilized to present the 
findings in a relatively straightforward and intuitively understandable manner, in Table 5.14 
below. 
Table 5.14 – Authoritarianism and Original 4-Item Battery Predicted Probabilities 
Author. 
Control Group National Assurance Treatment Group 
Pred. 
Mat. 
Pred. 
Mixed 
Pred. 
Post. 
Pred. 
PDI 
Pred. 
Mat. 
Pred. 
Mixed 
Pred. 
Post. 
Pred. 
PDI 
Low 50.0% 48.3% 1.7% -48.3 30.3% 44.6% 25.1% -5.2 
High 17.3% 21.5% 61.2% +43.9 5.6% 86.8% 7.6% +2.0 
Difference in PDI 
[High PDI-Low PDI] 
+92.2 
Difference in PDI 
[High PDI-Low PDI] 
+7.2 
 
 131 
Contrary to expectations, within the control group higher levels of authoritarianism are 
associated with a higher probability that respondents will be classified as postmaterialist rather 
than the mixed baseline.  At the lowest observed level of authoritarianism respondents are 
twenty-eight times more likely to be categorized as mixed rather than postmaterialist; at the 
highest observed level of authoritarianism subjects are nearly three times more likely to be 
classified as postmaterialist rather than mixed.  Within the treatment group precisely the opposite 
pattern is found, as higher levels of authoritarianism are associated with a lower probability that 
subjects will be classified as postmaterialist rather than the mixed baseline.  At the lowest level 
of authoritarianism subjects are only 1.8 times more likely to be classified as mixed rather than 
postmaterialist; at the highest actual level of authoritarianism found in the sample, subjects are 
more than eleven times more likely to be categorized as mixed rather than postmaterialist.   
The differing impact of authoritarianism on the likelihood of subjects being classified as 
postmaterialist versus mixed translates into large differences in the impact of authoritarianism on 
overall postmaterialism PDI scores between the two groups.  Within the control group, going 
from the lowest to highest level of authoritarianism observed in the data predicts a 92.2-point 
shift in PDI toward the postmaterialist end of the spectrum (from a -48.3 PDI at the minimum 
level of authoritarianism to +43.9 PDI at the sample’s maximum observed value).  Within the 
treatment group, the corresponding shift is only 7.2 points in the postmaterialist direction (from -
5.2 PDI at minimum authoritarianism to +2.0 at the maximum).  In this regard hypothesis H6c 
would appear to be sharply contradicted by the data.  The expectation was that authoritarianism 
would have a weaker negative impact on overall postmaterialism scores in the treatment group as 
compared to the control group, whereas the results here indicate that authoritarianism has a 
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weaker positive impact on overall postmaterialism scores among those exposed to the national 
assurance experimental treatment than among those who were not. 
Discussion  
I submit that the findings presented in this chapter provide strong empirical support for the 
core theoretical propositions of this study – specifically, that individuals’ responses to the 
postmaterialism values priority batteries can be strongly and significantly influenced by their 
perception of the presence or absence of external threat to their nation, with a heightened sense 
of national threat tending to translate into overall postmaterialism scores further toward the 
materialist end of the scale, and a heightened sense of national assurance tending to result in 
postmaterialism scores further toward the postmaterialist end of the scale. 
At the same time, these results do not provide strong support for the corollary hypotheses 
predicting significant interactions between the experimental treatments and subjects’ 
authoritarianism and sense of national attachment.  Only in one instance are the findings 
supportive of the type of “activation” dynamic predicted: in the case of the original 4-item 
battery, national attachment was found to have a larger negative impact on overall 
postmaterialism scores among subjects exposed to the national threat treatment than it did among 
those in the control group.  In the case of the “country aims” 4-item battery, by contrast, the 
results are tentatively suggestive of a pattern opposite to the one predicted, as national 
attachment had less of a negative impact on postmaterialism scores among national threat 
treatment group respondents than it did on their control group counterparts. 
Furthermore, an authoritarian predisposition – as operationalized in the study by the NES-
derived forced-choice child rearing values battery – exhibits significant interactive effects with 
the experimental treatment in only one instance, with authoritarianism having a lesser positive 
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impact on postmaterialism scores, as measured by the original 4-item battery, among subjects 
exposed to the national assurance experimental treatment than among those in the control group.  
The curiousness of this result, and the absence of any other significant interactions between 
authoritarianism as measured in the CUSVS and either the national threat or national assurance 
experimental treatments, suggests the possibility that (due either to translational problems or 
cultural differences, or both) the forced-choice child-rearing values battery may be acting as a 
poor and/or invalid measure of an authoritarian predisposition among Chinese subjects in this 
study.
23
 
In any case, the strongest findings found relate to the direct effects of the experimental 
treatments on subjects’ measured levels of postmaterialist values.  In regards to the national 
threat experimental stimulus, subjects exposed to the treatment were twice as likely to provide 
answers (to both of the two values batteries) that would categorize them as pure materialists; also, 
in the case of the “country aims” 4-item battery, treatment group respondents were nearly a 
dozen times less likely to be classified as pure postmaterialists.  These effects in turn translated 
into substantial and significant PDI shifts, placing national threat treatment group subjects 
considerably further toward the materialist end of the materialist-postmaterialist spectrum, as 
compared to their control group counterparts.   
The national assurance experimental stimulus utilized in Phase Two of the CUSVS study 
produced no significant differences in net postmaterialism scores between the control and 
treatment vis-à-vis the “country aims” 4-item battery, but did result in substantial and significant 
differences in overall PDI scores between the two groups as measured by the original 4-item 
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 The poor explanatory power of the child-rearing values battery may also result from or be compounded by the fact 
that the survey subjects are all relatively young university students barely out of childhood themselves. 
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values priority battery, with individuals exposed to the national assurance treatment more than 
two and half times less likely to be categorized as pure materialists, and rating considerably 
further toward the postmaterialist end of the scale than those subjects not exposed to the 
experimental stimulus. 
Of course, the core theoretical proposition of this study was not simply that exposure to 
threatening or reassuring stimuli would tend to produce – respectively – significantly lower or 
higher levels of measured postmaterialism.  Rather, the theoretical focus here is specifically on 
the impact of the treatments on the likelihood of respondents selecting authoritarian-materialist 
versus libertarian-postmaterialist options contained within the batteries, with the expectation that 
the national threat treatment would result in heightened emphasis on the former over the latter, 
and with the national assurance stimulus producing the exact opposite effect.  
To a large extent, these expected effects are borne out by the CUSVS findings, albeit with 
some notable exceptions, as well as some interesting differences in the specific dynamics of the 
impacts of the two different treatments within the two separate priority values batteries.  In this 
vein, both the weakest and the strongest findings are evident in the case of the “country aims” 4-
item battery.  Whereas the national assurance treatment produced only a mildly significant 
increase in the likelihood that respondents would select the libertarian-postmaterialist 
“guaranteeing that people have more say at work and in their communities”, exposure to the 
national threat stimulus produced truly dramatic effects that were very much in line with 
expectations.  Respondents exposed to the national threat treatment were eight times more likely 
to select the “defense” materialist item as a first-choice priority, and twice as likely to select it 
overall; the treatment also significantly diminished both the first-choice and overall appeal of the 
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two postmaterialist options, “guaranteeing that people have more say at work and in their 
communities” and “working hard to make our cities and towns more beautiful.” 
Turning to the core, original 4-item battery, it is worth noting, first, that this battery 
demonstrated significant sensitivity to both versions of the experimental treatment; also notable 
is the fact that, in both cases, the impact of the experimental treatments on individual priority-
item selections demonstrated some interesting caveats and “cross-cutting” effects somewhat at 
odds with expectations.  Subjects exposed to the national assurance treatment were, as predicted, 
significantly and considerably more likely to the select the “giving people more say in important 
political decisions” libertarian-postmaterialist item. At the same time, contrary to expectations, 
the control and treatment groups were virtually identical in both their first-choice and overall 
preference for authoritarian-materialist “maintaining order in the nation” priority.  Rather, it was 
preference for the economic-materialist “fighting rising prices” option that was significantly (and 
strongly) affected by the national assurance experimental stimulus, with subjects exposed to the 
treatment more than two and half times less likely to select this option as a first or second-choice 
priority. 
Why were subjects exposed to the national assurance overwhelmingly less likely to view 
inflation as a problem requiring attention, and why were they also no less likely than their 
control group counterparts to emphasize national order as a top priority? The answer may lie in 
the specific nature of the national assurance experimental treatment utilized.  This treatment was 
designed to convey a sense of a less threatening and more supportive international environment 
by exposing subjects to media content from foreign/western news sources filled with praise for 
China’s accomplishments – particularly in the economic sphere – and recognition of China’s 
“return to greatness” on the international scene.  It appears that the positive evaluations of the 
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nation’s vibrancy may have had the unexpected effect of dampening subjects’ concerns about 
China’ macroeconomic health, resulting in a diminished concern with inflation as a societal 
problem. 
At the same time, the “prosperous nation, strong military” element contained within the 
treatment could also go a long way to explaining the striking non-results vis-à-vis the national 
assurance treatment’s impact on both the “maintaining order in the nation” materialist option, as 
well as the “ensuring our country has strong defense forces” materialist item offered in the 
“country aims” 4-tiem battery.  These negative results were, after all, rather puzzling in light of 
the strong positive effect that the national threat treatment had on respondents’ likelihood of 
prioritizing “national order” as a first-choice priority, and a “strong defense” as an overall 
priority.  After all, if the perception of a hostile and threatening international environment causes 
individuals to place greater priority on a well-ordered nation and a strong military, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the perception of a benevolent and supportive international community 
would tend to cause individuals to place less emphasis on these goals. 
It may be that exposure to these news stories and accompanying media images (which 
included a photo of Chinese People Liberation Army soldiers marching in parade formation) did 
nothing to dampen subjects’ enthusiasm for strong, well-ordered nation because the national 
assurance treatment implied that the international community’s positive regard for China was 
contingent upon China’s resurgent comprehensive national power (in the economic sphere and 
beyond).  Viewed in this way, there would appear to be nothing inherently incompatible with a 
enhanced sense of a benevolent international environment and a (continued) emphasis on 
national order and military strength. 
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Finally, some of the most interesting individual effects can be observed when we turn to an 
analysis of the impact of the national threat experimental treatment on responses to the original 
4-item values priorities battery.  Exposure to the national threat treatment was associated with a 
significantly and substantially higher likelihood of selecting the materialist “maintaining order in 
the nation” as a first-choice priority, although not as a preferred option overall, due in part to 
marked decrease in preference for this option as a second-choice priority.  Closely related to this 
are the interesting findings regarding the impact of the national threat treatment on the 
postmaterialist “giving people more say in important political decisions” item.  Unexpectedly, 
respondents exposed to the national threat treatment were significantly and substantially more 
likely than their control-group counterparts to select this libertarian-postmaterialist item as their 
second-choice priority; however, they were also significantly less to choose this item as a first-
choice priority, with the net result being a modest but statistically insignificant overall preference 
for the “more say in important political decisions.” 
My interpretation of these results above is that the “giving people more say in important 
political decisions” postmaterialist item has (as noted previously by Flanagan 1987; Middendorp 
1989, 1992; Todosijević and Enyedi 2000) libertarian characteristics that tend to make it less 
attractive to individuals with greater emphasis on authoritarian values, but also a high degree of 
utility for expressing nationalistic concerns, which makes this item relatively more appealing for 
individuals whose sense of nationalism (that is, a concern with the relative power and prestige of 
their nation vis-à-vis the outside world) has been awakened.  I contrast these findings with the 
strong assumption running through the extant canonical postmaterialism literature (Inglehart 
1971, 1977, 1997), which holds that whereas preference for materialist items is solely reflective 
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of utilitarian motives, the selection of postmaterialist items is indicative of subjects’ emphasis on 
that priority as an intrinsic good.   
In this vein, Inglehart (1971) originally posited that the “maintaining order in the nation” 
option offered in the core postmaterialism battery “is presumed to relate, above all, to the 
protection of property” (p. 994); selection of this item would thus be interpreted to reflect an 
instrumental logic, with a well-ordered nation being valued solely as a means to an end 
(specifically, the preservation of one’s material property and prosperity).  But, again, the 
previous body of research developed by Flanagan and others, taken together with the findings 
presented in the current study, suggest a different conclusion.  I have proposed that the 
substantial and significant increase in the likelihood of selecting the “maintaining order in the 
nation” option as a top priority among respondents exposed to the national threat experimental 
treatment is a direct consequence of treatment-group subjects’ elevated perception of a hostile 
international environment, which in turn produces both a heightened authoritarian preoccupation 
with order and obedience, as well as an aggrandized nationalistic concern with the integrity and 
unity of the nation-state.  This is, I would argue, a much more plausible interpretation of the data 
at hand than one in which the heightened first-choice preference for national order among 
national threat treatment-group subjects is attributed to subjects’ increased prioritization of 
purely materialistic concerns with private property and economic security. 
Turning to respondents’ second-choice selections, individuals who have already exhausted the 
“maintaining order” option (a large majority in the case of the treatment group) with their first 
choice are left without another item that so neatly combines their authoritarian and nationalistic 
concerns.  The postmaterialist item of “giving people more say in important political decisions,” 
however, would have understandable appeal to these respondents’ nationalistic sensibilities, as 
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an instrumental means through which the general public may put greater pressure on the ruling 
authorities to better pursue and protect China’s material interests, geopolitical position and 
international prestige.  This pattern – or at least this interpretation of the evidence at hand – is 
reminiscent of Clarke and Dutt (1991) and Clarke et al.’s (1999) finding of a perversely positive 
relationship between societal unemployment and postmaterialism, as respondents eschew the 
“fighting rising prices” materialist item in favor of the “giving people more say in important 
political decisions” postmaterialist option as a pragmatic channel through which citizens may put 
greater pressure on the government to deal with their (materialistic) concerns with joblessness. 
Lastly, recall that, compared to the control group, respondents in the treatment group 
significantly de-emphasize the “guaranteeing freedom of speech” postmaterialist option.  This is 
true overall, and overwhelmingly the case when we focus on the second choices of individuals in 
the two groups (majorities in both cases) selecting “maintaining order in the nation” as their first 
priority.  I interpret this pattern as a direct result of the heightened levels of authoritarianism 
present in the treatment group; that is, whereas the heightened nationalism among respondents in 
this group is quite compatible with the goal of “giving people more say in important political 
decisions” as an instrumental means for pursuing certain ends, their heightened authoritarianism 
causes them to place significantly less emphasis on “guaranteeing freedom of speech” as an 
intrinsic good. 
The following – and final – chapter continues this discussion by addressing the implications 
of the empirical findings presented here (together with the theoretical foundations laid out in the 
previous chapters) for the core questions and concerns raised at the beginning of this study.     
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
The Dilemma Revisited 
In the introductory chapter to this study I described the “damned if you do, damned if you 
don’t” dilemma faced by modern authoritarian regimes, as suggested by the theoretical 
foundations and empirical findings of contemporary modernization literature.  To reiterate: in the 
current geopolitical climate, in which democratic rule has emerged as the predominant preferred 
regime form, autocratic governments must rely on economic performance as their primary – if 
not sole – basis of popular support and legitimacy.  Yet success in the realm of economic 
development tends to foster the emergence of “postmodern” or “postmaterialist” values among a 
country’s population that make the continuation of authoritarian rule increasingly untenable, as 
citizens embrace emancipative values emphasizing personal freedom and individual choice that 
create increasing pressure for democratization at the national level.  In other words, authoritarian 
regimes that tie their mandate to economic development are doomed to lose that mandate once a 
certain level of economic development is actually achieved. 
It’s the Economy, Stupid(?) 
Inglehart’s original Maslowian, needs-hierarchy formulation of postmaterialism theory 
emphasized the central importance of the level of economic security experienced at the time of 
one’s youth in determining an individual’s relative prioritization of survival (materialist) versus 
self-expression (postmaterialist) values later in life.  In more recent developments of the theory 
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Inglehart and his colleagues have shifted the emphasis from the individual to the societal level, 
articulating an argument of “diminishing returns” on subsequent economic gains once a certain 
level of societal prosperity has been attained.  Common to both of these formulations of 
modernatization/postmaterialist theory, I have argued in this study, is an overwhelming emphasis 
on economic concerns that has obscured the critical role of other factors in influencing the 
development and articulation of “democracy-friendly” postmodern values. 
No Postmaterialist is an Island 
In the preceding chapters I have presented theoretical and empirical evidence supportive of 
the notion that responses to the values priority batteries used to measure postmaterialist values 
are strongly influenced by individuals’ perceptions of the nature of the nature of the external 
international environment – i.e. whether that environment is perceived as a threatening or a 
reassuring one.  These findings have, I believe, significant implications for both the 
modernization/postmaterialism research program and for the study and understanding of political 
behavior and political development in the People’s Republic of China today.  I address each of 
these two general areas of inquiry in separate sections below. 
Implications for Postmaterialist/Modernization Theory 
The data and analyses presented here are to a large extent a continuation and further 
exploration of Clarke & Dutt’s (1991) and Clarke et al.’s (1999) findings regarding the core 
postmaterialism values battery’s sensitivity to subjects’ perceptions of external factors impacting 
upon society.  In this previous study the authors demonstrated that contemporary macroeconomic 
conditions (as opposed to societal conditions prevalent at the time of one’s maturation into 
adulthood) can have significant impacts on individuals’ ordering of values priorities vis-à-vis the 
original 4-item postmaterialism index.  Higher levels of inflation increase the likelihood that 
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subjects will select the “fight rising prices” materialist item (effecting a net shift in favor of 
materialism) while higher levels of unemployment increase the likelihood that subjects will 
eschew the materialist “fight rising prices” item in favor of the postmaterialist “giving people 
more say in important political decisions” (effecting a net shift in favor of postmaterialism).   
The findings in the current study suggest that the postmaterialism values priority batteries 
may also be sensitive to subjects’ perceptions of external conditions and factors that are 
unrelated to such strictly macroeconomic concerns such as inflation and unemployment.  With 
some caveats, the overall pattern evidenced in the analysis of the Chinese University Students 
Values Study (CUSVS) data presented in Chapter 5 is one in which exposure to stimuli designed 
to instill the perception of a hostile, threatening international environment is associated with 
lower levels of measured postmaterialism, and exposure to stimuli intended to convey a 
perception of a benevolent and supportive international community is associated with higher 
levels of measured postmaterialism.   
The original 4-item values priority battery merits special attention in this – or any – 
discussion of postmaterialism measurement issues, as researchers whose goal is to track trends 
and changes in postmaterialist/self-expression values over time are generally forced to restrict 
themselves to this single battery, as the full 12-item postmaterialist index and the broader range 
of self-expression values “syndrome” indicators were not included in the earliest surveys.  Also, 
due to practical constraints on questionnaire length and resources, many researchers who wish to 
include a measure of postmaterialist values in their surveys will often restrict themselves to the 
original 4-item measure, which Inglehart et al. have “vigorously” defended as a viable alternative 
to the full-length index (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Layman and Carmines 1997).  Given this 
privileged role of the core 4-item battery in the measurement of postmaterialist/self-expression 
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values, the finding that responses to this battery were strongly and significantly influenced by 
subjects’ heightened perceptions of both a more hostile and a more benign international 
environment is all the more compelling.
24
 
The bottom line conclusion that can be drawn from the data and analyses presented in this 
study is that there exists at the very least the strong possibility that responses to the values 
priority batteries utilized to measure postmaterialist/self-expression values may be substantially 
and significantly influenced by individuals’ perceptions of the relative hostility or benevolence 
of the contemporary external international environment.  The experimental findings presented 
here strongly suggest that heightened perceptions of a threatening international environment will 
tend to translate into lower levels of measured postmaterialism, whereas heightened perceptions 
of a friendlier and more supportive international community will tend to produce higher levels of 
measured postmaterialism.   
The modernization research program as it currently stands, however, makes little allowance 
for such influences or effects.  This creates a situation in which postmodern/postmaterialist 
values – which are presumed to emerge and develop as purely a result of long-term, domestic 
                                                 
24
 The argument could be made, of course, that the experimental design incorporated into the Chinese University 
Students Values Survey questionnaire constitutes a relatively “easy” test of the hypothesized relationships between 
individuals’ perceptions of a hostile or benevolent external environment and their responses to the postmaterialism 
values batteries.  The sample utilized in this study was comprised of young university students, a segment of the 
population whose political attitudes and opinions are relatively easy to manipulate, especially as compared to older 
cohorts whose values tend to be less malleable and more “crystallized.”  Moreover, subjects in the treatment group 
were asked to provide responses to the postmaterialism values priority batteries immediately after their exposure to 
the media content, in order to maximize the potential manipulative effects of the experimental stimuli. 
At the same time, however, it could be argued that the experimental treatments utilized in the CUSVS study were 
considerably less potent than others that could have been employed.  All of the news stories and images presented 
relate to events that occurred up to one or two years prior to the administration of the survey.  Even if the students 
had not already encountered this media content previously, the impact of the material was likely to be diminished by 
the fact that actions, policies and pronouncements described within were already (in most cases) rather dated by the 
time of the survey.  It would not be difficult to envisage a much more potent set of, for example, national threat 
treatments that presented fabricated but potentially possible scenarios as actual fact (e.g. “U.S. government officially 
recognizes Taiwan and Tibet as independent states”).  
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socio-economic and demographic trends – are being measured by an instrument that exhibits 
strong potential sensitivity to short-term events and developments in the international sphere.  
This creates the possibility that accurate measurement of postmaterialist values at any given 
time-point (as well as accurate tracking of changes in postmaterialist values across various time-
points) may be confounded by external influences that are simply not taken into account by the 
current modernization/postmaterialism paradigm. 
Thus, the findings presented in this study – building upon insights and analyses previously 
presented by Flanagan (1987) and Feldman and Stenner (1997) amongst others – suggest that the 
values priority batteries designed to measure the phenomenon of postmaterialism contain items 
that touch upon authoritarian, libertarian and nationalistic attitudes, which in turn demonstrate 
sensitivity to the presence or absence of perceived societal/national threat.  The problem is that 
the concept of postmaterialism, as it has been formulated, makes little or no allowance for these 
elements.  As observed in Chapter Two, Inglehart and his colleagues have addressed the 
phenomena of authoritarianism and nationalism in their studies – but have generally relegated 
them to the set of “traditional” values lying on one end of a separate spectrum of value change 
(i.e. traditional vs. secular-rational orientations toward authority).  The current study, however, 
provides additional evidence that items related to authoritarian and nationalistic attitudes are 
present within the key instrument used to measure postmaterialist attitudes, which constitute the 
core of the survival vs. self-expression values dimension of cultural change.   
Implications for the “Damned Dilemma” 
As stated at the beginning of this study, the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of 
contemporary modernization and postmaterialism literature strongly imply an insidious Catch-22 
dilemma for economic-development-oriented authoritarian regimes under the current geopolitical 
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climate.  If such regimes fail to provide the economic goods, they lose one of (if not their only) 
basis of legitimacy and popular support and are removed from power.  If such regimes are 
successful in effecting heightened socio-economic growth, they unwittingly unleash an attendant 
set of societal changes that render their autocratic mode of rule increasingly unpalatable to the 
very population that has so keenly benefited from the economic goods that they have provided.  
The causal mechanism linking economic failure with regime demise in the first scenario is rather 
straightforward; in the second scenario it is the emergence and expansion of postmodern “self-
expression” values – with postmaterialist values emphasizing emancipation and personal choice 
at their core – that serve as the causal linkage between economic prosperity and popular demand 
for political liberalization. 
Inglehart et al. have conceded that the existence of a high level of national wealth alone is not 
a sufficient condition for the emergence of democracy-friendly postmodern/postmaterialist 
values, as otherwise all of the oil-rich nations of the world would already be flourishing 
democracies.  Inglehart and his colleagues have also been careful in explicitly rejecting what 
they term the “economic determinism” of previous (especially Marxist) versions of 
modernization theory.  But the fact remains that contemporary modernization/postmaterialist 
theory as it currently formulated – and, by extension, they “damned” hypothesis derived from it 
– focuses overwhelming on material/economic factors to the general exclusion of other potential 
considerations. 
The current study has provided theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that individuals’ 
perception of the relative level of external threat facing their nation has potentially profound 
consequences for their measured levels of postmaterialist values, with higher levels of perceived 
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threat/insecurity tending to be associated with lower levels of overall postmaterialism and lower 
levels of threat/insecurity tending to be associated with higher levels of postmaterialism. 
To be clear, Inglehart and his colleagues also make a strong case for both the long-term and 
short-term influence of perceptions of threat and insecurity on the formulation of 
postmaterialist/self-expression values; indeed, the core foundation of their integrated theory of 
economic, cultural and political change is that  
The difference between feeling secure or insecure about survival is so basic that it [leads] to a 
wide-ranging but coherent syndrome of changes, from the “survival” values that characterized 
agrarian and early industrial society, to the “well-being” values that characterize advanced 
industrial society.  (Inglehart 1997, p. 123) 
 
The postmaterialism/modernization literature thus asserts a quite specific and direct 
relationship between perceptions of threat and insecurity on the one hand and levels of 
postmodern values on the other.  In the long term, Inglehart et al. propose a socialization 
hypothesis which dictates that “to a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions [of 
relative security or insecurity] that prevailed during one’s adult years,” together with a scarcity 
hypothesis which allows that short-term contemporary factors may also have some impact upon 
one’s value priorities, as “one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in 
relatively short supply [e.g. security from threat and danger]” (Inglehart 1997, p. 33).   
The key and critical difference between the treatment of threat and insecurity presented in the 
extant postmodernization literature and the perspective proposed in the current study, thus, 
focuses on the types of threats to security that are considered.  Inglehart et al.’s focus is on 
threats to material and economic security, whereas the findings from the CUSVS study strongly 
suggest that the relative emphasis that individuals place on the value-items offered in the 
postmaterialism batteries is also affected by the perception of threats that are clearly not directly 
related to one’s material well-being.  
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I have interpreted the findings above in terms of the manifestation of authoritarian and 
nationalistic attitudes; certainly, other interpretations for the effects noted in the CUSVS 
experimental survey data may be offered.  But the core finding remains: individuals exposed to 
stimuli designed to increase one’s sense that the nation-state faces a hostile, threatening and 
disrespectful international environment tend to exhibit significantly lower levels of overall 
postmaterialism, whereas subjects exposed to stimuli intended to bolster the impression of a 
friendly and supportive international community tend to exhibit significantly higher levels of 
postmaterialism.  On one level, there is no fundamental contradiction between these findings 
above and Inglehart et al.’s general proposition that the level of postmaterialism in a given 
country will vary negatively with the level of threat/insecurity perceived by its citizens.  Under 
closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that too much theoretical, conceptual and empirical 
stretch would be required to label the content of either the national threat or national assurance 
experimental treatments utilized in the CUSVS experimental study as pertaining solely to issues 
of physical and economic (that is, purely material) security and well-being.  Here, then, is the 
current study’s point of departure from the extant postmaterialism literature’s treatment of issues 
of threat and insecurity. 
This new approach to the understanding and analysis of the relationships between threat and 
insecurity on the one hand and the development and expression of postmaterialist/postmodern 
values on the other has clear implications for the “damned” dilemma ostensibly faced by 
development-minded autocratic regimes in the contemporary era.  As noted at the beginning of 
this study, the modernization literature has offered heady predictions regarding the near-
inevitability of political liberalization and eventual democratization in such authoritarian 
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societies based primarily on predictions related to certain macroeconomic trends, focusing in 
particular upon projected per capita income growth.   
The logic of these predictions is simple and straightforward.  Once citizens within a given 
society have attained a certain level of socio-economic prosperity and security (as measured by 
per capita GDP) they will tend to shift their priorities from materialist/survival-oriented values to 
postmaterialist/self-expression goals emphasizing individual freedom and personal choice – a 
societal value shift which in turn translates into increase demand for political liberalization and 
democratization at the national level.   
The key problem with these types of predictions is that, as Inglehart himself has observed, 
there is in fact no “one-to-one relationship between economic level and the prevalence of 
Postmaterialist values,” as an emphasis on postmodern values priorities “reflect one’s subjective 
sense of security, and not one’s economic level per se” (Inglehart 1997, p. 34; emphasis in 
original).  Per capita income growth figures and projections are not direct indicators of 
individuals’ personalized perceptions of threats to their well-being and welfare, and become 
particularly uninformative once we expand the notion of a “subjective sense of security” to 
include perceptions of threats that go beyond those pertaining to individuals’ immediate physical, 
material or socio-economic security.  As the findings in the current study strongly indicate, 
citizens’ perception of the extent to which the relative power and prestige of their nation as a 
whole are either threatened or assured is likely to also have a strong impact on their ordering of 
the values priorities contained within the postmaterialism question batteries.  Yet long-term 
predictions regarding the development of postmaterialist/self-expression values in economically-
developing authoritarian societies – and the increasing demands for democratization that they are 
presumed to bring – have generally made virtually no reference to issues of critical issues of 
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national pride, national identity or national threat.  The findings of the current study thus indicate 
that such predictions need to be re-visited and possibly revised, with a broader set of societal 
factors, indicators and phenomena taken into account. 
Implications for the People’s Republic of China 
One could argue that the core findings presented in this study would have strong implications 
for the analysis of political behavior and political trends in the People’s Republic of China even 
if China were not in fact the focus of the study from which these findings were derived.  The 
People’s Republic of China is, after all, the prototypical development-oriented authoritarian 
regime of the closing decades of the 20
th
 century and first decades of the 21
st
, and as such would 
appear to be very much at the mercy of the “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” Catch-22 
dilemma suggested by contemporary modernization theory.  As described previously, heady 
predictions of eventual political liberalization and democratization occurring in China by the first 
half of this century are based largely on projected Chinese economic growth and development 
for the coming decades, without reference to phenomena such as nationalism or perceptions of 
national threat – phenomena which the current study strongly suggest may have profound 
impacts on the relative priority that individuals may place on postmaterialist values (which lie at 
the heart of the cluster of postmodern “self-expression” values purportedly serving as the causal 
linkage between economic development/growth and political liberalization/democratization). 
This oversight in the extant literature becomes even more of a concern once one considers that 
the level of economic growth within a given country, on the one hand, and the degree to which 
citizens of that country perceive their nation to be either threatened or reassured by the external 
international environment, on the other, are not likely to be completely independent phenomena.  
Taking the People’s Republic of China as an illustrative example, consider the following.  Many 
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politicians and pundits in America, Europe and Japan look at China’s high GDP growth figures 
and, rather than seeing a faltering autocratic regime that is damning itself by its own economic 
success, see instead a dangerous and dissatisfied emerging world power (and a communist one at 
that that!) which is amassing greater and greater military might and overall power projection 
capabilities as a direct result of its economic success.  Indeed, a cursory internet search 
conducted at the time of this writing
25
 obtained a number of representative examples of this 
conceptualization of the dangerous and threatening relationship between China’s economic 
prosperity and her growing military power.  Serving as guest host on The Rush Limbaugh Show 
on Sept. 1, 2010, commentator Mark Steyn observed that “American taxpayers are funding the 
entire cost of the Chinese military simply through the interest payments on the debt” owed by the 
U.S. to the Chinese due to the ongoing trade imbalance between the two countries.
26
  In a similar 
vein, Michael Stumo of the Coalition for a Prosperous America observed on March 3, 2011 that 
We enable the wealth drain on our economy via trade imbalance.  Consume foreign goods in a 
greater amount than we export, handing billions of dollars to geopolitical rivals.  We get poorer.  
Yet, China is building not only their economy, but their military with our money.
27
 
 
The Heritage Foundation’s John Tkacik, Jr. offers a similar (albeit somewhat less alarmist) 
appraisal of the current geopolitical situation in his May 17, 2007 piece entitled “China’s Quest 
for a Superpower Military,” in which the author observes that 
Chinese leaders are not seized by self-doubt about the direction of their regime.  The declared 
strategy of the Chinese leadership has been to turn its economic growth into military power by 
means of the "four modernizations" (agricultural, industrial, science and technology, and military) 
and the "prosperous nation, strong military" (fu guo, qiang bing) model.
28
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 Conducted on July 18, 2011 utilizing the Yahoo search engine to search the terms “economy” and “China’s 
military”. 
26
  http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_090110/content/Mark_Steyn.guest.html 
27
 http://www.tradereform.org/2011/03/u-s-is-funding-chinas-military-rise/ 
28
 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/05/Chinas-Quest-for-a-Superpower-Military 
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The Chinese leadership, for its part, insists that “its military spending remains proportional to 
the country’s rapid economic development” and is simply a natural component of China’s goal 
of being a “normal” global and regional power (in direct contrast to the Japanese model) with a 
“military that is the equal of its economy.”29  But this is precisely what is so disconcerting to 
many outside observers: a rising, resurgent “Red China” with a military strength commensurate 
with – and directly funded by – its formidable economic power. 
This problematic relationship between China’s internal socio-economic development and 
external perceptions of/concerns with a growing “China threat” is even more pernicious when 
one considers the fact that China’s economic growth not only makes the strengthening of her 
military power possible, but indeed makes it both necessary and (perhaps) inevitable.  As 
observed in a 2010 article appearing in the Foreign Policy in Focus publication of the Institute 
for Policy Studies, 
[A] key reason for China to continue its military modernization efforts is its sense of urgency 
regarding access to markets and natural resources that feed its economic growth. This need is 
becoming an important factor in shaping China’s strategic behavior. China is extremely reliant 
on imports from abroad, particularly metals and fossil fuels. To secure these resources, China 
feels the need to defend the sea lanes vital for its imports.
30
 
 
The basic point that is argued here is that China’s domestic economic growth has the potential 
to create, in economic terms, “externalities” which may in turn affect the dynamics through 
which socio-economic modernization in China does (or does not) translate into the development 
and spread of the types of democracy-friendly, postmodern/postmaterialist values.   In order to 
(quite literally) fuel her ongoing economic growth, China will continue to seek crucial resources 
such as oil and industrial minerals, and compete with other major world powers – particularly the 
                                                 
29
 http://www.fpif.org/articles/chinas_military_spending_soft_rise_or_hard_threat 
30
 Ibid. 
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United States and the European Union – for both these resources and for the diplomatic favor of 
the states that possess them (in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South America).  At the 
same time, China will continue to modernize her military forces, both out of an understandable 
desire to bring her military strength up to par with her economic power – consistent with the 
Chinese leadership’s guiding concept of “comprehensive national power” 31  – and out of a 
growing need to protect her vital economic interests abroad (especially the sea lanes, pipe lines 
and other channels she depends on for the resources and raw materials that make her continued 
economic growth possible).  
 It does not require a great leap of imagination to envision how these actions on China’s part 
could continue to exacerbate regional and global concerns over China’s power and ambitions. 
Nor is a great deal of creativity needed to imagine how these concerns over the “China threat” 
could (continue) to produce the types of “anti-China” rhetoric, policies and actions presented in 
the national threat experimental treatments in the current study – ones which were found, of 
course, to tend to produce lower levels of measured postmaterialist values among the Chinese 
subjects surveyed. 
None of this is to say that China, the United States and other world powers are doomed to 
engage in destructive, mercantilist-style, zero-sum conflict over resources and markets in the 
coming decades – i.e. “the coming conflict with China” scenario suggested by authors Richard 
Bernstein and Ross H. Munro in their book of the same title
32
, or in any number of other, more 
recent, similarly-themed publications.
33
  The argument here is that the perceptions of citizens 
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 Ibid. 
32
 Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro, 1998.  The Coming Conflict with China.  Vintage. 
33
 A relevant search of the Amazon.com website (conducted on July 25
th
, 2011) suggested, for example, such titles 
as The China Threat: How the People’s Republic of China Targets America (Bill Gertz, 2002), Hegemon: China’s 
Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (Steven Mosher, 2002), Red China Rising: Communist China’s Military 
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and their leaders – across the globe – may be critical to determining whether or not the economic 
successes of authoritarian regimes such as China are able to translate into the “democracy-
friendly” value priority transformations predicted by contemporary modernization theory.  As 
Peter Hays Gries (2005) observes: 
There are real conflicts of material interests in United States-China relations.  The substantive 
content of U.S. policies is therefore extremely sensitive.  But how the Chinese public perceives 
American words and deeds also has a major impact on the direction of Chinese nationalism and 
Chinese foreign policy in the twenty-first century. (p. 115; emphasis added) 
 
As Gries goes on to observe, tirades against China’s leadership and policies may be 
“emotionally gratifying” for editorialists, pundits and politicians alike, but such ad hominem 
attacks are ultimately quite dangerous as “American China-bashing begets Chinese American-
bashing, and vice-versa” (p. 115).  The findings presented in the current study suggest the added 
and specific danger that an increased perception of a threatening (and demeaning) international 
environment may tend to exaggerate Chinese citizens’ authoritarian and nationalistic sentiments 
at the expense of the democracy-friendly postmodern/postmaterialist values.  In other words, 
when media and political figures in the West rail against the evils of China’s authoritarian 
leadership in the interests of championing and encouraging pro-democratic aspirations among 
the Chinese people, they may very well be shooting themselves squarely in the foot. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Threat to America (Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett, 2002), America’s Coming War with China: A 
Collision Course over Taiwan (Ted Galen Carpenter, 2006), and Showdown: Why China Wants War with the United 
States (Jed Babbin and Edward Timperlake, 2006). 
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APPENDIX I 
 
2010 Chinese University Students’ Values Survey Questionnaire, 
Item Descriptions and Experimental Treatments 
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2010 University Students’ Values Survey 
Thank you for participating in the 2010 University Students’ Values Survey.  Your 
participation is completely anonymous, so please do not sign your name on the questionnaire and 
try to answer the questions below as honestly as possible.  Please read the directions carefully, do 
not leave any questions blank, and provide only one answer to each question except where 
indicated. 
University name:________________________               Today’s date: ____ Y  ____ M  ____ D 
We would first like to know a bit about your personal background. 
1 S
D1 
Year of birth:      19___                      Age:  _____ 
2 SD2 Gender  
 Male 1 
female   2 
3 SD3 What year are you in university? 
 first year  1 
second year   2 
third year   3 
fourth year   4 
Master’s program   5 
Ph.D. program 6 
other  7 
4 SD4 Is your family’s residence registration rural or urban? 
 rural   1 
urban  2 
other         3 
5 SD5 What is your ethnicity? 
 Han Chinese               1 
minority nationality   2 
other  3 
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6 SD6 What is your political status? 
 general citizen  1 
member of Communist Youth League 2 
member of Communist Party 3 
member of a Democratic Party 4 
 
7 EE1 
How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?  Is it… 
 very good   1 
good    2 
so-so (neither good nor bad)   3 
bad    4 
very bad   5 
8 EE2 How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the past five 
years?  Is it… 
 much better    1 
a little better  2 
about the same   3 
a little worse  4 
much worse  5 
9 EE3 What do you think will be the state of our country’s economic condition five years from now?  Will 
it be… 
 very good   1 
good    2 
so-so (neither good nor bad)   3 
bad    4 
very bad   5 
10 EE4 
How would you rate your own family’s economic situation today?  Is it… 
 very good   1 
good    2 
so-so (neither good nor bad)   3 
bad    4 
very bad   5 
11 EE5 How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was five years 
ago? Is it… 
 much better    1 
a little better  2 
about the same   3 
a little worse  4 
much worse  5 
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12 EE6 
What do you think the economic situation of your family will be five years from now? Will it be… 
 very good   1 
good    2 
so-so (neither good nor bad)   3 
bad    4 
very bad   5 
 
13-21 TR1-TR9 For each statement, would you say you STRONGLY AGREE, SOMEWHAT AGREE, SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE? 
  
strongly 
agree 
Agree disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
13 TR  TR1 Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, 
children should still do what they ask. 
1 2 3 4 
14 TR  TR2 When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more 
qualified, the opportunity should be given to 
relatives and friends. 
1 2 3 4 
15 TR  TR3 When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best 
way to deal with it is to accommodate the other 
person. 
1 2 3 4 
16 TR  TR4 Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all 
determined by fate. 
1 2 3 4 
17 TR  TR5 A person should not insist on his own opinion if 
his co-workers disagree with him. 
1 2 3 4 
18 TR  TR6 For the sake of the family, the individual should 
put his personal interests second. 
1 2 3 4 
19 TR  TR7 A man will lose face if he works under a female 
supervisor. 
1 2 3 4 
20 TR  TR8 If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to 
resolve the dispute. 
1 2 3 4 
21 TR  TR9 When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law 
come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is 
wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife 
to obey his mother. 
1 2 3 4 
 
22 TR10 If respect for authority in our society increased, would you think this was a good thing, a bad 
thing, or would you not mind either way? 
 a good thing   1 
a bad thing        2 
wouldn’t mind either way          3 
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23-
34 
NA1- 
NA12 
For each statement, would you say you STRONGLY AGREE, SOMEWHAT AGREE, SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE? 
   strongly 
agree 
Agree disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
23 NA1 
I am proud to be Chinese.  
1 2 3 4 
24 NA2 
China’s victory over other countries in 
international sports events is important to me.  
1 2 3 4 
25 NA3 I am proud of China’s economic achievements. 1 2 3 4 
26 NA4 
I am more willing to be a citizen of China than 
other countries. 1 
2 3 4 
27 NA5 China’s history makes me proud.  1 2 3 4 
28 NA6 
China’s position in the international order is 
important to me. 1 
2 3 4 
29 NA7 
If another war occurs, I am willing to fight for 
my country. 1 
2 3 4 
30 NA8 
I am proud of China’s equal treatment of the 
country’s various groups (cultural, political, 
religious).  
1 2 3 4 
31 NA9 
It is important to me that China’s military 
strength is capable of competing with other 
countries.  
1 2 3 4 
32 NA10 
Some things that happen in China make me feel 
ashamed of China. 1 
2 3 4 
33 NA11 China’s unity is important to me. 1 2 3 4 
34 NA12 
Generally speaking, I feel that China is better 
than other countries. 1 
2 3 4 
 
 
 
35 PE1 How often do you discuss politics with other people? 
 often    1 
sometimes    2 
infrequently   3 
never    4 
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36 PE2 How interested are you in politics? 
 very interested    1 
somewhat interested   2 
not very interested 3 
not at all interested  4 
 
37-
40 
AU1-
AU5 
For each pair of qualities, please indicate which one you think is more important 
for a child to be raised with. 
3
7 
AU1 
Independence 1 
OR 
respect for elders 2 
 
3
8 
AU2 
Obedience 1 
OR 
self-reliance 2 
 
3
9 
AU3 
Curiosity 1 
OR 
good manners 2 
 
4
0 
AU4 
being considerate 1 
OR 
being well behaved 2 
 
PLEASE CONFIRM THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL OF THE 
QUESTIONS IN THIS FIRST PART OF THE SURVEY (PLEASE DO NOT 
CHANGE ANY OF YOUR RESPONSES) 
ONCE YOU HAVE DONE SO, PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE. 
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[TREATMENT GROUP QUESTIONNAIRES ONLY] 
41-
46 
RE1- 
RE5 
Reading these new stories, to what degree did you feel each of the emotions below? 
  
a great deal somewhat a bit 
not at 
all 
41      RE1 Angry 1 2 3 4 
42     RE2 Proud 1 2 3 4 
43     RE3 afraid  1 2 3 4 
44     RE4 happy/satisfied 1 2 3 4 
45     RE5 surprised/shocked 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE. 
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46 SE1 If you had to choose, which one of the things below would you say is most important?  
(select one) 
 most important 
 maintaining order in the nation 1 
giving people more say in important government decisions 2 
fighting rising prices 3 
protecting freedom of speech         4 
47 SE2 And which would be second-most important?  (select only one, different from above) 
 second-most 
important 
 maintaining order in the nation 1 
giving people more say in important government decisions 2 
fighting rising prices 3 
protecting freedom of speech 4 
 
48 SE3 Below are goals that our county may achieve in the next ten years.  Which do you think 
is the most important? (select one) 
 most important 
 A high level of economic growth 1 
making sure this country has strong defense forces 2 
seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in 
their communities 
3 
trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful         4 
49 SE4 And which do you think is the second-most important? (select only one, different from 
above) 
 second-most 
important 
 A high level of economic growth 1 
making sure this country has strong defense forces 2 
seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in 
their communities 
3 
trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful         4 
 
50 SE5 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people?  
 most people can be trusted  1 
need to be very careful                 2 
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51 SE6 Taking all things together, would you say you are:       
 very happy    1 
Happy    2 
not very happy     3 
not at all happy 4 
 
 
52-
53 
SE7-
SE8 
Below are some forms of political action that people can take.  Please tell us, for 
each one, whether you have taken part in this activity, whether you might do it, or 
would never under any circumstances  do it:  
  have done might do wouldn’t do 
signing a petition  1 2 3 
joining in boycotts 1 2 3 
 
 
54 E9 Please tell us to what degree you are able to tolerate the behavior below, with 1 indicating 
that you find it completely unacceptable, and 10 indicating that you find it completely 
acceptable. 
  completely unacceptable                  completely acceptable 
 Homosexuality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE. 
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55- 
66 
DS1- 
DS12 
For each statement, do you STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE, or 
STRONGLY DISAGREE?   
  strongly 
agree 
agree disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
55    DS1 
People with little or no education should have 
just as much say in politics as highly-educated 
people.   
1 2 3 4 
 56    DS2 
Government leaders are like the head of a 
family, we should all follow their decisions.   
1 2 3 4 
 57    DS3 
The government should decide whether 
certain ideas should be allowed to be 
discussed in society.  
1 2 3 4 
 58    DS4 
Harmony of the community will be disrupted if 
people organize lots of groups.   
1 2 3 4 
59    DS5 
When judges decide important cases, they 
should accept the view of the executive 
branch.   
1 2 3 4 
60    DS6 
If the government is constantly checked by the 
legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great 
things.   
1 2 3 4 
61    DS7 
If we have political leaders who are morally 
upright, we can let them decide everything.   
1 2 3 4 
62    DS8 
If people have too many different ways of 
thinking, society will be chaotic.  
1 2 3 4 
 63    DS9 
In politics, it’s not so important what means 
are used to achieve great goals, as long as they 
are achieved. 
1 2 3 4 
64    DS10 
If someone really believes that their political 
opinion is correct, then they should stand by it 
to the bitter end, no matter how many people 
oppose them. 
1 2 3 4 
65    DS11 
For vicious crimes, punishment should be 
carried out right away, without waiting to go 
through the complicated judicial process. 
1 2 3 4 
66 DS12 
As long as a political leader enjoys majority 
support, he should his own agenda and 
disregard the view of the minority.   
1 2 3 4 
 
PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE. 
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67-
76 
RS1-
RS10 
For each of the institutions below, would you say that you trust them 
completely, trust them somewhat, don’t trust them very much, or don’t trust 
them at all? 
  trust 
strongly 
trust 
don’t trust 
very much 
trust 
completely  
67     RS1     local government 1 2 3 4 
68     RS2 labor unions 1 2 3 4 
69     RS3 Police 1 2 3 4 
70     RS4 Courts 1 2 3 4 
71     RS5 central government 1 2 3 4 
72     RS6 The Chinese Communist Party 1 2 3 4 
73     RS7 The National People’s Congress 1 2 3 4 
74     RS8 civil servants 1 2 3 4 
75     RS9 The People’s Liberation Army 1 2 3 4 
76 RS10 the media 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
77-
83 
RS11-
RS17 
For each statement, do you STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE, or 
STRONGLY DISAGREE?   
  strongly 
agree 
Agree disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
77    RS11 Whatever its faults may be, our form of 
government is still the best for us. 
1 2 3 4 
78    RS12 You can generally trust the people in 
government to do what is right. 
1 2 3 4 
79    RS13 Our country’s political system is the best in 
the world. 
1 2 3 4 
80    RS14 The majority of government officials are will 
sacrifice their personal benefit in order to 
serve the people. 
1 2 3 4 
81   RS15 What our national leaders say in the 
newspaper and on television is generally 
true. 
1 2 3 4 
82   RS16 In our country, regular people have a lots 
means by which to influence government 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 
83 RS17 Achieving democracy in our country will 
require the leadership of the Party. 
1 2 3 4 
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84-
87 
DS13-
DS16 
Below we will describe various types of political systems and ask what you 
think about each as a way of governing this country.  For each one, would you 
say that is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing 
this country?  
  very 
good 
good bad very bad 
84     DS13 
Having a strong leader who does not have to 
bother with parliament and elections. 
1 2 3 4 
85     DS14 
Having experts, not government, make 
decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country. 
1 2 3 4 
86     DS15 Having the army rule. 1 2 3 4 
87 DS16 Having a democratic political system. 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are almost finished! Please take a moment to make sure 
that you have answered all of the questions above in accordance with 
the directions given.  (Please do not change any answers that you 
have already provided). 
 
When you are completely done, please turn to the last page. 
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CONGRATULATIONS!  YOU ARE FINISHED.  PLEASE BRING YOUR 
QUESTIONNAIRE UP TO THE SURVEY ADMINSTRATOR. 
 
AS THIS IS AN ONGOING SURVEY, WE ASK THAT YOU DO NOT 
DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OR YOUR ANSWERS WITH OTHER 
STUDENTS WHO MIGHT ALSO BE PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY. 
 
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR COOPERATION! 
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2010 Chinese University Students’ Values Survey Item Descriptions 
Pre-treatment Section 
Basic socio-demographic background (SD1-SD6) – respondents were asked to provide their 
year of birth/age (SD1), gender (SD2), year in university (SD3), residence status (mutually 
exclusive categories of rural, urban, or other) (SD4), ethnicity (mutually exclusive categories of 
Han Chinese, minority nationality, or other) (SD5), and political status (mutually exclusive 
categories of general citizen, member of China Youth League, member of Chinese Communist 
Party, or other) (SD6). 
Economic satisfaction (EE1-EE6) – six-question index, taken directly from the East Asian 
Barometer Survey.  The first three questions ask respondents to state their evaluation of the 
country’s current national economic situation, how much it has improved or deteriorated from 
five years previously, and how much they expect it to improve or deteriorate over the next five 
years.  The latter three questions ask respondents to make similar evaluations concerning their 
own family household financial situation. 
Traditionalism (TR1-TR10) – first nine items taken directly from the East Asian Values 
Survey’s nine-item traditional social values battery, an index derived from the work of Hong 
Kong scholars H.C. Kuan and S.K. Lau and directly informed by “qualitative studies of Asian 
values going back to Max Weber and including, more recently, the work of Lucian Pye.” 
(Nathan 2007, p. 7).  The tenth item, measuring respondents’ receptiveness to “greater respect 
for authority” in society, is taken directly from the World Values Survey. 
National attachment (NA-NA12) – two of these items, NA1 (“I am proud to be Chinese”) and 
NA7 (“If another war occurs, I am willing to fight for my country”) are taken directly from the 
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World Values Survey; the remaining ten items are measures of patriotic and nationalistic 
attitudes taken from de Figuereido and Elkins (2003) 
Political Engagement (PE1-PE2) – two questions taken from the World Values Survey, gauging 
the frequency with which respondents discuss politics with others (PE1) and the degree to which 
respondents are interested in politics (PE2). 
Authoritarianism (AU1-AU4) – 8-item forced-choice child-rearing values battery, taken directly 
from the National Election Survey (NES).  
Post-Treatment Section 
Self-Expression Values (SE1-SE9) 
Postmaterialism was measured utilizing the original 4-item scale (SE1-SE2), together with the 
“country aims” battery that appears first in the full 12-item postmaterialism scale (SE3-SE4).34  
Interpersonal trust (SE5), life happiness (SE6), unconventional political behavior (SE7-SE8) 
and tolerance of homosexuality (SE9) were measured with the standard World Values Survey 
question items. 
Democratic support (DS1-DS12; DS13-DS16) was measured utilizing a 12-item scale taken 
directly from the East Asian Barometer (DS1-DS12) and the 4-item index measuring net 
preference for democracy over autocracy (DS13-DS16) taken from the World Values Survey.    
Regime support (RS1-RS10; RS11-RS17) was measured with an index of ten institutional 
confidence items derived from the World Values Survey (RS1-RS10) and an index of seven 
questions tapping generalized regime support and confidence taken from the East Asian 
Barometer (RS11-RS17).  
                                                 
34
 The third battery of the full 12-item index was not included in the original version of the CUSVS questionnaire.   
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2010 大学生价值观调查 
 
感谢您参加者 2010 年大学生价值观调查。此次为匿名调查，所以请不要在问卷上签名，
并希望您能诚实地回答下列问题。请仔细阅读问题，回答不能为空白，除注明外每个问题均
为一个答案。 
 您就读的大学:________________________                今天的日期: ____ 年  ____ 月  ____ 日 
首先，我们想简单了解一下您个人的情况。  
1 SD1 您的年出生年：    19___年                 年龄: ____  
2 SD2 性别  
 男  1 
女   2 
3 SD3 
请问您现在就读于大学哪一个年级？ 
 大学一年级   1 
大学二年级   2 
大学三年级   3 
大学四年级   4 
硕士研究生   5 
博士研究生      6 
其他      7 
4 SD4 您的家庭户口是农村户口还是城镇居民户口？ 
 农村户口   1 
城镇户口  2 
其他         3 
5 SD5 请问您属于哪个民族？ 
 汉族               1 
少数民族  2 
其他                   3 
6 SD6 请问您的政治面貌是什么？ 
 群众   1 
共青团员  2 
共产党员  3 
民主党派            4 
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7 EE1 您觉得我们国家目前整体经济形势怎么样？ 
 非常好    1 
还算好    2 
不好不坏   3 
不太好    4 
非常不好   5 
8 EE2 您认为目前我们国家经济形势与五年前相比，有些什么样的变化？ 
 好很多    1 
好一些    2 
跟以前一样   3 
差一些    4 
非常不好   5 
9 EE3 您认为五年后我们国家的经济形势会有些什么样的变化？ 
 非常好    1 
还算好    2 
不好不坏   3 
不太好    4 
非常不好   5 
10 EE4 您家目前的经济情况怎样？ 
 非常好    1 
还算好    2 
不好不坏   3 
不太好    4 
非常不好   5 
11 EE5 您家的经济情况与五年前相比，有什么变化吗？ 
 好很多    1 
好一些    2 
跟以前一样   3 
差一些    4 
非常不好   5 
12 EE6 您为您家的经济情况五年后会有些什么变化？ 
 非常好    1 
还算好    2 
不好不坏   3 
不太好    4 
非常不好   5 
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13-21 TR1-TR9 我们想知道您对下列各种说法的意见，是非常同意，同意，不同意，还是非常不同意？ 
  非常 
同意 
同意 不同意 
非常不
同意  
13 TR  TR1 父母的要求即使不合理，子女仍应该 照着去
做。 
1 2 3 4 
14 TR  TR2 用人的时候，尽管外人的条件比较好，还是应
该把机会优先给亲戚朋友。 
1 2 3 4 
15 TR  TR3 若与邻居发生争执，最好的处理办法就是尽量
迁就对方。 
1 2 3 4 
16 TR  TR4 一个人的富贵贫贱，成功失败都是命中注定
的。 
1 2 3 4 
17 TR  TR5 如果自己与同事意见不合，就不应坚持已见。 1 2 3 4 
18 TR  TR6 为了家庭的利益，应该把个人的利益摆在其
次。 
1 2 3 4 
19 TR  TR7 男人在女领导手下工作总是很丢脸的事。 1 2 3 4 
20 TR  TR8 如果因事争执不下，应请年长的人主持公道。 1 2 3 4 
21 TR  TR9 婆媳闹矛盾时，即使婆婆不对，做丈夫的也应
该劝妻子听婆婆的话。 
1 2 3 4 
 
22 TR10 如果我们社会更加尊重权威，您认为这是好事，坏事，还是无所谓？ 
 好事   1 
坏事                  2 
无所谓                 3 
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23-
34 
NA1- 
NA12 
请问您对下列各种说法的意见，是非常同意，同意，不同意，还是非常不同意？ 
  非常同意 同意 不同意 非常不同意 
23    NA1 作为一个中国人，我感到很骄傲。 1 2 3 4 
   24    NA2 在国际体育比赛中，中国战胜其他国家而
获得比赛的胜利对我来说很重要。 
1 2 3 4 
   25    NA3 我为中国在经济上取得的成绩而骄傲。 1 2 3 4 
   26    NA4 与其他国家相比，我更愿意成为中国公
民。 
1 2 3 4 
   27    NA5 中国的历史很让我骄傲。 1 2 3 4 
   28    NA6 中国在国际政坛中的地位对我来说很重
要。 
1 2 3 4 
29 NA7 如果发生了战争，我很愿意为国家而战。 1 2 3 4 
30 NA8 我为中国平等的对待国内各团体（文化、
政治、宗教）而骄傲。 
1 2 3 4 
31 NA9 中国的军事力量能够赶超世界其他国家对
我来说很重要。 
1 2 3 4 
32 NA10 在中国发生的一些事让我很为中国而羞
愧。 
1 2 3 4 
33 NA11 中国的统一对我来说很重要。 1 2 3 4 
34 NA12 总的来说，我觉得中国比其他国家都要
好。 
1 2 3 4 
 173 
35 PE1 您经常跟人谈国家大事或政治方面的问题吗? 
 经常    1 
有时    2 
很少   3 
从不    4 
36 PE2 您对政治上的事情有没有兴趣去了解？ 
 非常有兴趣    1 
比较有兴趣    2 
不太有兴趣   3 
完全没兴趣    4 
 
37-
40 
AU1-
AU5 
您认为培养孩子学习下列那个品质更重要？每组请选择一个答案。 
37 AU1 
独立性    1 
还是  
孝顺    2 
 
38 AU2 
服从    1 
还是  
自主性    2 
 
39 AU3 
求知，问题精神  1 
还是  
修养    2 
 
40 AU4 
想得周到的，体贴的  1 
还是  
规矩    2 
 
请确认你已经回答问卷第一部分所有的问题（请不要更改您的答案） 
当您确定已经完成所有问题，请翻到下一页。 
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41-
46 
RE1- 
RE5 
看了这几则新闻之后，你感觉到下列各种情绪的程度是： 
  
强烈 一般 一点 没感觉 
41      RE1 愤怒 1 2 3 4 
42     RE2 骄傲/自豪 1 2 3 4 
43     RE3 威胁感  1 2 3 4 
44     RE4 高兴/满意 1 2 3 4 
45     RE5 震惊  1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
请翻到下一页。 
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46 SE1 如果您不得不在下列选项中做出选择，您认为哪一个最重要？    [您只能选一个回答]  
          最重要 
 维持国家的秩序      1 
使人民在重要的政府决策上有更多的发言权  2 
控制物价上涨 3 
保障言论自由 4 
47 SE2 那么，您认为哪一个是第二重要？    [您只能选择一个答案，并且不能跟上一题重复]  
        第二重要 
 维持国家的秩序      1 
使人民在重要的政府决策上有更多的发言权  2 
控制物价上涨 3 
保障言论自由 4 
 
4 SE3 下面列出了今后十年我国可能的发展目标。您认为哪一个最重要？[您只能选一个回答] 
 最重要 
 快速的经济增长 1 
保证我国有强大的国防力量 2 
保证人们在工作单位和社区中有更多的发言权 3 
努力使我们的城市和乡村环境变得更美丽 4 
44 SE4 那么，您认为哪一个是第二重要？    [您只能选择一个答案，并且不能跟上一题重复] 
 第二重要 
 快速的经济增长 1 
保证我国有强大的国防力量 2 
保证人们在工作单位和社区中有更多的发言权 3 
努力使我们的城市和乡村环境变得更美丽 4 
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45 SE5 一般来说，您认为大多数人是可以信任的，还是认为和人相处要越小心越好？ 
 大多数人是可以信任的  1 
要越小心越好                 2 
 
 
46 SE6 将所有的情况考虑进来，目前您生活得愉快吗？        
 很愉快        1 
愉快        2 
不太愉快       3 
一点都不愉快       4 
 
 
47-
48 
SE7-
SE8 
人们可能采取不同的行为表达自己的意愿，对于下列两种活动，请问您是实际参加过，有可能
参加，还是在任何情况下都不会参加？  
  参加过 可能参加 绝不参加 
在请愿书上签名  1 2 3 
参加抵制活动 1 2 3 
 
 
47 E9 请告诉我们，您多大程度上能接受下列做法？接受程度由 1到 10表示，1表示完全不能接受，
10表示完全能接受，请在表中标出您的看法。 
  完全不能接受                                     完全能接受  
 同性恋  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
 
请翻到下一页。 
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50-61 DS1-
DS12 
我们想知道您对下列各种说法的意见，是非常同意，同意，不同意，还是非常不
同意？  
  
非常 
同意 
同意 
不 
同意 
非常 
不同
意 
50 DS1 
教育程度很低的人，应该和教育程度高的人一样，在
政治上享有同样的发言权。 
1 2 3 4 
   51 DS2 
政府的领导人就像大家庭的家长，他们关于国家事务
的决定，人民都应该服从。 
1 2 3 4 
   52 DS3 
一种思想(文化的,政治的或宗教的)能否在社会上进行
讨论应由政府决定。 
1 2 3 4 
   53 DS4 
在一个地方，如果东一个团体，西一个团体(文
化,政治或宗教团体)，就会影响地方的安定与和
谐。 
1 2 3 4 
   54 DS5 法院在审判重大案件时，应该接受当地政府的意见。 1 2 3 4 
   55 DS6 
人民代表大会如果干预政府的决策，政府就很难有所
作为了。 
1 2 3 4 
   56 DS7 
只要有了品德高尚的领导人，任何事情都可以由他做
主。 
1 2 3 4 
   57 DS8 大家的想法若不一致，社会就会混乱。 1 2 3 4 
   58 DS9 
在政治上为了达成重要目标，不必太计较用什么手
段。 
1 2 3 4 
   59 DS10 
如果确信自己的政治主张是正确的，尽管多数人反
对，还是要坚持到底，绝不妥协。 
1 2 3 4 
   60 DS11 
对残暴的罪犯， 应立即处罚，不必等待法院的复杂审
判程序。 
1 2 3 4 
 61 DS12 
只要获得多数人的支持，政治人物就应贯彻他的主
张，不必顾及少数人的看法。 
1 2 3 4 
 
请翻到下一页。 
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62-
71 
RS1-
RS10 
您对于下面这些组织的信任度如何？是很信任，信任，不太信任，还是根本不
信任？  
  
很信任 信任 不太信任 
根本 
不信任  
62 RS1     地方政府 1 2 3 4 
63 RS2 工会 1 2 3 4 
64     RS3 警察 1 2 3 4 
65     RS4 法院 1 2 3 4 
66     RS5 中央政府 1 2 3 4 
67     RS6 中国共产党 1 2 3 4 
68     RS7 人民代表大会 1 2 3 4 
69     RS8 一般政府官员 1 2 3 4 
 70     RS9 解放军 1 2 3 4 
71 RS10 广播，电视，报纸等新闻机构 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
72-
78 
RS11- 
RS17 
请问您对下列各种说法的意见，是非常同意，同意，不同意，还是非常不同意？ 
  
非常同意 同意 不同意 
非常 
不同意 
72   RS11 
尽管我们国家的政治制度有这样那样的缺
点，但它还是最适合我们的国情。 
1 2 3 4 
   73   RS12 
一般情况下，你可以相信管理国家的人做
的是对的。 
1 2 3 4 
   74   RS13 我国的政治制度是世界上最好的。 1 2 3 4 
   75   RS14 
大多数的政府官员都能牺牲个人利益为人
民服务。 
1 2 3 4 
   76   RS15 
国家领导人在报纸和电视上讲话时，通常
讲的是真话。 
1 2 3 4 
   77   RS16 
在我们国家里，人民有许多办法有效地影
响政府的决定。 
1 2 3 4 
78 RS17 在我国，实行民主要依靠党的领导。 1 2 3 4 
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35 PE1 您经常跟人谈国家大事或政治方面的问题吗? 
 经常    1 
有时    2 
很少   3 
从不    4 
36 PE2 您对政治上的事情有没有兴趣去了解？ 
 非常有兴趣    1 
比较有兴趣    2 
不太有兴趣   3 
完全没兴趣    4 
 
 
 
79-
82 
DS13-
DS16 
下面我们将列举一些不同形式的政治体制，请问假如在我国采用这种政治体
制，您认为是非常好，好，不好，还是非常不好？  
  非常好 好 不好 非常不好 
79  DS13 有一个不受人大选举干扰的强有力的领
袖。 
1 2 3 4 
   80  DS14 应该依据专家而不是政府的意见进行决
策。 
1 2 3 4 
   81  DS15 实行军事统治。 1 2 3 4 
82 DS16 实行民主体制。 1 2 3 4 
 
您即将完成此次问卷调查。请确认你已经回答了所有的问题（请不要更改您
的答案）您确定已经完成所有问题，请翻到最后一页。 
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恭喜！您已经完成了本次问卷调查。请把问卷交到管理人。 
 
因为本次调查仍在进行，所以请不要与其他同学讨论本次问卷中的问
题和答案。 
 
非常感谢您的合作！ 
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2010 CUSVS NATIONAL THREAT EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT 
Now we would like to get your reaction to some news reports.  Please read carefully and 
answer the questions that follow. 
March 21, 2008 – Top U.S. Leader Visits Dalai Lama, 
Asks World to “Oppose China” 
 
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, while visiting the 
Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India, 
asked all of the “freedom-loving peoples of the world” to 
“oppose Chinese government oppression in China and Tibet”; 
in the past Pelosi has also invited Taiwan to “join the United Nations as a member state.”  
March 2008 – Foreign Media Publish Lies about Tibetan Protests 
The Berlin Morning Post website 
labeled a photograph of a Han 
Chinese man being rescued by 
police as an “insurrectionist being 
arrested by the police.”  
Germany’s NTV television station 
also falsely labeled footage from a protest in Nepal as “a new incident in Tibet.” 
 
The BBC’s website displayed a photo with the caption that 
“there is a heavy military presence in Tibet,” completely 
failing to note the Chinese characters for “ambulance” on 
the vehicle pictured.   
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And CNN’s website posted a photo 
of the Tibetan protests that cut out 
the Tibetan rioters throwing stones 
at government vehicles. 
 
April 7, 2008 – French police allow a Tibetan separatist protestor 
to attack handicapped Olympic torch bearer Jin Jing 
 
April 9, 2008 – CNN Calls Chinese “Thugs and Goons”                  
During an April 4th broadcast CNN commentator Jack Cafferty 
stated that “Chinese products are junk” and that “over the past 50 
years the Chinese people have basically been a bunch of thugs 
and goons.”  
May 5, 2008 – U.S. Actress Sharon Stone Calls Sichuan Earthquake “Karma” for 
China’s Treatment of Tibet 
In an interview at the 61
st
 annual Cannes film festival American 
actress Sharon Stone told reporters that the Sichuan earthquake 
was China’s “karma” for its treatment of Tibet, describing the 
tragedy as “interesting.” 
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October 3, 2008 - U.S. Breaks Promises, Sells $6.5 Billion 
of Weapons to Taiwan 
The American government announced on Oct. 3, 2008 that it would 
go through with a sale of six major weapon systems to Taiwan, 
including the Patriot-3 anti-missile system, Apache attack 
helicopters, Harpoon guided missiles and Javelin guided anti-tank missiles, components for 
upgrading E-2 Hawkeye early-warning aircraft and various spare parts, at a combined value of 
6.5 billion U.S. dollars.  This act is a serious violation of promises the U.S. has made to China 
regarding its Taiwan policy.    
February 4, 2009 – Japanese Military Occupies 
Diaoyutai Islands, Prime Minister Calls Them 
Sovereign Japanese Territory 
Japan’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper reported on Feb. 4th 
that Japan’s Maritime Safety Agency had stationed for the 
first time PLH (patrol vessels large with helicopter) in the waters of the Diaoyu Islands, saying 
that such action was aimed to defend against “invasion” by Chinese marine survey ships. 
March 9, 2009 – America Says OK for Taiwan to 
Have Nuclear Weapons 
According to a March 9
th
 report from www.huanqiu.com, the 
U.S. has recognized Israel as a nuclear power, and stated that 
if Taiwan, Korea, or Japan need them, they may also acquire 
nuclear weapons. 
 
 184 
March 17, 2009 – Pro-Independence Chair of Taiwan Democratic 
Progress Party Calls for “Joining with Japan to Oppose China”; 
Says Diaoyu Islands Have Nothing to Do with China 
18
th
 Edition, Huanqiu Times – Chairwoman of Taiwan’s Democratic 
Progress Party and future presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen, speaking to 
reporters in Tokyo on March 17
th
, stated that her “belief in Taiwanese independence is firm”; she 
also affirmed “Taiwanese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands,” stating that both Taiwan’s claim 
to the islands and the Taiwanese-Japanese deliberations over their territorial rights “nothing to do 
with China.”  
April 18, 2009 – U.S. Pentagon: China a Threat, Calls for Stronger Security 
Cooperation with Japan 
The Wall Street Journal, “China, Friend or Foe?” 
The American Defense Department talks up the 
“China threat” to justify greater spending on new 
weapons systems. 
The U.S. in recent years has moved to strengthen its 
forces in the Pacific and urged its ally Japan to do the 
same.  Washington and Tokyo are working together to 
boost anti-missile defenses, to defend against threats 
from both North Korea and China. 
 
WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED READING ALL OF THE NEWS STORIES, PLEASE 
TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE. 
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现在我们想知道您看下列新闻报告的感受。请认真观看并回答问题。 
 
2008.03.21 美国高层领导访问达赖,让世界”反对中国” 
美国国会众院议长佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)2008 年 3 月 21
日在印度北部达兰萨拉拜会西藏流亡精神领袖达赖喇嘛
时，让全世界“热爱和平的人们”去“反对中国当局在中国
和西藏的镇压行动”；佩洛西以前还欢迎台湾“加入国际
组织作为成员。” 
 
2008.03外国媒体对西藏暴动进行不实报道  
 
 
《柏林晨报》网站
将一张西藏公安武警解救
被袭汉族人的照片硬说成
是在抓捕藏人。 
 
 
德国 NTV 电视台也在报道中将尼泊尔警察抓捕藏人抗议者说成是“发生在西藏的
新事件”。 
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 BBC 给出的图片说明却写道：“在拉萨有很多
军队”，似乎完全没有看到救护车上大大的“急救”
二字。 
 
  
 
     
CNN 网站图中没有暴徒向车辆投掷石
块。 
 
 
 
2008.04.07 法国警方放任藏独份子袭击坐在轮椅上的火炬手
金晶 
 
 
 
2008.04.09 CNN称中国人是“暴民和匪徒”   
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2008年 4月 9日美国 CNN时事评论节目主持人 Jack Cafferty（卡弗蒂）说：“中国产品
是垃圾”，“在过去 50年里中国人基本上一直是一帮暴民和匪徒。” 
2008.05.25  美国演员莎朗·斯通称 5.12 地震是中国对西藏政
策的“报应” 
美国女演员 Sharon Stone(莎朗·斯通)在出席第 61 届戛纳电影
节的时候，被记者问及四川地震时居然称四川地震是中国(对
西藏政策)的“报应”; 并以“有趣”等字眼形容灾难。 
 
2008.10.03  美国违背诺言，向台湾出售 65亿美金的武器  
华盛顿时间 10 月 3 日，美国政府通知国会，决定向台出
售“爱国者”-3反导系统、“E-2T”预警机升级为“鹰眼 2000”
型相关设备和服务、“阿帕奇”直升机、“标枪”型导弹、潜
射“鱼叉”导弹和飞机零部件等 6 项武器装备，总价值
64.63 亿美元。美方的做法严重违反美方在台湾问题上向
中方作出的严肃诺言。 
2009.02.04 - 日本军方占领钓鱼岛，并声称其为
日本的领土 
据日本《产经新闻》2 月 4 日报道，日本海上保安
厅已经在中国钓鱼岛（日本称为尖阁诸岛）海域常
驻了可搭载直升机的ＰＬＨ型巡视船，自称目的是
“防范中国海洋调查船的入侵”。 
 
 
2009.02.04 美国称台湾若有需要可“有核” 
环球时报特约记者梁小逸报道 五角大楼近日公布文件
表示，以色列已可以独立自主研制非常规武器。美国
因此把以色列列入核大国名单。报告还指出，如果台湾，
韩国和日本宣布有防备需要，它们也很快会拥有“有核”身份。 
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2009.03.17 欲望台独民进党主席鼓噪“联日抗中” 
18 号版的环球时报报道说，台湾民进党主席和未来女性总统候选人
蔡英文于 2009 年 3 月 17 日在日本东京访问期间明确表示：“我对
台湾独立的信念很坚定”; 针对钓鱼岛问题，她表示，“台湾对钓鱼岛
主权的主张”，“与中国完全无关”；台日之间对此的“主权争议”是台
日之间的问题，“也与中国无关”。  
 
2009.04.18 - 美国五角大楼鼓吹中国威胁论，并号召加强与日本的合作来对抗中国 
2009年 4月报 18日【华尔街日报】中国，是朋友还是敌人 :  
 
美国国防部大谈“中国威胁
论”，以此证明美国增加开发
新式武器的支出是正确的。 
 
 
美国近几年已经逐步加强其在太平洋
的军事实力，并且催促其盟友日本也
这么做。华盛顿与东京一直致力于推
进反导弹防御工程的合作，防卫来自
韩国与中国的潜在威胁。 
 
当您看好了上面所有新闻报告，请翻到下一页。 
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2010 CUSVS NATIONAL ASSURANCE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT 
Foreign Media Praise China’s Handling of the May 12th Earthquake in Sichuan  
 
UK, The Times: “Chinese leaders’ response to the crisis can be held up as a model…volunteer 
rescue workers were mobilized from across the nation to aid victims, steps were taken to prevent 
the outbreak of disease; Premier Wen Jiabao immediately flew out to the disaster area to express 
an entire nation’s sorrow and sympathy, visit with victims, and state his demand that survivors 
still trapped beneath the rubble be found and rescued as quickly as possible.” 
Russia, National News Web report: “China doesn’t 
need our sympathy, China needs our understanding; China 
doesn’t need our comfort, China needs our support.  We stand 
by the Chinese people wholeheartedly.  We know, a country 
whose prime minister is able to fly out to a national disaster 
site with two hours, that is able to dispatch 100,000 rescue 
workers, whose businesses and private citizens donate relief 
funds in the tens of billions, where the sheer numbers of 
people pouring out to donate their blood and volunteer 
themselves as rescue workers causes traffic jams – this is a 
country that can never be defeated.” 
U.K., The Independent: “In the wake of an earthquake that had taken the lives of at least 12,000 
people, Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao rushed to the disaster area and immediately 
dispatched military units to the region to engage in relief efforts.  In Myanmar, the military 
government’s top leader Than Shwe only emerged from seclusion a full ten days after a 
hurricane that left 100,000 people dead or missing.   Even United Nations Secretary Ban Ki-
 190 
Moon was unable to raise Than Shwe on the phone, and expressed his personal “extreme 
disappointment” with the tardiness of Myanmar’s disaster response.  The most striking 
comparison between China and Myanmar’s disaster responses that the language of the military 
government was uncannily similar to the propaganda style of Beijing 30 years ago.  But since 
that time China has achieved a huge change, most clearly evident in China’s rapid economic 
growth, which has allowed her to rise from the ranks of the world’s developing countries to 
become one of the new global great powers.” 
U.S., CNN – A CNN correspondent, reporting from a 
TV station in Chenjiaba village: “As he was taking me 
to see the destruction that his area had suffered [from the 
earthquake], the local party secretary told me that over 
3,000 people had gone missing from his village.  I asked 
him how many people had died.  His eyes filled with tears.  ‘500 people,’ he said, among them 
his parents, wife, and his two children.  At just this moment of extreme sorrow, his walkie-talkie 
suddenly sounded with some matter that required his attention, and he ran off to continue with 
his work.” 
Foreign Media Lavish Praise on Beijing’s Olympic Opening Ceremonies 
 
U.S, The Wall Street Journal – 
“Beijing’s Olympic opening ceremonies 
fused together traditional performing arts 
with high-tech wizardry; the 
performance was accompanied by 
applause and cheers throughout, and was 
the most-watched event in television 
history.” 
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U.S., The Washington Post – “After 7 years of 
painstaking preparation, Beijing has unveiled its 
Olympic Games opening ceremony.  The Chinese 
have showcased 5,000 years of history, while at the 
same time reveling in their resurgence as a global 
great power.” 
 
U.S., The Chicago Tribune – Mayor Daly of 
Chicago (the city slated to host the 2016 Summer 
Olympic games) was quoted as saying ‘No one has 
ever seen such an opening ceremony before.  The 
Chinese people have declared that this is a new 
beginning, a new century, and that they will 
continue marching forward.’ 
 
 
Foreign Media Praise China’s Glorious Achievements of Past 60 Years, Say China 
Will “Change the World” 
France, European Times, “Looking Back on 60 Years: 
Overseas Chinese Pride Reaches a Zenith”: This article 
praised China’s glorious achievements of the past 60 
years, noting that the sentiment of overseas Chinese on 
the occasion of the New China’s 60th birthday can only be 
described with one word: ‘pride.’  The article declared 
that the “Chinese Path” has paved the way for the “Chinese Miracle,” combining Chinese 
traditional culture with modern culture to create a new culture.  This new culture provides a new 
value system for approaching the issues of peace and development, multi-polarity and mutual 
 192 
gains, justice and efficiency, morality and idealism, freedom and responsibility, democracy and 
realpolitik.  This culture doesn’t have “power” as its ultimate goal, but rather “greatness.” 
U.K., The Financial Times, “China’s Star is on the 
Rise”: “The 60th anniversary celebration of the new 
China can’t help but arouse the world’s envy and 
admiration for China’s ancient civilization.  China has 
regained the national confidence lost during its period 
of colonialization.  60 years ago, almost no one 
believed that the CCP could realize such glorious achievements; yet reform and opening have 
unleashed China’s great potential. 
U.S., [The Los Angeles Business Paper] –“Over the past 
60 years China has experienced an excess of misfortunes 
and hardships, yet the heroic Chinese people have not 
shrunk back from these trials and tribulations.  They 
have braved on through social experiments and societal 
reforms, marching along the road that many developed 
countries took centuries to travel.  From here, China will increase the speed of reform and 
development and break through developmental bottlenecks; the Chinese people are confident and 
excited that China is on the road back to its former glory.  Over the past 60 years, China’s pace 
of development has attracted the attention and admiration of the world.  In another 60 years, the 
“Chinese Road” will have changed the world. 
AFTER YOU HAVE READ ALL OF THE NEWS STORIES, PLEASE TURN TO THE 
NEXT PAGE. 
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现在我们想知道您看下列新闻报告的感受。请认真观看并回答问题。 
外国媒体高度评价中国 5.12汶川抗震工作 
英国《泰晤士报》中国的领导人的反应速度和关注堪称楷模，动员全国救援幸存者，预防疾病
的爆发。中国总理温家宝立即飞往灾区，表达了全国的悲伤与同情，访问幸存者，并重申他的要求：
要更快速地救援那些被被埋在建筑物内或被埋在瓦砾底下的人们。” 
 
俄罗斯国家新闻网报道:中国不需要同情，中国需
要理解；中国不需要安慰，中国需要支持。我们愿以杯水
之力，尽寸尺之能，和中国人民站在一起。我们知道，一
个总理能在两小时就飞赴灾区的国家，一个能够出动十万
救援人员的国家，一个企业和私人捐款达到数百亿的国家，
一个因争相献血、自愿抢救伤员而造成交通堵塞的国家，
永远不会被打垮。 
 
英国《独立报》：“面对国内大规模的紧急状况，中国
和缅甸两国领导人的反应形成对比。在中国至少造成 1.2 万人
死亡的地震发生后，中国总理温家宝匆匆前往灾区，而且已经
派遣军队到那里执行救灾任务。在缅甸，在导致 10 万人死亡或
失踪的飓风发生整整十天后，缅甸军政府的领导人丹瑞
（ThanShwe）躲起来了。甚至联合国秘书长潘基文都无法打通
他的电话，以表达自己对缅甸迟缓回应的“极度失望”。“中国和缅甸灾难中最惊人的类比之处是，仰光
军政府的说法跟三十年前的北京所宣布的说法非常相似。但中国自此以后发生了很大的改变，最明显
的是中国急速的经济发展让它从发展中国家一跃成为世界新兴的超级大国。” 
 
CNN 一个记者采访陈家坝村的视频。“…… 本地的领导救援的书记告
诉我超过 3000 人失踪，当他带着我看他的地区受到的破坏的时候，
我问他有多少人死亡。他在眼泪中崩溃了。‘500 人死了’，他说，其
中包括他的父母、妻子、还有他的两个孩子……正当他极度悲痛的时
候，他的对讲机里突然传出来消息需要他，然后他就又跑回去继续工
作了” 
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海外媒体称赞北京奥运会开幕式令世界倾倒 
美国《华尔街日报》说，北京奥运
会开幕式融合了传统表演和科技魅
力，掌声和欢呼声贯穿整个表演过
程，北京奥运会开幕式将是电视转
播史上观众人数最多的盛会。 
 
 
 
 
 
《华盛顿邮报》说，经过７年的悉心准备，
北京奥运会大幕拉开。中国人在展示五千
年历史的同时，也为重新成为世界强国而
欣喜。 
 
 
 
 
 
《芝加哥论坛报》援引２０１６年奥运会申
办城市芝加哥市市长戴利的话说，“没有人
见过这样的开幕式，中国人发出了声明，这
是一个新的开始、新的世纪，他们将继续前
进”。 
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外媒称赞新中国 60年来的辉煌成就 称中国改变世界 
法国《欧洲时报》“回眸 60 载：侨胞自豪感在此刻升华”
的评论文章。文章盛赞新中国 60 年来取得的辉煌成就，
指出海外华侨华人在新中国 60 岁生日时唯一的情感就是
“自豪”。文章说，“中国道路”玉成了“中国奇迹”，
在中国道路的背后，是某种结合了中国传统文化与当代
文化的新文化。这为处于危机中的世界，从和平与发展、
多极与共赢、公平与效率、道德与理想、自由与义务、民主与决策等视角，提供了一个新
的价值参照系。这个文化不以“强大”为最后目标，却以“伟大”为终极诉求。 
 
英国《金融时报》2 日在题为“中国的胜利”的社
论中说，中华人民共和国的地位正日益上升，新中
国 60周年的庆典不能不让人对中华民族的古老文明
感到敬慕，中国恢复了在殖民屈辱中丧失的自信。
60 年前，几乎没有人相信中国共产党能够取得如此
辉煌的成就，改革开放使中国巨大的潜力得以释放。 
 
美国《洛杉矶商报》 60 年来，中国经历了太多坎坷与
磨难，但英雄的中国人民不畏艰险，在探索与变革中跋
涉，走过了许多发达国家用几百年走过的路程。今后，
加速发展模式转型，突破发展瓶颈，中华民族壮怀激烈，
将迈向伟大复兴的新征程。文章说，过去 60 年，“中
国步伐”举世瞩目；再过 60 年，“中国道路”将改变
世界。 
 
 
当您看好了上面所有新闻报告，请翻到下一页。 
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Table 5.2 – CUSVS Phase One: control and treatment group socio-demographic characteristics 
Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
Overall (99) Control (45) Treatment (54) 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Gender 
43.4% female (43) 
56.6% male (56) 
48.9% female (22) 
51.1% male (23) 
38.9% female (21) 
61.1% male (33) 
0.3225 
Age Average 20.5 years Average 20.8 years Average 20.2 years 0.0027 
Residence 
36.4% rural (36) 
63.6% urban (63) 
40% rural (18) 
60% urban (27) 
33.3% rural (18) 
66.7% urban (36) 
0.4973 
Ethnicity 
4% minority (4) 
96% Han (95) 
4.4% minority (2) 
95.6% Han (43) 
3.7% minority (2) 
96.3% Han (52) 
0.8540 
Political Affiliation 
7.1% general citizen 
(7) 
2.2% general citizen  
(1) 
11.1% general 
citizen (6) 
0.0874 
82.8% China Youth 
League (82) 
86.7% China Youth 
League (39) 
79.6% China 
Youth League (43) 
0.3604 
10.1% CCP (10) 11.1% CCP (5) 9.3% CCP (5) 0.7637 
Attitudinal 
Characteristics 
Overall (99) Control (45) Treatment (54) Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Economic 
Satisfaction 
.681701 (97) .6569602 (44) .7022406 (53) 0.1198 
Traditionalism .3622685 (96) .3815676 (43) .3466108 (53) 0.0984 
More Authority .459596 (99) .4666667 (45) .4537037 (54) 0.8887 
National Attachment 
12-Item 
.6862573 (95) .6660207 (43) .7029915 (52) 0.2435 
National Attachment 
10-Item
35
 
.7225694 (96) .6968992 (43) .7433962 (53) 0.1812 
Political Engagement .5892256 (99) .5777778 (45) .5987654 (54) 0.6306 
Authoritarianism  .2121212 (99) .2111111 (45) .212963 (54) 0.9631 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Two different measures of national attachment were utilized in the analyses of control and treatment group 
differences : a 12-item measure including all of the national affect question items included in the survey, and a 10-
item measure constructed based on the results of exploratory factor analysis utilizing pooled data from the first two 
phases of the CUSVS . 
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Table 5.2a – CUSVS Phase One: observed and predicted differences (with age, general citizen and 
traditionalism set to their mean values) in measured postmaterialism, control and national threat 
treatment groups 
Battery Category 
Control 
(Observed) 
Control 
(Predicted) 
Treatment 
(Observed) 
Treatment 
(Predicted) 
Original 4-Item 
Battery 
Materialist 13.3% 13.4% 29.6% 30.7% 
Mixed 77.8% 77.5% 63.0% 66.1% 
Postmaterialist 8.9% 9.1% 7.4% 3.3% 
PDI -4.4 -4.3 -22.2 -27.4 
“Country Aims” 4-
Item Battery 
Materialist 20.0% 19.9% 42.6% 44.8% 
Mixed 57.8% 58.8% 55.6% 52.8% 
Postmaterialist 22.2% 21.3% 1.9% 2.4% 
PDI +2.2 +1.4 -40.7 -42.4 
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Table 5.6 – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with original 4-item battery regressed 
against national threat treatment, authoritarianism and national threat * authoritarianism interaction 
term (CUSVS Phase One) 
Original 4-
item 
outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Materialist 
National threat .8464924 .815448 0.04 0.299 -.7517564 2.444741 
Authoritarianism .5772368 2.386872 0.24 0.809 -5.255419 4.100946 
National threat * 
authoritarianism 
.7385302 2.825903 0.26 0.794 -4.800138 6.277199 
Constant -1.637545 .6705015 2.44 0.015 -2.951703 -.323386 
Postmaterialist 
National threat .3855811 .8663773 0.45 0.656 -1.312487 2.083649 
Authoritarianism -6.825242 4.46312 1.53 0.126 -15.5728 1.922313 
National threat * 
authoritarianism 
-134.7657 6.79e+07 0.00 1.000 -1.33e+08 1.33e+08 
Constant 1.264461 .6389229 1.98 0.048 -2.516727 -.0121949 
Baseline: original 4-item = mixed 
Log likelihood = -69.719921 
Number of observations = 99 
LR chi2(6) = 16.81 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0100  
Pseudo R2 = 0.1076 
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Table 5.6a – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with original 4-item battery regressed 
against national threat treatment, national attachment and national threat * national attachment 
interaction term (CUSVS Phase One) 
Original 4-item 
outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Materialist 
National threat 8.911808 4.517737 
-
1.97 
0.049 -17.76641 -.0572063 
National 
attachment 
-16.13472 7.022639 
  
-2.30 
0.022 -29.89884 -2.3706 
National threat * 
national attachment 
15.48011 7.284113 
2
.13 
0.034 1.203506 29.7567 
Constant 8.589251 4.264527 
2
.01 
0.044 .2309319 16.94757 
Postmaterialist 
National threat -8.256642 5.541283     
-
1.49 
0.136 -19.11736 2.604073 
National 
attachment 
-23.0305 8.772068 
-
2.63 
0.009     -40.22343 -5.83756 
National threat * 
national attachment 
14.23798 9.610901 
1
.48 
0.138 -4.599045 33.07499 
Constant 11.82224 5.019632 
2
.36 
0.019 1.983947 21.66054 
Baseline: “country aims” 4-item = mixed 
Log likelihood = -61.03928 
Number of observations = 96 
LR chi2(6) = 29.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1957 
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Table 5.6b – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with “country aims” 4-item battery 
regressed against national threat treatment, authoritarianism and national threat * authoritarianism 
interaction term (CUSVS Phase One) 
Original 4-
item outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Materialist 
National threat .6347057 .7241622 0.88 0.381 -.7846261 2.054037 
authoritarianism -.2328013 2.024603 0.11 0.908 -4.200951 3.735348 
National threat * 
authoritarianism 
.7268401 2.450643 0.30 0.767 -4.076333 5.530013 
constant -1.008147 .5966642 1.69 0.091 -2.177588 .1612931 
postmaterialist 
National threat -1.821479 1.169444 1.56 0.119 -4.113547 .4705879 
authoritarianism -2.480712 2.190872 1.13 0.258 -6.774742 1.813318 
National threat * 
authoritarianism 
-136.466 1.10e+08 0.00 1.000 -2.15e+08 2.15e+08 
constant -.4879755 .5298884 0.92 0.357 -1.526538 .5505867 
Log likelihood = -83.142595 
Number of observations = 99 
LR chi2(6)      =      18.15 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0059 
Pseudo R2       =     0.0984 
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Table 5.6c – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with “country aims” 4-item battery 
regressed against national threat treatment, national attachment and national threat * national 
attachment interaction term 
Original 4-
item outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Materialist 
National threat 7.007583 3.43124 0.04 0.041 .2824754 13.73269 
National 
attachment 
9.922993 3.753268 0.64 0.008 2.566723 17.27926 
National threat * 
national 
attachment 
-7.632556 4.164618 1.83 0.067 -15.79506 .5299455 
Constant -8.969769 3.133061 2.86 0.004 -15.11046 -2.829082 
Postmaterialist 
National threat 277.0121 9.48e+07 0.00 1.000 -1.86e+08 1.86e+08 
National 
attachment 
.0245336 2.573453 0.01 0.992 -5.019341 5.068409 
National threat * 
national 
attachment 
-795.8819 . . . . . 
Constant -.9717791 1.746784 0.56 0.578 -4.395412 2.451854 
Baseline: “country aims” 4-item = mixed 
Log likelihood = -69.896149 
Number of observations = 96  
LR chi2(6) = 38.93  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2178 
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Table 5.9 – Control & treatment group, sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics           
(CUSVS Phase Two) 
Socio-
Demographic 
Overall (91) Control (46) Treatment (45) Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Gender 
51.6% female (47) 
48.4% male (44) 
58.7% female (27) 
41.3% male (19) 
44.4% female (20) 
55.6% male (25) 
0.1776 
Age 19.62 years 19.59 years 19.64 years 0.7874 
Residence 
52.7% rural (48) 
47.3% urban (43) 
47.8% rural (22) 
52.2% urban (24) 
57.8% rural (26) 
42.2% urban (19) 
0.3473 
Ethnicity 
6.6% minority (6) 
93.4% Han (85) 
2.2% minority (1) 
97.8% Han (45) 
11.1% minority (5) 
88.9% Han (40) 
0.0877 
Political 
Affiliation 
1.1% general 
citizen (1) 
0.0% general citizen  
(0) 
2.2% general 
citizen (1) 
0.3147 
94.5% Chinese 
Youth League (86) 
95.7% Chinese Youth 
League (44) 
93.3% Chinese 
Youth League (42) 
0.6320 
4.4% CCP (4) 4.3% CCP (2) 4.4% CCP (2) 0.9823 
Attitudinal Overall (91) Control (46) Treatment (45) Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Economic 
Satisfaction 
.707761 (91) .7126359 (46) .7027778 (45) 0.6862 
Traditionalism .3741157 (89) .3761317 (45) .3720539 (44) 0.8310 
More Authority .3791209 (91) .3043478 (46) .4555556 (45) 0.0940 
National Affect 
12-item 
.7002442 (91) .6871981 (46) .7135802 (45) 0.3502 
National Affect 
10-Item 
.732967 (91) .726087 (46) .74 (45) 0.6439 
Political 
Engagement 
.5897436 (91) .5797102 (46) .6 (45) 0.6216 
Authoritarianism .2244318 (88) .25 (46) .1964286 (42) 0.1499 
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Table 5.10a – Observed and predicted distributions (with respect for authority and minority ethnic 
status set to their mean values) of measured postmaterialism, control and treatment groups (CUSVS 
Phase Two)  
Battery Category 
Control 
(Observed) 
Control 
(Predicted) 
Treatment 
(Observed) 
Treatment 
(Predicted) 
Original   4-Item 
Battery 
Materialist 45.7% 46.7% 17.8% 16.6% 
Mixed 47.8% 46.4% 66.7% 66.8% 
Postmaterialist 6.5% 6.9% 15.6% 16.5% 
PDI -39.1 -39.8 -2.2 -0.1 
“Country Aims” 
4-Item Battery 
Materialist 32.6% 32.8% 31.1% 30.5% 
Mixed 60.9% 59.4% 51.1% 51.8% 
Postmaterialist 6.5% 7.8% 17.8% 17.7% 
PDI -26.1 -25.0 -13.3 -12.8 
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Table 5.13 – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with original 4-item battery regressed 
against national assurance treatment, authoritarianism and national assurance * authoritarianism 
interaction term (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Original 4-
item 
outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Materialist 
National assurance -.4518344 .7951054 0.57 0.570 -2.010212 1.106543 
Authoritarianism -.4424931 1.821441 0.24 0.808 -4.012451 3.127465 
National assurance 
* authoritarianism 
-4.207215 3.412493 1.23 0.218 -10.89558 2.48115 
Constant .0563134 .5216348 0.11 0.914 -.9660719 1.078699 
Postmaterialist 
National assurance 4.525987 2.174743 0.08 0.037 .2635685 8.788406 
Authoritarianism 8.623478 4.408187 0.96 0.050 -.0164103 17.26337 
National assurance 
* authoritarianism 
-12.41498 5.296359 2.34 0.019 -22.79565 -2.034304 
Constant -5.169896 2.077635 2.49 0.013 -9.241986 -1.097805 
Baseline: original 4-item = mixed 
Log likelihood = -73.607683 
Number of observations = 88 
LR chi2(6) = 18.04 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0061 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1092 
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Table 5.13a – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with original 4-item battery regressed 
against national assurance treatment, national attachment and national assurance * national attachment 
interaction term (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Original 4-
item 
outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Materialist 
National assurance -1.176145 2.742039 0.43 0.668 -6.550443 4.198154 
National attachment .3743332 2.384253 0.16 0.875 -4.298716 5.047382 
National assurance 
* national 
attachment 
-.1429822 3.612017 0.04 0.968 -7.222406 6.936441 
Constant -.3204754 1.77154 0.18 0.856 -3.792631 3.15168 
Postmaterialist 
National assurance -1.023329 4.376996 0.23 0.815 -9.602083 7.555426 
National attachment -6.165053 5.953938 1.04 0.300 -17.83456 5.504452 
National assurance 
* national 
attachment 
2.423532 6.551427 0.37 0.711 -10.41703 15.26409 
Constant 2.221594 3.933344 0.56 0.572 -5.487619 9.930806 
Baseline: original 4-item = mixed 
Log likelihood = -78.120624 
Number of observations = 91 
LR chi2(6) = 12.45 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0526 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0738 
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Table 5.13b – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with “country aims” 4-item battery 
regressed against national assurance treatment, authoritarianism and national assurance * 
authoritarianism interaction term (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Original 4-
item 
outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Materialist 
National assurance -.090385 .7671511 
-
0.12 
0.906 -1.593973 1.413204 
Authoritarianism -.7941062 1.796322 
-
0.44 
0.658 -4.314834 2.726621 
National assurance 
* authoritarianism 
1.669372 2.863687 
0
0.58 
0.560 -3.943351 7.282094 
Constant -.4287849 .5402127 
-
0.79 
0.427 -1.487582 .6300126 
Postmaterialist 
National assurance .6158421 1.280493 
0
0.48 
0.631 -1.893878 3.125562 
Authoritarianism -.2725504 3.368208 
-
0.08 
0.936 -6.874116 6.329015 
National assurance 
* authoritarianism 
3.253077 4.312461 
0
0.75 
0.451 -5.199192 11.70535 
Constant -2.164241 1.040682 
-
2.08 
0.038 -4.20394 -.1245423 
Baseline: original 4-item = mixed 
Log likelihood = -81.652291 
Number of observations = 88 
LR chi2(6) = 5.01 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5419 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0298 
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Table 5.13c – Results of multinomial logistic regression equation with “country aims” 4-item battery 
regressed against national assurance treatment, national attachment and national assurance * national 
attachment interaction term (CUSVS Phase Two) 
Original 4-
item 
outcome 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Materialist 
National assurance 1.396738 2.549315 0.55 0.584 -3.599826 6.393303 
National 
attachment 
1.003166 2.494568 0.40 0.688 -3.886097 5.89243 
National assurance 
* national 
attachment 
-1.71947 3.388257 0.51 0.612 -8.360331 4.921392 
Constant -1.353715 1.848223 0.73 0.464 -4.976165 2.268735 
Postmaterialist 
National assurance 4.989927 4.034198 0.24 0.216 -2.916957 12.89681 
National 
attachment 
1.532763 4.693538 0.33 0.744 -7.666403 10.73193 
National assurance 
* national 
attachment 
-5.283142 5.420827 0.97 0.330 -15.90777 5.341484 
Constant -3.35505 3.534771 0.95 0.343 -10.28307 3.572974 
Baseline: original 4-item = mixed 
Log likelihood = -83.379161 
Number of observations = 91 
LR chi2(6) = 5.12 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5291 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0298 
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